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Résumé
Si l’on essaye de concentrer notre attention sur un objet physique ou mental donné,
on s’aperçoit vite qu’elle ne peut pas rester indéfiniment fixée sur l’objet en question
mais se ré-oriente rapidement vers d’autres pensées ou sensations, un phénomène
appelé dérive attentionnelle. Fait intéressant, les anciennes traditions de pratiques
de méditation ont développé une grande variété de méthodes visant à développer
la prise de conscience des épisodes de dérive attentionnelle et à entraîner l’esprit à
rester concentré. Il est important de souligner que la connaissance du contenu de
l’attention est une information qui est personnelle au sujet et qui ne peut être évaluée
qu’à l’aide de méthode prennant en compte la perspective à la première personne. Au
cours de ma thèse, j’ai étudié à la fois la dérive attentionnelle et les états de médita-
tion dans un effort pour mieux comprendre ce qui se passe dans le cerveau quand
quelqu’un médite. Quelle que soit la tradition de méditation, les dérives attention-
nelles sont omniprésentes pendant la méditation. Ce sujet constitue donc un point
de départ idéal pour l’étude de la méditation. Ce phénomène de dérive attentionnelle
n’est pas unique à la méditation mais est présent dès qu’une personne se concentre sur
une tâche à l’exclusion de toute autre. En utilisant un protocole nouveau, nous mon-
trons que les épisodes de dérive attentionnelle sont accompagnés par une amplitude
accrue des basses fréquences EEG 1-3Hz delta et 4-7Hz theta ainsi qu’une réduction
du traitement sensoriel pré-attentif, comme le montre l’analyse de potentiels évoqués.
Ces résultats indiquent que la dérive attentionnelle est associée à un niveau réduit
de vigilance, similaire aux premiers stades de la somnolence. Ceci est cohérent avec
certains textes bouddhistes sur la méditation, qui représentent la dérive attentionelle
comme un état de sommeil par rapport aux périodes où l’esprit est concentré. Puis,
nous avons réalisé une étude comparative de l’activité EEG au cours de la méditation
pour tenter de déterminer l’origine des résultats divergents de la littérature. Nous
avons enregistré l’activité spontanée EEG de 3 groupes de méditants de 3 différentes
traditions de méditation et d’un groupe de non-méditants en utilisant le même proto-
cole. Nous avons montré que tous les groupes de méditants avaient une amplitude de
fréquence gamma 60-110Hz plus élevée par rapport aux contrôles pendant la médi-
tation, indiquant peut-être des processus attentionnels différents chez les méditants.
Aucune différence n’a été trouvée entre l’état mental contrôle et l’état méditatif chez
les méditants, ce qui suggère que les modifications dues à la pratique longue de la
méditation sont plus robustes que les effets de l’état mental de méditation par rapport
à un état contrôle. Dans l’ensemble, notre étude souligne la nécessité de mieux définir
ce que pourrait être le meilleur état de contrôle mental pour la méditation. Au cours
de ce travail j’ai également exploré les méthodologies pour recueillir des informations
subjectives pertinentes. Notre travail apporte de nouvelles perspectives pour l’étude
la conscience humaine, mais la route reste longue avant que nous ne comprenions
parfaitement les mécanismes sous-jacents de notre vie intérieure.
Mots-clés: dérive attentionnelle, méditation, attention, électroencéphalographie
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Abstract
Trying to focus our attention on any given physical or mental object, we soon re-
alize it cannot be kept indefinitely focused and soon drifts towards other thoughts or
sensations, a phenomenon called mind wandering. Interestingly, ancient traditions of
meditation practices have developed a large variety of methods aiming at developing
the awareness of mind wandering episodes and training the mind to remain focused.
It is important to point out that the knowledge of the focus of attention is a type of
information that is private to the subject and that can only be assessed using methods
that take into account first-person perspectives. During my thesis, I studied both the
mind wandering and the meditation mental states in an effort to better understand
what is happening in the brain when someone meditates. First, regardless of the med-
itation tradition, mind wandering is ever present during meditation and it seemed
like an ideal starting point for studying meditation. It is also a phenomenon that is
not unique to meditation and is present whenever a person attempts to focus. Using a
novel EEG protocol, we show that mind wandering episodes are accompanied by in-
creased amplitude at low frequencies in the delta (1-3Hz) and theta (4-7Hz) frequency
bands as well as a reduction of pre-attentive sensory processing as shown by the anal-
ysis event-related potentials. These results indicate that mind wandering is associated
with a lower vigilance level, resembling early stages of drowsiness. These results are
consistent with some Buddhist texts on meditation, in which mind wandering is con-
sidered to be a state of relative sleep where the mind is not aware. Then, we realized
a comparative study of EEG activity during meditation to attempt to sort out the ori-
gin of the divergent results found in the literature. We recorded the spontaneous EEG
activity of 3 groups of meditators from 3 different meditation traditions in addition to
a non-meditator group using the same protocol and equipment. We showed that all
groups of meditators had higher 60-110Hz gamma amplitude when compared to the
controls during meditation, possibly indicating different attentional processes in med-
itators. No differences were found between the mental control state and the meditative
state in meditators, suggesting that we were observing trait rather than state effects of
meditation. Overall, our study emphasizes the need to better define what could be the
best control mental state for meditation. During this work, I also explored the method-
ologies allowing the collection of accurate subjective data. Our work brings new data
in the field of consciousness, mind wandering and meditation study, but the road will
be long before we fully understand the mechanisms underlying our inner life.
Keywords: mind wandering, meditation, attention, electroencephalography
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Résumé substantiel en français
Cette thèse traite de deux états mentaux, la dérive de l’attention et la médita-
tion, étudiés grâce à la technique d’électroencéphalographie (EEG). Les dérives de
l’attention, ou dérives attentionnelles (DA) correspondent à ces moments où, alors
que nous sommes concentrés sur une tâche, notre conscience nous échappe et nous
commençons à suivre le cours de pensées qui ne sont pas en lien avec la tâche en
cours. Par exemple, il vous est certainement déjà arrivé, alors que vous étiez en train
de lire, de vous rendre compte que vos yeux sont arrivés en bas de la page, alors même
que vous étiez en train de songer à votre prochaine soirée et que vous n’avez aucune
idée du contenu des lignes parcourues. Ces “échappements de conscience” sont très
fréquents et occuperaient même près de 50% de notre vie mentale.
Fait intéressant, les anciennes traditions de pratiques de méditation ont développé
une grande variété de méthodes visant à développer la prise de conscience des épisodes
de dérive attentionnelle et à entraîner l’esprit à rester concentré. Il est important de
souligner que la connaissance du contenu de l’attention est une information qui est
personnelle au sujet et qui ne peut être évaluée qu’à l’aide de méthode prennant en
compte la perspective à la première personne. Au cours de ma thèse, j’ai étudié à
la fois la dérive attentionnelle et les états de méditation dans un effort pour mieux
comprendre ce qui se passe dans le cerveau quand quelqu’un médite. Quelle que
soit la tradition de méditation, les dérives attentionnelles sont omniprésentes pendant
la méditation. Ce sujet constitue donc un point de départ idéal pour l’étude de la
méditation. Comme évoqué précédemment, le phénomène de dérive attentionnelle
n’est pas unique à la méditation mais est présent dès qu’une personne se concentre
sur une tâche à l’exclusion de toute autre. L’entraînement à la méditation requiert la
reconnaissance des dérives attentionnelles et la redirection de l’attention sur la tâche
méditative après une DA. Les différentes traditions de méditations (il en existe des
centaines) ont développé une grande variété de méthodes pour développer la prise de
conscience des dérives attentionnelles et rester concentré. De fait, l’esprit sujet aux DA
est considéré dans les textes bouddhiques comme étant “endormi” alors que l’esprit
dépourvu de DA serait “clair, lucide”. Par ailleurs, de nombreuses études récentes
suggèrent un lien entre la pratique de la méditation et le bien-être physique et men-
tal ainsi que des modifications des processus attentionnels et émotionnels. Certaines
formes de méditation ont même été adaptées pour intégrer des pratiques thérapeu-
tiques dans le traitement du stress et des angoisses par exemple. Que peut donc être
les différences entre l’activité du cerveau d’une personne normalement sujette aux
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dérives attentionnelles et celui de celle qui s’est entraînée à la méditation ? C’est à
cette question que cette thèse tente d’apporter des éléments de réponse, sous l’angle
des indications données par l’activité neuronale enregistrée grâce à l’EEG. Parmi les
techniques d’imagerie cérébrale, l’EEG présente l’avantage de permettre l’observation
directe de la dynamique cérébrale. L’EEG permet en effet d’enregistrer à la surface
du scalp le champ électrique produit par la somme des activités synchronisées, ex-
citatrices ou inhibitrices, de grandes populations de neurones corticaux, donnant un
aperçu des activités neuronales globales du cortex . L’EEG possède une excellente ré-
solution temporelle, de l’ordre de la milliseconde. Ceci donne la possibilité d’analyser
l’activité oscillatoire cérébrale, et fait de l’EEG une technique de choix pour l’étude de
phénomènes cérébraux dynamiques.
Il est bon tout d’abord de rappeler que l’étude scientifique des états mentaux s’est
depuis toujours heurtée aux difficultés posées par les données concernant l’expérience
subjective, dont le recueil ne peut se faire que via un processus d’introspection du su-
jet. Ces données introspectives dont l’intégration dans des études scientifiques date
du début du siècle dernier ont régulièrement été montrées du doigt comme n’étant
pas fiables, le sujet pouvant ne pas être lui-même conscient des opérations se tenant
dans son esprit. Fort heureusement, et notamment depuis les années 1990, les progrès
faits dans le développement des techniques d’enregistrement et d’analyse des activités
cérébrales permettent aujourd’hui de corréler les données introspectives avec des don-
nées physiologiques, apportant la touche d’objectivité initialement absente des études
sur la conscience et relançant du même fait l’intérêt des neurosciences pour ce thème.
Nous avons tout d’abord réalisé une première étude visant à caractériser la dy-
namique des activités cérébrales lors des dérives attentionnelles. Les études en élec-
troencéphalographie portant directement sur la dérive attentionnelle sont rares et utilisent
principalement l’analyse des potentiels évoqués (PE). Toutefois l’étude des PEs ne per-
met pas une analyse complète des données contenues dans les EEG enregistrés. En
effet, la dynamique oscillatoire de l’EEG est perdue lors du moyennage nécessaire au
calcul des PEs. Les études existantes ne caractérisent donc que d’une façon limitée la
dynamique de l’activité neuronale lors de la dérive attentionnelle.
Les dérives attentionnelles ainsi que nous l’avons déjà évoqué avec l’exemple de la
lecture, peuvent se produire en l’absence initiale de prise de conscience du sujet qu’il
n’est plus concentré sur sa tâche et est entré en état de dérive attentionnelle. Cette
caractéristique met en évidence l’existence de processus de re-représentation des con-
tenus de la conscience, temporellement dissociés de l’arrivée d’un contenu mental en
conscience. et nous permettant l’accès aux contenus conscients en cours. Cet état de
fait pose un problème lors de l’étude expérimentale des dérives attentionnelles: com-
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ment étudier un phénomène purement psychique qui peut se produire en l’absence de
conscience explicite de la part du sujet ?
Une approche populaire, l’ “échantillonage de l’experience” (experience sampling)
consiste à interrompre régulièrement le sujet au cours de sa tâche pour lui deman-
der d’indiquer où se trouvait son attention juste avant l’interruption: était il concentré
sur l’exécution de la tâche ou bien était il perdu dans ses pensées, en état de DA ?
Cependant, nous souhaitions pouvoir enregistrer l’activité cérébrale lors du rapport
spontané de l’occurrence d’une DA par le sujet. En effet, c’est ce qu’il se passe lors de
la méditation, le sujet doit se rendre compte par lui-même de la présence d’une dérive
attentionnelle. Pour ce faire, nous avons mis au point un protocole nouveau, nous
permettant de recueillir des indications sur l’occurrence d’une dérive attentionnelle
basées sur le seul jugement introspectif du sujet: le sujet devait compter ses respira-
tions en boucle, de 1 à 10, et presser un bouton chaque fois qu’il s’apercevait qu’il
avait cessé de compter ou qu’il s’était perdu dans le compte de ses respirations. En
parallèle de cette tâche, le sujet écoutait passivement un protocole de stimulus auditifs
déviants, c’est à dire une succession de sons de basse fréquence tous identiques, inter-
rompue aléatoirement et peu fréquemment par la présentation d’un son plus aigu. Un
changement inattendu dans le cours d’une stimulation auditive, tel que dans le pro-
tocole de stimulus déviant, provoque une activité cérébrale spécifique en réponse à la
détection de ce changement et nous souhaitons étudier comment ce marqueur évolue
en fonction de l’état attentionnel du sujet.
En utilisant les indications du sujet (pression du bouton) pour définir les condi-
tions expérimentales de dérive attentionnelle et de concentration sur la respiration,
nous montrons que les épisodes de dérive attentionnelle sont accompagnés par une
amplitude accrue des basses fréquences EEG 1-3Hz delta et 4-7Hz theta. Cette obser-
vation est tout à fait compatible avec des études montrant la présence de fluctuations
des activités cérébrales lorsque le sujet n’est pas activement impliqué dans le traite-
ment d’une tâche nécessitant une attention soutenue vers l’environnement externe.
Ceci est aussi en adéquation avec les études associant l’apparition du rythme théta
avec des états de vigilance réduite tels que l’endormissement alors que les sujets es-
saient de rester vigilants. Par ailleurs, l’augmentation de la puissance théta lors de la
dérive attentionnelle peut aussi être rapprochée de résultats montrant une corrélation
positive entre l’activité théta et l’augmentation de la charge mnésique en mémoire
de travail. En effet nous supposons que les pensées spontanément générées lors de
la dérive attentionnelle se rapportent à la projection du sujet dans des situations fu-
tures ou passées, deux types d’opérations mentales sous-tendus par des processus
mnésiques. Par ailleurs, l’activité des ondes théta est anormalement élevée chez des
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personnes souffrant de déficits attentionnels éprouvant des difficultés à rester con-
centrées ce qui est en accord avec notre résultat associant théta à l’état de dérive de
l’attention. La diminution du rythme théta lorsque les sujets sont en état de concentra-
tion que nous observons entre en contradiction avec de nombreuses études associant
la concentration sur un tache donnée à une augmentation du rythme théta. Cependant
cette diminution a aussi été observée au cours d’une étude employant un protocole ex-
périmental de méditation similaire au nôtre . Il est donc possible que la diminution du
rythme theta varie en fonction de la direction de l’attention du sujet (internalisée ou
vers une tâche exérieure) et des études supplémentaires seront nécessaires pour tester
cette hypothèse.
L’étude des potentiels évoqués montre une différence de négativité relevée au niveau
des électrodes frontales entre les PEs aux stimuli déviants et les PEs aux stimuli stan-
dards entre 90 et 120ms. Cette observation est compatible avec la négativité de dis-
cordance ou “mismatch negativity” (MMN) décrite dans la littérature comme une
réponse cérébrale négative à la détection sensorielle d’un changement soudain dans le
flux de perception auditive et ayant lieu dans une fenêtre temporelle d’approximativement
100- 150ms. Bien que cet effet soit controversé, l’amplitude de la MMN peut être mod-
ulée selon la direction de l’attention des sujets . Elle est notamment plus ample lorsque
l’attention des sujets est engagée dans le traitement des stimuli . Nos résultats mon-
trent que l’amplitude de la MMN entre stimuli déviants et standards est moins forte
lors de la dérive attentionnelle que lors de la concentration, ce qui suggère, à l’image
des résultats de Smallwood 2008 mentionnés en introduction, un désengagement des
processus de traitement des stimuli associé à l’état de dérive attentionnelle. Il faut
noter que, bien que la MMN soit généralement suivie du composant P3a, pic positif
aux alentours de 300ms, indice de l’orientation automatique de l’attention envers un
stimulus nouveau, nous n’observons ni P3a ni P300 analysable dans notre étude. Il est
probable que dans notre étude, les stimuli déviants présentés de façon passive n’ont
pas eu un effet de nouveauté suffisant pour induire une P3a. L’analyse des PEs indique
également que l’amplitude de la composante positive à 200 ms (P2) est plus forte lors
de la dérive attentionnelle qu’en état de concentration et est dans les deux conditions
plus faible pour les stimuli déviants. Certaines études ont associées la diminution
d’amplitude de P2 à l’augmentation du degré d’attention des sujets envers les stimuli.
Ceci semble compatible avec l’idée selon laquelle lors de l’état de dérive attentionnelle
l’engagement attentionnel des sujets vers les stimuli diminue. Toutefois, le composant
P2 des potentiels évoqués auditifs n’a été que très peu étudié aussi est-il difficile de lui
associer un rôle fonctionnel.
Ces résultats indiquent que la dérive attentionnelle est associée à un niveau réduit
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de vigilance, similaire aux premiers stades de la somnolence. Ceci est cohérent avec
certains textes bouddhistes sur la méditation, qui représentent la dérive attentionelle
comme un état de sommeil par rapport aux périodes où l’esprit est concentré. Notre
étude est également à notre connaissance la première en neurosciences cognitives à
utiliser des conditions expérimentales purement établies sur la base de l’expérience
introspective des sujets.
Dans un second temps, je me suis intéressée plus spécifiquement à l’état de médi-
tation. Il faut tout d’abord savoir qu’il existe de très nombreuses formes de médi-
tation, dans des cultures différentes à travers le monde. La pratique de la médita-
tion est souvent considéré par les neuroscientifiques comme étant un entrainement
de l’attention. Selon les formes de méditation, l’attention est utilisé de facon plus ou
moins focalisée, tout au moins lors des premières étapes d’apprentissage de la médi-
tation. Tout d’abord j’ai réalisée une revue des travaux existants retraçant l’impact de
l’entrainement à la méditation sur le système nerveux autonome, le cerveau, les fonc-
tions cognitives et la régulation des émotions. Cette revue met en évidence des aspects
positifs de la pratique de la méditation sur la santé physique et mentale lorsqu’elle
est utilisée par des personnes souffrantes (stress chronique, dépression etc..) et sug-
gère également un effet protecteur de la pratique de la méditation chez les personnes
saines. Par exemple, des études suggère que la méditation protégerait de la perte neu-
ronale et des modifications du sommeil liées au vieillissement normal.
Toutefois, concernant les modifications de l’activité EEG produites par la médita-
tion, je n’ai pu dégager aucun consensus clair de la littérature. Outre l’intérêt pour
la recherche fondamentale, la connaissance précise des activités EEG induites par la
méditation pourrait s’avérer très utile pour la mise en place par exemple de thérapies
basées sur la technique de contrôle de ses ondes cérébrales (neurofeedback).
Il est difficile de savoir si les différents résultats présents dans la littératures sont
dus à des différences entre les protocoles expérimentaux utilisé ou à des différences en-
tre les pratiques méditatives étudiées. Nous avons donc décidé de réaliser une étude
comparative des activités EEG au cours de la méditation, en nous servant d’un seul et
même protocole et équipement pour étudier 3 groupes de sujets issus de traditions de
pratiques méditatives différentes ainsi que un groupe de sujet contrôles, ne pratiquant
aucune forme de méditation. Les sujets méditants ont été recrutés sur la base de la
durée de leur expérience avec la pratique de la méditation: nous n’avons recruté dans
la plupart des cas que des personnes attestant d’une pratique quotidienne depuis un
minimum de 5 ans dans une seule et même tradition. Les 3 traditions de méditation
étudiées ont été choisie pour maximaliser les différences d’utilisation de l’attention
entre chaque groupe. La tradition Himalayenne requiert la concentration sur la répéti-
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tion de syllabes en sanskrit (mantra), la tradition Vipassana requiert la concentration
sur la sensation de respiration puis sur les sensations du corps. Enfin la tradition Isha
ne demande aucun contrôle particulier de l’attention. Les enregistrements nécessaires
à cette étude ont eu lieu au centre de Recherche sur la Méditation de l’ashram SRSG à
Rishikesh, en Inde.
Notre protocole impliquait 2 enregistrements successifs, ou blocs, de 40 minutes
chacun, l’un réalisé dans et après l’élicitation d’un état de méditation et l’autre réalisé
dans un état mental dit de contrôle consistant en une tâche de rappel de souvenirs
autobiographiques. Dans chacun des blocs, les sujets réalisait une succession de tâches
psychophysiques après une période de 20 minutes d’enregistrement sans stimulation
aucune.
Les résultats que nous rapportons dans ce manuscrit portent sur cette période
d’enregistrement de l’activité EEG induite par l’état de méditation et l état contrôle,
sans aucune sorte de tâche psychophysique. Chaque groupe est composé de 16 sujets,
et les groupes sont homogènes en âge. Nous montrons que tous les groupes de médi-
tants avaient une amplitude de fréquence gamma 60-110Hz plus élevée par rapport
aux contrôles pendant la méditation, indiquant peut-être des processus attentionnels
différents chez les méditants. Aucune différence n’a été trouvée entre l’état mental
contrôle et l’état méditatif chez les méditants, ce qui suggère que les modifications
dues à la pratique longue de la méditation sont plus robustes que les effets de l’état
mental de méditation par rapport à un état contrôle. Par ailleurs, le groupe de médi-
tants Vipassana montre une amplitude des ondes de fréquence gamma 8-10Hz plus
élevée que celle des autres groupes de méditants et du groupe contrôle, ce qui suppose
là aussi des différences de processus attentionnels dans la pratique de la méditation
Vipassana. Toutefois, une étude longitudinale sur des sujets avant et après le début
de la pratique de Vipassana serait nécessaire pour déterminer si cette plus grande am-
plitude des fréquence 7-10Hz est acquise grâce à la pratique de la méditation où si
les individus de la population générale ayant de fait une activité EEG de 7-10Hz plus
élevée sont attirés par la pratique de Vipassana. Nos résultats présentés ici seront
sans nul doute affinés dans le futur par l’analyse des tâches psychophysiques. Dans
l’ensemble, notre étude souligne la nécessité de mieux définir ce que pourrait être le
meilleur état de contrôle mental pour la méditation et l’intérê de réaliser des études
associant différents types de méditation et un groupe contrôle.
Au cours de ce travail j’ai également exploré les méthodologies pour recueillir des
informations subjectives pertinentes, notamment en utilisant l’entretien d’explicitation.
Bien que préliminaire, les données recueillies par cette approche permettent d’entrevoir
les possibilités de raffinement dans la description des états mentaux, par exemple
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en ce qui concerne les dérives attentionnelles. Nous prévoyons dans le futur que
l’analyse des données physiologiques telles que le signal EEG pourront être affinées
par l’utilisation de données subjectives acquises selon une méthodologie rigoureuse.
A la fin de ce manuscrit, je propose une synthèse de mes différents résultats, soulig-
nant les différences entre les activités EEG de l’état de dérive attentionnelle, carac-
térisées par des oscillation de basses fréquences (1-3Hz et 4-7Hz) et celles de l’ état de
méditation, qui semble produire des oscillations de fréquence très rapide (60-110Hz).
Les études EEG de la dérive attentionnelle devraient pouvoir être affinées grâce à
l’utilisation de données subjectives produites par le sujet. Des pistes pour mieux
comprendre son rôle fonctionnel sont évoquées, comme l’hypothèse d’une activité
cérébrale en lien avec la consolidation mnésique qui se produirait en continu en état
d’éveil et dont les dérives attentionnelles pourraient être l’expression phénoménologique.
Concernant les études neuroscientifiques de la méditation, je souligne le besoin de
mieux définir ce que devrait être l’état ou la population de sujets servant à contraster
les activités cérébrales induites par la méditation. Nous n’avons pu dans les travaux
présenté mettre en évidence une différence d’activité EEG chez les méditants entre
l’état de méditation et notre état contrôle. Dans l état actuel de nos connaissance nous
ne pouvons pas déterminer si cela provient d’une modification sur le long terme de
l’activité cérébrale des méditants, qui modifierait leur activité EEG même en dehors
d’une période de méditation proprement dite ou si cette observation est due à une
trop grande ressemblance entre les processus de surveillance du focus attentionnel en
oeuvre lors de la méditation qui se retrouveraient également lors de la tâche de remé-
moration des souvenirs. Enfin, l’état de dérive attentionnelle et celui de méditation
sont intégrés dans le modèle des états de conscience de J.Allan Hobson, au côté des
états de veille, de sommeil et de rêve. Cette première tentative de modélisation des
états de dérives attentionnelle et de méditation au côté d’états de consciences plus
classiquement étudiés appelle à la prise en compte de l’ensemble des caractéristiques
de l’expérience consciente des êtres humains.
Dans l’ensemble, mon travail apporte de nouvelles perspectives pour l’étude la
conscience humaine, mais la route reste longue avant que nous ne comprenions par-
faitement les mécanismes sous-jacents de notre vie intérieure. Mon espoir est que les
neurosciences cognitives aideront à une meilleure compréhension de l’esprit humain
qui donnerait à chacun la possibilité de vivre et d’agir en adéquation avec sa nature.
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This chapter aims at providing a theoretical background regarding the study of
mental states in cognitive neuroscience as well as basis concerning the study of atten-
tion and consciousness. I will also introduce what will be the major focus of this thesis:
the study of meditation and mind wandering.
3
Subjective data and cognitive sciences, a brief history
1.1 Subjective data and cognitive sciences, a brief his-
tory
1.1.1 The introspective approach at the beginning of the 20th century
Philosophers have long tried to describe our patterns of conscious experience. In the
17th century, Descartes established his view of dualism, stating that the seat of the soul
was the pineal gland, influencing the body through a fluid delivered by the ventricles
(Descartes and Rodis-Lewis, 1649/1988). Locke (1975) started classifying our expe-
rienced "ideas" into different categories depending on whether they emerged from
sensation or from thoughts. Simmilarly, Hume et al. (1739/2007) distinguishes mental
images from perceptual experiences in terms of their “strength” or “liveliness”.
One of the first scientific exploration of conscious experience came with introspec-
tive psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
“ Introspective observation is what we have to rely on first and foremost
and always. [...] Thoughts are the subjective data of which [the psychol-
ogist] treats, and their relations to their objects, to the brain, and to the
rest of the world constitute the subject-matter of psychological science. Its
methods are introspection, experimentation and comparison.”
, stated William James in his masterwork, The Principles of Psychology (James, 1890,
chap.7,pg 197)
The early twentieth century was the time when the basis of psychophysics were
being developed and introspection emerged as common methodology used in the
first experimental psychology laboratories. Psychologist such as Wilhelm Wundt and
Edward Titchener tried to understand how introspective experiences covaried with
changes in external stimulation by presenting them carefully calibrated stimuli and
training their subjects to take careful notes of their past or immediately occurring ex-
periences (Danziger, 1980). Three main centers of experimental introspection were
active: in France with Alfred Binet, in the United States with Titchener, a former stu-
dent of Wundt, and in Germany with a group of psychologist lead by Külpe and Marbe
known as the Würzburg school. During the decade between 1903 and 1913 experimen-
tal introspection flourished (Danziger, 1980). Nevertheless, at that time, researchers
from the different groups could not agree on basic premises, leading to the persistent
idea that results based on introspection were weak and not replicable. However, more
contemporary reads of studies of that time reveal that, in fact, introspective psychol-
ogists of the beginning of last century were disagreeing not on the actual existence of
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subjects reports of such and such phenomenon but instead on their interpretations!
(see Depraz et al., 2011, chapter 4, pg 203-204) A famous example is the disagreement
between Titchener and the school of Würzburg on whether “imageless thoughts” exist
or not: despite 20 years and thousands of hours spent in introspection in both labo-
ratories to try solving the issue, neither side could settle the controversy (Hurlburt
and Heavey, 2001). Closer to us, Monson and Hurlburt (1993) reviewed results from
both the Würzburg and the Titchener’ s schools and revealed that in both laboratories
subjects gave highly similar description of “vague and elusive processes” carrying the
entire meaning of a situation such as “a realization that the division can be carried
out without a remainder” (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001, Titchener quoted by). These
“vague and elusive processes” were imageless thoughts for the Würzburg school but
not for Titchener. The popular skepticism towards the use of introspective data that
emerged at that time and can still be found today is mainly based on such theoretical
division rather than on the question of replicability or reliability of the subject reports.
In addition major criticisms against the use of introspection, some stemming from
the prominent french philosopher Maine de Biran (1766-1824), argued that the subject
could not both experience an event and report it at the same time. The observation
of experience itself necessarily influence what is being observed. This came at a time
where psychology transitioned to behavioural psychology.
1.1.2 Behaviourism
In 1913, John B. Watson (1878-1958) published a now classic text exposing his view of
what psychology should be:
“The time seems to have come when psychology must discard all refer-
ences to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into thinking
that it is making mental states the object of observation [...] If psychology
would follow the plan I suggest, the educator, the physician, the jurist and
the businessman could utilize our data in a practical way, as soon as we are
able, experimentally to obtain them ”, (Watson, 1913)
Another quote taken from yet another psychology textbook contemporary of Wat-
son reinforce the underlying proposed view of psychology as providing possible ap-
plication in the industrial and technical domain:
“The practical end is to determine upon what human capacity depends
and, in the light of this knowledge, to discover means of increasing man’s
efficiency”, Pillsbury (1911), quoted in Danziger (1980)
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It is easy to understand that in light of such materialistic goals, introspection lost
momentum, and remained unpopular until the late 20th century. Yet, although be-
haviourism sets psychology as the science of behaviour and not the science of the
mind, it is noteworthy that the "radical behaviourist", as he called himself, B.F Skinner
(1904-1990) did not consider private events to be non existent or unimportant and even
acknowledged that both private and public events have the same essential nature:
“ The statement that behaviourists deny the existence of feelings, sensa-
tions, ideas, and other features of mental life needs some clarification. Method-
ological [non-Skinnerian] behaviourism and some versions of logical posi-
tivism ruled private events out of bounds because there could be no public
agreement about their validity. Introspection could not be accepted as a
scientific practice, and the psychology of people like Wilhelm Wundt and
Edward B. Titchener was attacked accordingly. Radical [Skinnerian] be-
haviourism, however, takes a different line. It does not deny the possibility
of self-observation or self- knowledge or its possible usefulness. ” (Skinner,
quoted by Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001)
The rise of behaviourism and the fact that early leaders of the main introspection
schools died without leaving successors pushed introspection into the background
of psychological research.
In parallel with the development of experimental introspection, the philosopher
Edmund Husserl, influenced by William James work, elaborated a new psychologi-
cal theory: phenomenology. Phenomenology is the study of the structures of various
types of experience, such as perception, body awareness, imagination, standing from
the first-person - i.e, from the subjective point of view (Smith, 2012). At the basis
of phenomenology Husserl placed what he called "intentionality", which states that
experiences are directed towards objects in the world – in other words that a funda-
mental property of consciousness is that it is a consciousness of, or about, something.
Thus our experience represents objects only through particular concepts, images or
thoughts, etc. and these make up the meaning or content of a given experience. How-
ever these concepts, images or thoughts are distinct from the objects they represent
(Smith, 2012). Phenomenology considers that conscious experiences have a unique
feature, that is we do not observe or engage in conscious experiences but rather we
live through them, we experience them. Thus the phenomenological approach to the
study of a type of experience assumes that by living we acquire a certain familiarity
with that experience. It is the structure of a type of experience that phenomenology
wants to determine rather than the structure of a particular instance of that type of ex-
perience. During the 20th century, phenomenology took a central place in European
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philosophy, for example through the work of philosophers Martin Heidegger (1889-
1976) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980), as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961).
We will see that, recently, there has been a regain of interest for phenomenology in
Cognitive Sciences (1.2). But let’s review first briefly the early beginnings of cognitive
sciences.
1.1.3 Cybernetics and cognitive sciences
Between 1946 and 1953, the Macy Conferences, which were interdisciplinary gather-
ings of leading scientist, aimed at setting the foundations for “a general science of
the working of the human mind” 1. They developed contemporary cybernetics, the
study of the structure of regulatory systems which subsequently gave birth to cogni-
tive science (Dupuy, 1994). The brain was regarded as an information-processing unit,
cognition as a representation of the perceived world, and both had to be modeled to be
understood. Although wider in scope originally, cognitive science eventually adopted
a reductionist view stating that understanding of neuronal mechanisms in the brain
will bring understanding of higher order cognitive phenomena. In such it departs
from behaviourism which did not consider the mechanisms of the brain as a valuable
domain of investigation to understand human behaviours.
In the 1970s, Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela devel-
oped an alternative, non-representationist viewpoint contrasting with the classical po-
sitions in cognitive sciences and biology in general: they called it the autopoietic (or
self-production) theory. According to autopoiesis, the necessary and sufficient condi-
tion to characterize a living being is the concept of functional relationship between its
elements: any living being is a system continuously creating and transforming itself
in a somewhat circular process (see figure 1.1.3) (Maturana and Varela, 1987).
An interesting implication of the autopoietic theory is that it is becoming impossi-
ble to distinguish what comes from the environment from what comes from the sys-
tem itself, there is a structural coupling between the two. Applied to the notion of self,
autopoiesis also implies that it is in perpetual transformation and grounded in imper-
manence, a way of thinking of the self that is not far from the Buddhist philosophy.
1.1.4 Consciousness studies and neurophenomenology
Until the end of the 20th century, the study of inner experience continued in psy-
chology, although mostly based on the subject’s verbalization - a practice that pushes
forward language-based representation .
1http://www.asc-cybernetics.org/foundations/history/MacySummary.htm
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Figure 1.1: Example of an autopoietic system: the eucharyote cell. The autopoietic
organization is defined as a unit by a network of production of components (chemi-
cal reactions) which (i) participate recursively in the same network of production of
components (chemical reactions) that produced them, and (ii) carry out the network
of production as a unit in the space in which the components exist (figure and legend
from Rudrauf et al. (2003)).
Researchers were also looking at bypassing the problems posed by the used of sub-
jective judgments. For example, Cooper and Shepard (1973) and Kosslyn and Pomer-
antz (1977) used chronometry to study the properties of mental images,
In the 1960s, scientific interest turned also towards studying positive, “extra-ordinary”,
mental states (Maslow et al., 1968). With the development of humanistic psychology,
came a growing interest for Eastern traditions of meditation. Using electroencephalo-
graphic (EEG) recordings, a group of parisian researchers were amongst the first to
publish reports of the brain activity during meditation (Henrotte et al., 1972; Banquet,
1973; Etévenon et al., 1973), along with a Japanese (Kasamatsu and Hirai, 1966) and
American groups (Wallace, 1970).
EEG, a technique first introduced by the German physician Hans Berger in 1929, al-
lows recording at the surface of the scalp the ionic current created by the synchronous
activity of millions of cortical neurons. Oscillatory components may be seen on the
electroencephalogram. They are elicited by cerebral networks including cortical, tha-
lamic and brainstem structures. These oscillations are by convention characterized
by their frequency and labeled with Greek letters. Thus the first rhythm observed by
Berger, induced by eye closure in awake and calm subjects, was a large-amplitude sig-
nal oscillating at about 10Hz and that he called “alpha” rhythm – alpha being the first
letter of the Greek alphabet, this is the one he chose. The faster rhythm present when
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Figure 1.2: One of the first recording of meditation-induced changes in the EEG. A.
EEG activity of a priest with open eyse before Zen meditation. B. EEG activity of the
priest after 8 minutes and 20 secondes of Zen meditation, without regards of opened
eyes: appearance of well-synchronized alpha waves. Figure adapted from Kasamatsu
and Hirai (1966).
subjects had the eyes open was called “beta” rhythm. Ever since the initial report of
EEG, researchers and clinicians have tried associating a specific rhythm with a spe-
cific cognitive state. For example figure 1.1.4 shows one of the earliest report of the
appearance of alpha waves during meditation.
At about the same time, the american psychologist Charles Tart coined the term “al-
tered state of consciousness” to define the “qualitative alteration of the general mental
functioning leading one to feel his own consciousness as functioning radically differ-
ently than ordinarily” (Tart, 1972). American psychologists Jerome Singer and Ken-
neth Pope published The Stream of Consciousness: scientific investigation into the flow of
human experience in 1978, a state of the art of studies on daydreaming, mental imagery,
creativity and theories of consciousness (Pope and Singer, 1978).
However critics of the investigations of inner experience were still present. A par-
ticular influential one came from the research from Nisbett and Wilson (1977) who
established that the subject often lacks awareness of the cause of their behaviours and
set a conclusion about introspective reports in general:
the accuracy of subjective reports is so poor as to suggest that any intro-
spective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct
or reliable reports (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001)
Nonetheless, as noted by Hurlburt and Heavey (2001) Nisbett and Wilson (1977)
still recognized that accurate reports of inner experience are possible:
“ We also wish to acknowledge that the studies do not suffice to show that
people could never be accurate about the processes involved. To do so
would require ecologically meaningless but theoretically interesting proce-
dures such as interrupting a process at the very moment it was occurring,
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alerting subjects to pay careful attention to their cognitive processes, coach-
ing them in introspective procedures, and so on.”
Starting in the 1980s, a slowly expanding community of neuroscientists and psy-
chologists started to identify themselves as studying "consciousness". This gave rise to
a stream of published experimental work and journals such as Consciousness and Cog-
nition are created (Baars and Banks, 1992). Until that time, the word “consciousness”
or even “awareness” had remained taboo.
In 1987, American businessman Adam Engel and renowned French/Chilean sci-
entist Francisco Varela organized the very first meeting between the Dalaï-Lama and
cognitive science researchers. This original meeting subsequently gave birth to the
Mind and Live Institute, whose mission is:
“ to understand the human mind and the benefits of contemplative prac-
tices through an integrated mode of knowing that combines first person
knowledge from the world’s contemplative traditions with methods and
findings from contemporary scientific inquiry. Ultimately, [the Institute’ s]
goal is to relieve human suffering and advance well-being.” 2.
Francisco Varela became convinced that an interaction between cognitive science
and the millenary traditions of self-observance and introspection developed in Bud-
dhist meditative practices was a way not to miss an essential element in the explo-
ration of human consciousness.
During the 1990s brain imaging technologies have seen great developments. On
the electrophysiological side, higher montage density became available with 128 or
even 256 channels compared to the standard 16/32 channels previously used. Magne-
toencephalography (MEG) also developed towards more high density and less noisy
recordings. Progress in signal processing also allowed for a better characterization of
dynamical interactions in the brain. (Friston, 2002; Lachaux et al., 1999; Makeig et al.,
2004). In 1992 the first studies to report the recording of blood oxygen level depen-
dent (BOLD) signal variations in human using functional magnetic resonance imagery
(fMRI) were published (Kwong et al., 1992; Ogawa et al., 1992; Bandettini et al., 1992).
These technological improvements created a resurgence of interest for the study of
consciousness from the neuroscientific point of view, allowing the investigation of the
neural correlates of conscious experience.
However, even if these descriptive third-person approaches to consciousness flour-
ished, the study of conscious experience from the first person did not follow immedi-
2http://www.mindandlife.org/about/history/
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ately. In the mid-1990s, Francisco Varela developed the neurophenomenological ap-
proach for cognitive science to bring forth the first-person perspective, with an empha-
sis on neuroscience (Varela, 1996). The aim of neurophenomenology is to understand
the nature of consciousness and subjectivity, as well as their relation to the body and
brain. Thus reports of a given subjective experience are used to guide the analysis
of neuroimaging data. Detailed description of the origins and principles of the neu-
rophenomenology approach can be found in Varela (1996); Thompson (2005); Depraz
et al. (2011).
Neurophenomenology derives from the embodied approach that Varela elaborated
on the ground of autopeiesis and which states that to understand what the mind is,
it is not enought to study the brain only but that one should the mutually interactive
system the brain is forming with the body and the external environment (Varela et al.,
1991).
Thus in neurophenomenology, experience is not seen as an epiphenomenon but
considered central to an adequate understanding of the mind, and consequently needs
to be carefully investigated. Varela considered that Cognitives Sciences account for the
brain processes and phenomenological sciences accounts of the structure of human
experience are mutually informative and enriching (Varela, 1996; Thompson, 2005;
Varela et al., 1991):
“ [progress in the understanding of the human mind would require] to
marry modern cognitive neuroscience and a disciplined approach to hu-
man experience, with respect to the continental tradition of phenomenol-
ogy” (Varela, 1996, pg 330)
In 1999, Jonathan Shear and Francisco Varela edited a special issue of the Journal
of Consciousness Studies titled The view from within : first person approaches to the study
of consciousness (Shear and Varela, 1999). This special issue sat up a line of research
to develop first-person methodologies. It is meaningful that an anniversary issue of
the Journal of Consciousness Studies was entitled “Ten years of viewing from within: the
legacy of F.J Varela”. It was published in 2009, stating the progress that had been made
towards the scientific establishment of first-person methods over the previous decade.
In the literature the neurophenomenological paradigm is now experimented and
tested by a small but growing group of researchers. In cognitive science it has been
used to guide the study of the dynamic of brain activity under condition of binocular
rivalry, in which subjects were extensively trained to report their subjective experi-
ence during the task (Lutz et al., 2002), and successfully applied to the anticipation
of epileptic seizure by combining data on the cerebral dynamic and data on the dy-
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namic of the lived experience of a seizure (Petitmengin, 2007). In addition, neurophe-
nomenology is also applied in the clinical domain, for example in the study of pain
(Price et al., 2002). In neurophenomenological protocols, subjects are either very well
used to the experience that is studied, for example in the case of epileptic crisis, or
beforehand trained to identify and recognize the subjective experience to be studied,
such as in Lutz et al. (2002)’ s protocol. It is also in this context that contemplative men-
tal training such as the one developed in Buddhist tradition of meditation can play a
role in the scientific study of consciousness: because of their meditation training prac-
titioners have become sensitized to even subtle variations in the moment-to-moment
variations of their mental life, allowing for a deeper characterization of their ongoing
experience (Lutz et al., 2007).
Developing methodologies to collect data on the lived experience of subjects for
a scientific study of consciousness is anything but trivial. Indeed, as was shown by
(Nisbett and Wilson, 1977), that we usually have only little awareness of our mental
mechanisms and, when asked to describe them, we are usually quicker to express the
general knowledge we have about them than to report the way we really lived them.
This was the same type of critic that was made to introspection approach in the early
20th century. However, the ongoing effort to develop rigorous methods for collection
of subjective data allied to the now high-resolution brain neuroimagery methods raise
the hope to overcome the initial biases of introspective methodology and develop an
experience-based science of consciousness.
There is a large number of methodologies to study conscious experience, in the
next section I present techniques that are relevant in the context of my thesis project.
1.2 Methodologies to collect inner experience
1.2.1 Explicitation interview
The explicitation interview is a method initially developed by psychologist Pierre Ver-
mersch and adapted to cognitive science by Claire Petitmengin, former student of
Francisco Varela, as described in Petitmengin (2006). The explicitation interview al-
lows collecting a posteriori lived experience. The interviewer guided the subject (ie.
the interviewee) to evoke a particular situation and precisely describe it and guiding
him to focus on the structure of the experience rather than on the description of its
semantic meaning. The explicitation interview can be compared to a non-inductive
guidance of introspection (Vermersch, 2009).
This interview technique is inspired by various works on subjective experience
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such as Husserl’ s phenomenological approach of the study of consciousness, Milton
Erickson’ s practice of psychotherapy as well as meditation techniques. In addition
it is also based on the work of psychologist Pierre Vermersch who studied the inner
gestures leading to accurate introspective reports (Vermersch, 2009).
The explicitation interview has been incorporated in the neurophenomenological
program and is since being used by a growing number of cognitive scientists (Petit-
mengin, 2007; Maurel, 2009; Petitmengin and Bitbol, 2009).
1.2.2 Experience sampling
Experience sampling, also found under the term thought sampling, methodology im-
plies to randomly interrupt the subject from his ongoing activity with a probe requier-
ing him to immediately pay attention to his ongoing inner experience at the moment of
the interruption. Depending on the goal of the study, the nature of the question might
vary. For example, during execution of a given task, the subject can be interrupted
and ask wether his attention was or not on the task (see for example Christoff et al.,
2009; Smallwood et al., 2008). Experience sampling can also be used in a more general
fashion, as for example in Russel Hurlburt’ s Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES)
procedure. DES uses a beeper to randomly cue subjects, who are evolving in their
daily life, to report their ongoing experience at the moment they heard the beep. Sub-
jects have then to put in a notebook the characteristics of that moment and, within 24
hours, will complete an in-depth interview to describe that particular moment (Hurl-
burt and Heavey, 2001; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007) Experience sampling can be
found in laboratory set up, coupled or not with cerebral imaging or in natural envi-
ronment - the subjects in that case are carrying a device delivering them the probes
during the day.
1.3 Mind wandering and meditation, two aspects of con-
scious experience
1.3.1 Attention, consciousness and awareness
Resembling Poe’ s Purloined letter, the stream of consciousness is always present for
us, even if we don’t always notice it.
For example, it is most likely that during the course of reading this manuscript
your attention will wander. Your eyes may keep going through the lines and you
will continue reading mindlessly with your mind busy with other thoughts. It may
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take you some time to realize that your attention is not focused on your reading ma-
terial anymore. This phenomenon is termed “zoning out” and is almost ubiquitous
(Schooler et al., 2004). Zoning out while reading sheds light on the complexity of the
processes of consciousness.
What is happening in our attentional and conscious processes during a zoning out
episode ?
Let us first start by defining some important terms such as “attention”, “conscious-
ness” and “awareness”. For this, I will rely on the definition given by Endel Tulving
in his paper Memory and Consciousness (Tulving, 1985):
“ ‘Consciousness’ refers to a particular capability of living systems, whereas
‘awareness’ refers to the internally experienced outcome of exercising this
ability in a particular situation [...] ‘Attention’ [...] refers to the control that
the organism, or environmental events, can exert over the direction of con-
sciousness in the selection of the ‘contents’ of awareness.”
Thus coming back to the phenomenon of zoning out, at some point attention gets
redirected, and awareness switched from the reading material to a random thought.
In addition, there is a specific amount of time when the subject is not aware that he
is not reading. Eventually, he realizes he has zoned out and is actually not reading
anymore.
This phenomenal dissociation between the content of awareness and the explicit
recognition of it led psychologists and philosophers to propose the existence of a meta-
level of consciousness (Jack and Shallice, 2001; Schooler, 2002). Meta-consciousness
refers to the consciousness of one’ s awareness contents in the same way as meta-
cognition refers to the knowledge about one’s own knowledge (Nelson, 1996). Meta-
consciousness is thus distinct from phenomenal consciousness, that is the content of
awareness. The psychologist Jonathan Schooler (2002) has outlined a temporal dis-
sociation between phenomenal consciousness, that is conscious experience , and the
meta-conscious processes allowing the explicit appraisal of the experience (see Figure
1.3.1).
1.3.2 Mind wandering and meditation
Zoning out while reading is an instance of a more general phenomenon called mind
wandering. Mind wandering is the emergence of thoughts that unvoluntarily at-
tract the attention away from the current task (Mason et al., 2007; Smallwood and
Schooler, 2006). According to a recent large scale experience sampling study, such at-
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Conscious
experience
Non-conscious Tacit monitoring
Basic consciousness
Meta-consciousness Intermittent
Continuous
Figure 1.3: Schematic of the relationships between the different levels of meta-
conscious, conscious and non-conscious processes. Basic consciousness, equivalent to
phenomenal consciousness, is a continuuous experience throughout the waking state.
At the non-conscious level, basic consciousness is monitored to check its adequacy
with current goals. Meta-consciousness processes are implemented intermittently de-
pending on psychological or physiological changes, for example a strong emotional
response or the detection of goal failure (figure from Schooler (2002).
tentional drifts represent almost 50% of people mental experiences in their daily lives
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010).
The fleeting quality of attention has long been recognized in the Theravada Bud-
dhist literature, which calls it the “monkey mind” (Gunaratana, 2002). It is said that
the following metaphor was given by the Buddha:
“ Just as a monkey swinging through the trees grabs one branch and lets
it go only to seize another, so too, that which is called thought, mind or con-
sciousness arises and disappears continually both day and night.” (Chodron,
1995)
In the practice of all meditation traditions, one of the first step is to realizes that
the mind wander all the time. Any time a practitioner notices that his attention has
turned towards self-centered thoughts he has to redirect it towards the object of med-
itation. It is interesting to note that the word meditation - which latin roots means to
reflect upon- is used as a translation of the pali word bhavana, meaning mental cultivation
(Gunaratana, 2002). Figure 1.4 is an illustration of the meditation training in Tibetan
Buddhism.
Thus meditation traditions consider that natural spontaneous occurrence of thoughts
or ideas are not necessarily the most beneficial to human being and provide teaching
and training to stabilize attention. Are there biological and cognitive basis arguing
for a detrimental effect of mind wandering ? Equally, using the tools of neuroscience,
15
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Figure 1.4: The different stages of a monk calming his mind through meditation train-
ing, from bottom to top of the picture. The mind is figured as an elephant, distraction
as a monkey, and effort as fire. The bottom of the painting represents the onset of med-
itation training. The mind wanders so much, it is represented by a muddy elephant
led by a monkey while the monk is running after it. Half-way up the painting, it is now
the monk leading the elephant which is also partly clean. Notice the monkey is still
interfering by pulling the elephant tail. Further up, the monk only is in charge of the
clean elephant, and say goodbye to the monkey. Soon after, the monk can get to ride
the elephant. Arriving at the top, the monk is fully in charge of his mind, the elephant,
and now rides down to put its power in good use. Picture from the Shelley & Donald
Rubin Foundation, http://www.himalayanart.org/image.cfm/59661.html
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can we find evidences for the positive effects of meditation ? These two questions will
guide us through the present work.
1.4 Summary and aim of this thesis
The scientific investigation of consciousness developed at the end of the 19th century
but had to face strong criticisms leading to the loss of interest of the mainstream psy-
chologists and scientists. After the 1950s and the birth of cognitive sciences, a few
researchers started to apply neuroimagery techniques to the study of altered states
of consciousness, such as the ones reached during meditation. Meanwhile, psycholo-
gists were also reviving the study of subjective experience. From the 1990s, a research
community started to built up around the study of consciousness. Progress in neu-
roimagery and data analysis made possible to record more and more precisely brain
activity in difference states of consciousness. In parallel to these technical progresses,
scientist Francisco Varela warned against the dangers of considering only observable
data to understand the human mind and consciousness. He advocated taking into
account the subjective experience as well, and developed methodologies avoiding the
flaws of the early introspective approaches some of them on millennium Buddhist
practices of introspection through meditation. This also, for the first time in modern
science, created a bridge between cognitive science and spiritual traditions. In this
view, attention has to get to stabilize through the practice of meditation if one wants
to study his own mind. Indeed it is the most common experience of each and every-
one that, when left with no distinct focus, our attention is fluctuating, jumping from
thought to thought or from one memory to another. Even when subjects are given ex-
plicit instructions on a given task to accomplish, they often found that their attention
has drifted toward unrelated thoughts. If meditation traditions has developed over
the centuries and still remains active today, can we find any scientifically valuable rea-
son for their affirmation ? What is the effect of mind wandering on the brain activity ?
Conversely, what is the effects of long term training in meditation on the brain ? These
are the questions I will address in this thesis.
In the first part of the manuscript, chapter 1 presents the evolution of the study
of consciousness in psychology and cognitive science during the past century and in-
troduces the ancient mental training of meditation traditions as a way to investigate
consciousness and focus attention. It also depicts method to study attentional lapses
which are central to meditation practices.
In the second part, we will focus on the neuroscientific study of mind wandering
phenomenon. After a review of the existing work and theories, chapter 3 will present
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a first experimental study aiming at characterizing the brain EEG dynamic during
episodes of mind wandering. Chapter 4 is a preliminary and exploratory study of
the phenomenology of mind wandering, using the explicitation interview and online
questionnaires.
The third part is dedicated to the study of meditation, starting with an introduction
to the paradigm currently in use for the scientific investigation of meditating states in
chapter 5. Then, chapter 6 reviews the literature regarding the effects of meditation
on the body and the brain. Finally, chapter 7 is an experimental report of a compara-
tive study of the EEG correlates of meditation, involving 64 subjects from 3 different
meditation tradition and a non-meditator control group.
A last chapter 8 presents a general discussion and synthesis of this work and its
consequences for consciousness research.
Although chapter 3 and chapter medit-review are based on published work, we
decided not to present them under their publication format to ensure the fluidity of
reading with the rest of the manuscript.
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This part of the manuscript presents our mind wandering study. In this introduc-
tory chapter, we are presenting a brief review of the existing litterature.
2.1 Theoretical aspects on mind wandering
Since you’ve started reading this manuscript, there is little doubt that you have expe-
rienced mind wandering several times. For example, you might have found yourself
thinking about something else, such as your plans for the next week-end. It is even
likely that, at times, you have found that your eyes had reached the end of a page and
you had no idea of what the page was about.
At the end of the 19th century William James already devoted an entire chapter to
the discussion of the fleeting quality of what he called the stream of thoughts (James,
1890). Although an important part of our mental life, thoughts that are not directly
goal driven have not elicited a lot of interest from mainstream science until recently.
References to the formal study of undirected thoughts can be found starting from the
1960s, with the work on daydreaming of pychologists Antrobus and Singer (Antrobus
et al., 1964, for example).
Figure 2.1 shows the fast growth of the number of publication related to mind
wandering since the start of the 2000s.
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of the numbers of publication having the term “mind wander-
ing” either in its title or abstract and referenced in PubMed from 1970 to July 2012
2.1.1 Terminology of mind wandering research
Like any developping field, the study of mind wandering lacks of an established
terminology. For example, references to mind wandering can be found across the
literature, under various terms such as “task-unrelated images and thoughts” (Gi-
ambra, 1989), “stimulus independent thought” (Teasdale et al., 1995), “task-unrelated
thought” (Smallwood et al., 2003), “incidental self-processing” (Gilbert et al., 2005),
“inner speech” (Morin, 2009), “momentary attentional lapses” (Weissman et al., 2006)
or also “spontaneous thoughts” (Christoff et al., 2008) and of course “mind wander-
ing” (Mason et al., 2007).
Recently, Christoff (2012) have proposed criteria to distinguish between 3 cate-
gories of undirected thoughts: “stimulus independant thoughts”, “spontaneous thoughts”
and “mind wandering”. Christoff (2012) retains the criteria of intentionality and rela-
tion to the task and current sensory information to help define between the three cate-
gories. However, distinction between the different categories remains fuzzy as a mind
wandering episode may exhibit multiple traits. For example Christoff (2012) proposes
that mind wandering occurs only in the context of performing a task and can be ei-
ther deliberate or unintended. Unintended mind wandering in this context resembles
“spontaneous thoughts”. In addition, a mind wandering thought may be triggered by
an environmental stimulus or be stimulus independent - and in that case the definition
overlap with “stimulus independent thoughts”.
Thus much work is still needed before establishing a clear taxonomy that would
allow mind wandering researchers to accurately qualify the type of thoughts subjects
experience. In chapter 4 we present our own attempts to better define thoughts occur-
ring during mind wandering episodes.
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2.1.2 Type of tasks to elicit mind wandering
Behavioral examination of the context of occurrence of mind wandering indicates that
when a primary task is simple or automatized enough not to monopolize all atten-
tional resources, the mind is likely to wander (Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood et al.,
2003, 2004). In addition mind wandering impairs task performances only in cases
where the task still requires a certain amount of controlled processing (Teasdale et al.,
1995). Thus, favoured tasks to study mind wandering include tasks that can easily
be automated such as signal detection tasks (Smallwood et al., 2004), inhibition of re-
sponse tasks (Smallwood et al., 2008), or easy working memory tasks (Mason et al.,
2007).
2.2 Experience sampling of mind wandering and brain
activity
The experience sampling methodology 1.2 is one of the most popular to collect the
occurrence of mind wandering events. By explicitly asking subjects to report the con-
tent of their thoughts, experience sampling methods allow collecting mind wandering
events irrespective of the degree of awareness the subject has of these events.
In the 1960s, Singer and Antrobus (Pope and Singer, 1978) had their subjects report
on a notebook the content of their thoughts each time a beep signal occurred. This
approach is still in use today and have been adapted to contemporary technologies,
such as in Killingsworth and Gilbert (2010)’s study using a smartphone application.
Experience sampling to study mind wandering is also commonly done during the
execution of a laboratory task designed to favor the occurrences of mind wandering
episodes – one popular task being the rare target detection paradigm. For example,
subjects are asked to press a button in response to all numbers presented to them,
except for number 3 - which comes up only rarely. Subjects are regularly interrupted
during the performance of the task by a probe requesting them to report the content
of their experience just prior to the presentation of the probe: where they focused
on the task or thinking of something else (ie. where they "on" or "off" task?). Their
performances are then examined both in terms of their response to the probe and of
their target detection efficiency. Using this type paradigm, Giambra (1995) show that
subjects had decreased performances in the rare-target detection task when they were
mind wandering.
Mind wandering research also couple experience sampling with neuroimaging
protocols to study the effect of mind wandering on brain activity. This line of re-
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search have been triggered by the discovery of a network of areas activated during the
“default mode” activity of the brain when the subject is resting (Greicius et al., 2003;
Raichle et al., 2001). The main hypothesis is that mind wandering could be the phe-
nomenological experience of this default mode activity. Studies in fMRI have found
increased activity of areas of the default mode network as well as higher recruitment
of frontal executive networks during periods with high degree of mind wandering
Mason et al. (2007); Christoff et al. (2009); Stawarczyk et al. (2011b).
Regarding EEG studies, Smallwood et al. (2008) show using mean event-related
potential (ERP) analysis that the amplitude of the P300 ERP component - a physiologi-
cal marker of attentional redirection - was reduced during mind wandering. Based on
this results they suggested a decrease in attentional resources directed towards stimu-
lus processing during periods of mind wandering.
Studies of the resting state both in simultaneous EEG and fMRI recordings have
found that the activity in different EEG frequency bands is spontaneously fluctuat-
ing at rest and can be correlated to spontaneous fluctuations of the fMRI BOLD sig-
nal (Laufs et al., 2006; Mantini et al., 2007). These fluctuations seem to underlie two
distinct modes of cerebral activity: a mode dominated by fast frequency waves (12-
30Hz, beta) that may index higher degrees of task-related attention (Ray and Cole,
1985; Laufs et al., 2006), and a mode dominated by slow 3-7Hz theta waves oscilla-
tions that has been linked to decreased sustained task-related attention and diverse
stages of transition from wake to sleep (Loomis et al., 1937; Makeig and Inlow, 1993;
Klimesch, 1999; Smit et al., 2005).
Thus, there are evidences suggesting the existence of spontaneous fluctuation be-
tween attention directed toward the external and attention directed toward the inter-
nal environment. ERP results from Smallwood et al. (2008) suggest that mind wander-
ing is associated to the inwards direction of the attention. However ERP analysis does
not inform us on the underlying brain dynamics associated with mind wandering.
This is the question we try to tackle in the next chapter.
.
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This chapter is based on a research article published in 2011, Braboszcz and De-
lorme (2011). To study the brain dynamic of mind wandering, we designed an EEG
experiment in which the subject is doing a breath counting task and has to press a
button whenever he realizes a thought is occurring . In contrast with classic thought
sampling methods our task relies only on the pure introspective habilities of the sub-
ject to signal occurrences of mind wandering. If this approach results in missing out
mind wandering episodes that do not come in the subject’s awareness, it is a first at-
tempt to test wether it is possible to rely only on the introspective skills of untrained
subjects to accurately collect mind wandering episodes.
3.1 Introduction
Based on the litterature (see chapter 2, we hypothesized that mind wandering would
be associated with decreased vigilance and increased delta and theta power. In addi-
tion, to further characterize the brain activity during mind wandering we wanted to
add sensory stimulation, allowing us to later perform evoked related potential analy-
sis. Indeed, it has been shown that brain evoked response to external stimuli change
with the degree of vigilance or sleep stage. For example, the negative brain response
to the sensory detection of a sudden change in the flux of auditory perception, called
mismatch negativity (Näätänen et al., 2007), is reduced during the early sleep stages
and drowsiness (Lang et al., 1995; Winter et al., 1995). Following our hypothesis that
the mind wandering state should be associated with decreased vigilance, we added an
auditory oddball protocol to our experiment, in order to elicit a mismatch negativity
in the ERP response. We expected to observe a decrease in the mismatch negativity
amplitude during the mind-wandering state compared to the breath focus state.
In sum, we designed an experiment allowing subjects to experience mind wander-
ing in conditions we believe to be as close as possible to the way they are experiencing
it in their daily life. We chose a simple concentration task - a silent breath counting
task - that only requires weak cognitive involvement from the subject, a characteris-
tic known to favor the induction of mind wandering (Giambra, 1995; Cheyne et al.,
2006). Simultaneously we presented frequent and rare pure-frequency auditory stim-
uli that subjects were instructed to ignore. We used the subjects indications of mind
wandering events and the auditory stimuli to assess both the brain EEG spontaneous
and evoked activity during the mind wandering and breath concentration states.
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3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Participants
Sixteen volunteers from the laboratory staff and local universities (8 females and 8
males; age 19-36 years old, mean: 27 and standard deviation 5) gave written consent
to participate to the experiment. Participants stated that they were not taking any
substances or medications that could potentially affect their concentration nor having
histories of major psychological disorders or any auditory deficiencies. Before start-
ing the experiment, all participants read the instructions and had the possibility to ask
questions about the experiment before giving written consent to participate in the ex-
periment. As detailed below, 4 of the 16 participants had to be excluded because they
did not report enough mind wandering episodes.
3.2.2 Procedure
Participants sat in a dark room. We asked them to keep their eyes closed during the
recording session. Participants were instructed to count each of their breath cycles
(inhale/exhale) from 1 to 10. As subjects often lack immediate awareness of their
mind wandering episodes (MWE), we could not ask them to signal MWE occurrence
at the moment their attention was drifting away from the task. Instead, we asked
them to indicate whenever they realized their attention had drifted, that is whenever
they gained meta-consciousness (Schooler, 2002) of their mind wandering episodes.
We asked subjects to hold a button in their right hand and press it whenever they be-
came aware of having lost track of their breath count (see figure 3.1). The following
instructions were given to subjects to define what was meant by losing track of the
count: “you stopped counting”, “you counted over 10 breaths” or “you had to reflect
intensively to figure out what was the next count”. Once they pressed the button, par-
ticipants were instructed to bring their focus back to their breath and start counting
again from one. We read task directions to participants and made sure they under-
stood them. The experiment lasted about one hour and 10 minutes, split into three
blocks of 20 minutes separated by five minutes of rest. At the end of each block, we
asked subjects to evaluate their alertness level during the past session (“Did you feel
like falling asleep?”), their eye movement activity “Did you open your eyes – if yes
can you estimate how many times”, and their subjective experience when reporting
mind-wandering episodes (“Did you press the button? If yes, what was your sub-
jective experience?”). None of the participants reported systematically opening their
eyes and none of the participants reported falling asleep. However, 6 of the 12 se-
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Figure 3.1: Experimental protocol. Subjects continuously count their breath from 1
to 10 while sitting eyes closed in a dark room. Any time they find themselves not
counting anymore, thinking of something else or having lost the count they have to
press on a button held in their hand. In parallel they are passively listing to a stream
of auditory stimuli organized in an oddball sequence. Their EEG activity is being
recorded using a 128 electrodes system.
lected participants reported some level of drowsiness at one time or another during
the one-hour experiment (see Discussion).
3.2.3 Auditory stimuli
While performing the breath counting task, subjects were also presented with a pas-
sive auditory oddball protocol that they were instructed to ignore. The auditory odd-
ball protocol was composed of pure sounds of 500 Hz for the standard stimuli (80%
of the stimuli) and 1000Hz for the oddball (20% of the stimuli). Each sound lasted
100 ms with 10 ms linear amplitude rising and falling times. Inter-stimulus intervals
randomly varied between 750 and 1250 ms. Oddball stimuli presentation was pseudo-
random to ensure there were never two oddball stimuli presented successively. Audi-
tory stimuli were calibrated at 72dB and played through a loudspeaker located at 1.20
meters in front and 45 degrees on the right of the subject.
3.2.4 Recording
We recorded data using a 128-channel Waveguard™ cap (Advanced Neuro Technol-
ogy Company – ANT) out of which we used 124-channels - electrodes AFZ, PO6, TP7,
and PO5 were damaged and left out. We plugged the Waveguard™ cap into two syn-
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chronized 64-channel EEG amplifiers also from the ANT Company. We kept most elec-
trode impedances below 5KOhm although about 10% of the electrodes still had higher
impedance at the end of preparation - all impedances were kept below 20Kohm as rec-
ommended in ANT ASA 4.0 software user’s guide – ANT recommendation is higher
than the standard 5 Kohm because of the high impedance of its amplifier. We used
M1 mastoid electrode as reference and sampled the data at 1024Hz. We also recorded
EKG by placing two bipolar electrodes on each side of the subject’s torso.
3.2.5 Artifacts correction
We first removed bad electrodes – from 2 to 17 bad electrodes per subject. We then
manually pruned the continuous data from non-stereotyped, unique artifacts such as
paroxysmal muscles activity - high frequency activities with large amplitude over all
electrodes - as well as electrical artifacts resulting from poor electrode contacts - short-
lasting aberrant oscillatory activity localized at a few electrode sites. We then used
Infomax Independent Component Analysis (Infomax ICA) on the pruned data to re-
ject artifacts. For each subject, we visually identified and rejected one to five well-
characterized ICA components for eye blink, lateral eye movements, and temporal
muscle noise (Delorme, Sejnowski et al. 2007). We used visual inspection of compo-
nent scalp maps, power spectrum and raw activity to select and reject these artifactual
ICA components.
3.2.6 Data processing
Data processing was performed under Matlab 7.0 (The Mathwork, Inc.) using the
EEGLAB 7.x toolbox (Delorme and Makeig 2004). We first downsampled the EEG data
from 1024 Hz to 256Hz and performed high-pass filtering at 1Hz using a non-linear el-
liptic filter. In addition, we applied an elliptic non-linear notch filter between 45 and 55
Hertz. For each subject, we then segmented the EEG data into 20-second data epochs
centered on subjects’ button presses. We considered that participants were mind wan-
dering during the 10-second period that preceded the button press and we considered
that participants were concentrating on their breath during the 10-second period that
followed the button press (Christoff et al., 2009). Four subjects did not have enough
clean data epochs to be considered for further analysis - the four subjects had six, five,
five and one clean epochs respectively. All the selected subjects had between 13 and
52 of such 20-second clean EEG data epochs (mean of 30 per subject; standard devia-
tion of 14), ensuring that, for each subject, there would be at least 20-30 stimuli in each
condition to compute ERPs (Kappenman and Luck, 2010) – see ERP analysis below.
29
Methods
The total number of analyzed mind wandering event across all subjects was 358.For
each of the two conditions, mind wandering and breath focus, we also extracted data
epochs from one second before to two seconds after the presentation of auditory stim-
uli. So that auditory stimuli do not occur too close to a button press, we removed all
three-seconds data epochs containing a button press - thus button presses were at least
one second prior to the stimulus or at least two seconds after the stimulus. This proce-
dure ensured that the brain activity related to the button press does not contaminate
our analysis. In addition, we processed brain activity from electrodes (Oz, Fz) that
were not over pre-motor and motor regions limiting potential contamination of but-
ton press brain related activity. We thus obtained four groups of data epochs – oddball
and standard stimuli defined over two conditions: mind wandering and breath focus.
We computed mean event related potential (ERP) using a -300 to 0 ms baseline and
we performed ERP visualization after applying a 30Hz linear low pass filter - note
that we used the non-filtered data for computing statistics. We counted a total of 4326
standard stimuli (mean of 180 per subject; standard deviation of 101) and 1040 oddball
stimuli (mean of 43 per subject; standard deviation of 23).
3.2.7 EEG time-frequency analysis
We applied Morlet wavelet decomposition (Goupillaud et al., 1984) to both the 20-
second long data epochs time-locked to button presses and the short 3-second data
epoch time-locked to auditory stimuli. We used 200 linearly-spaced time points and
a series of 100 log-spaced frequencies ranging from 1 Hz to 100 Hz, with 1.5 cycle at
the lowest frequency increasing linearly and capping at eight cycles at 30 Hz. For long
20-second epochs, we visualized absolute log power - 10*log10(X), X being absolute
power at a given time-frequency point. For short three-second epochs time-locked
to auditory stimuli presentation, we also removed baseline spectral activity by sub-
tracting the pre-stimulus average baseline log-power at each frequency (Delorme and
Makeig 2004) .
3.2.8 Statistics
Statistical tests were performed on ERPs, time-frequency maps and topographic maps
using two-tailed paired parametric student t-test (df=11). Since most representation
involves hundreds of tests, correction for multiple comparisons was performed using
the Montecarlo and the cluster method as developed by Maris (2007). This method
first measures the extent of 1-D (length) or 2-D (surface) of significance regions (uncor-
rected) and then tests if the extent of these regions is significant using a Monte-Carlo
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approach. For channel topographies, we set the number of channel neighbors to 4.5 be-
fore running Maris and Oostenveld (2007) Matlab function. We also tried FDR (False
Discovery Rate) (Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2001) to correct for multiple comparisons
and obtained similar results compared to the cluster method.
3.3 RESULTS
3.3.1 EEG activity time-locked to meta-consciousness events
The time frequency analysis of EEG data time-locked to meta-consciousness event
– button press - shows a significant influence of the subject’s attentional state at all
frequency bands from 2 to 25 Hz (figure 3.2. The most pronounced state-associated
change on the EEG spectral activity occurs in the theta (4-7Hz) band where absolute
spectral power is significantly higher in the mind wandering state compared to the
breath focus state. This effect is observed at all electrode sites and is larger over occipi-
tal and parieto-central regions. Absolute power in the delta band (2-3.5Hz) showed the
same trend although the largest power difference was now observed over the fronto-
central region. By contrast occipital alpha (9-11 Hz) and fronto-lateral beta (15-30 Hz)
power was significantly lower in the mind wandering state compared to the breath
focus state. For each subjects, figure 3.3 shows the evolution of the difference between
alpha and theta activity at electrode site Oz between mind wandering and breath fo-
cus.
Half of our subjects reported some level of drowsyness during the course of the
recording. To make sure that our data were not highly affected by these subjects, we
computed the same time-frequency decomposition as figure 3.2 but including only
subjects that did not report any drowsiness. As it can be seen in figure 3.4, the time-
frequency patterns are almost identical to the ones visible in figure 3.2.
During the transition associated with the meta-consciousness (MC) event, the al-
pha frequency band in figure 3.2 is not only affected in terms of amplitude but also in
terms of peak frequency. The peak frequency appears to increase by about 1 Hz after
the meta-conscious event for a period of about 2 seconds. To test if this observation
was significant across subjects, we defined three time windows, W1 from -6 to -4 sec-
ond before the MC event; W2 from 0 to 2 seconds after the MC event; W3 from 6 to 8
seconds after the MC event. For each subject and for each time window, we then man-
ually assessed the alpha peak frequency by taking the frequency of maximum power
between 8 and 12 Hz on the power spectrum – the power spectrum was computed by
averaging log-power values of figure3.2 over the windows of interest W1, W2 and W3.
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Figure 3.2: Time frequency decomposition of transition from mind wandering to
breath focus at electrode site Oz. Mind wandering was defined as the period pre-
ceding the meta-conscious event (button press) and breath focus was defined as the
period following the meta-conscious event. Topographic maps of power difference
are shown for the 2-3.5 Hz (d), 4-7 Hz (q) , 15-30Hz (b) frequency bands from -8 to -2
seconds before and from 2 to 8 seconds after the button press. Topographic map of
differential power is shown for the 9-11Hz (a) frequency band from -6 to -2 seconds
before and 2 to 6 seconds after the button press. (unlike other frequencies bands, the
difference of power in the alpha band between mind wandering and breath focus was
not significant for a larger time interval). Areas of statistical significance (p<0.05) are
highlighted on the topographic maps (shaded areas represent non-significant regions
for a; all electrodes are significant for other frequency bands). The black dot represents
the position of electrode Oz.
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Figure 3.3: Variation of alpha minus theta power over the 20-second epochs centered
on meta-conscious events. Difference of activity between log-power alpha (9-11Hz)
and theta (4-7Hz) waves at electrode Oz for each of the 12 subjects (the mean difference
value is removed for each subject so as to remove any offset on the ordinate axis). This
plot indicates significant variation in theta and alpha power (greyed regions p<0.05
after correction for multiple comparisons and removal of regions spanning less than
100 ms).
3
4
7
10
12
20
25
30
15
5
6
89Freq
uen
cy(H
z)
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8Time(sec)
40
43
47
50
53
10log10(µV2)MindWandering BreathFocus
Buttonpress
Figure 3.4: Time frequency decomposition of transition from mind wandering to
breath focus at electrode site Oz, including only the 6 subjects that did not report
drowsiness during the experiment.
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Note that the alpha peak frequency could not be found for one of the 12 subjects so we
computed statistics using 11 subjects only. Bootstrap statistics revealed significant dif-
ference between the central W2 window and the flanking W1 and W3 windows (W1
versus W2, p<0.0005, df=10; W3 versus W2, p<0.002, df=10) but not between W1 and
W3.
3.3.2 Stimulus evoked activity during mind wandering and breath
focus
We first tested if the attentional state affected grand average ERPs of the auditory stim-
uli in the passive oddball paradigm. We observed that the ERP positive component
at about 200 ms after stimulus presentation (P2) is significantly higher over fronto-
central sites from 180 to 280 ms during mind wandering than during breath focus for
both standard and oddball stimuli (figure 3.5). We did not observe any significant in-
teraction between mental state and type of stimuli in this latency range. However, we
did observe such an interaction at earlier latencies.
We found a significant effect of the type of stimulus - oddball or standard - on the
amplitude of the early ERP negative component between 90 and 120 ms after stimulus
onset (figure 3.6). After presentation of an oddball stimulus the ERP is significantly
more negative over frontal and temporal regions than after presentation of a stan-
dard stimulus both in the breath focus and mind wandering conditions (figure 3.6 3C
and 3D). This increased negativity for oddball is usually termed mismatch negativity
(Naatanen, Paavilainen et al. 2007). The mismatch negativity (MMN) was larger dur-
ing breath focus compared to mind wandering over the right frontal region (figure 3.6.
3E).
We then investigated event-related activity using time-frequency decompositions.
The event-related spectral perturbation plot reveals increased theta band power (4-
7Hz) and decreased high alpha (10-14 Hz) and high beta (20-25Hz) band power after
stimulus presentation (figure 3.7). In general, statistical inference testing between the
mind wandering and the breath focus state returned a lower p-value for standard
stimuli compared to oddball stimuli – it might be a matter of number of observations
since there was, on average, five times more trials for standard than for oddball stim-
uli. From 100 to 300 ms after standard auditory stimuli presentation, theta (4-7 Hz)
power was significantly higher on frontal sites when subjects were mind wandering
compared to when they were focusing on their breath. Delta (2-3.5 Hz) power 200 to
350 ms after standard auditory stimulation follows the same trend and we also ob-
served a significant power increase for oddball stimuli at occipital and frontal sites.
34
EEG correlates of mind wandering
Figure 3.5: Effect of the attentional state on the grand-average ERP for oddball and
standard stimuli. A,B: ERP at electrode site Fz for the mind wandering and the breath
focus state for standard (A) and oddball (B) stimuli. The shaded area surrounding
each curve represents the standard error of the mean. C, D: Topographical maps of the
average ERP difference between mind wandering and breath focus for standard (C)
and oddball (D) stimuli from 180 to 280ms after stimuli presentation (corresponding
to the yellow highlighted region on the ERP plots). Non-significant areas are grayed
out in topographic maps and the black dot indicates the position of electrode Fz.
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Figure 3.6: Mismatch negativity during the mind wandering and breath focus states.
A, B: grand-averaged ERP to standard and oddball stimuli for the breath focus and
mind wandering state. As in figure 1, the shaded area surrounding each curve rep-
resents the standard error of the mean. C, D: Topographical difference maps between
the mean ERPs to oddball and standard stimuli (Mismatch negativity MMN) for the
breath focus and the mind wandering state. E: Topographical difference map between
MMN maps in breath focus and mind wandering condition (map C – map D). Non-
significant areas are grayed out on the topographic maps and the black dot indicates
the position of electrode Fz.
‘
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High beta (20-25Hz) power from 100 to 300 ms after standard stimuli presentation
is significantly higher on parieto-occipital sites during mind wandering compared to
during breath focus. Interestingly, despite large high alpha (10-14 Hz) evoked power
to both standard and oddball stimuli, we did not observe any significant effect of the
attentional state on the ERSP in this frequency band.
We also tested for difference of ERSP between standard and oddball stimuli during
both the mind wandering and the breath focus states. Only beta band power from 100
ms to 300 ms after stimulus presentation differed significantly, being lower for oddball
stimuli . This effect was not significantly different between the mind wandering and
the breath focus states. Although figure 3.7 seems to show a decrease in the 10-15Hz
frequency band around 220-380ms after stimulus presentation, we did not find any
significant difference for that frequency window between either standard and oddball
stimuli or mind wandering and breath focus conditions.
3.4 Discussion
Our study aimed at characterizing the neural correlates of spontaneous and task-
unrelated mental activity (i.e. mind-wandering) and its effect on sensory processing.
Compared to a breath-focus mental state, we have shown that mind wandering is
characterized by a power amplitude increase in the theta frequency band and a power
amplitude decrease in the alpha and beta frequency bands. We also showed that, dur-
ing mind wandering, standard auditory stimuli induce a higher power in the theta
and delta frequency band over parieto-occipital regions and higher power in the high
beta frequency band over frontal regions. The study of mean evoked related potentials
revealed that the amplitude of the P2 positive ERP component is larger during mind
wandering than during breath focus and that the MMN is of smaller amplitude dur-
ing mind wandering than during breath focus. Taken together these results establish
a strong link between the subjects’ internal experience – mind wandering or breath
focus – and distinct neural correlates.
3.4.1 Brain states fluctuation at rest and spontaneous reports of mind
wandering
The difference in EEG activity between mind wandering and breath focus is consistent
with the Laufs et al. (2006) EEG-fMRI study showing that spontaneous EEG alternates
between two states at rest. Our study refines Laufs’ results by showing that the low
frequencies (theta-delta) and high frequencies (alpha-beta) changes he observed may
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Figure 3.7: Effect of attentional state and type of stimulus on event related spectral
perturbation. The central panel indicates the grand-average ERSP at electrode Oz av-
eraged over both oddball (Odd) and standard (Std) stimuli and over both the mind
wandering (MW) and the breath focus (BF) state. Topographical maps of power dif-
ference between oddball and standard stimuli are shown for the mind wandering
and breath focus condition as well as topographical maps of power differences be-
tween mind-wandering and breath focus conditions for oddball and standard stimuli.
Shaded areas represent non-significant regions. Scalp maps for which there is no sig-
nificant electrodes are indicated using a blank map with the sign ns. The black dot
represents electrode Oz.
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be associated to a transition between a state of concentration on processing external
stimuli and involuntary mind wandering. Our EEG study further confirms that when
subjects are engaged in a task, the brain can spontaneously shift into another alertness
mode, which is most likely mind wandering. fMRI bold signal during the resting state
shows spontaneous fluctuations between a “task positive” network comprising brain
areas activated during attention-demanding tasks and a “task negative” (or “default”
network being activated during rest and deactivated during these tasks (Fox et al.,
2005). Preceding reports of mind wandering, Christoff et al. (2009) found increased
BOLD activity both in the default network (precuneus, ventral anterior cingulate cor-
tex and temporoparietal junction) and in the frontal executive network. This result is
consistent with an fMRI study showing increased amount of mind wandering linked
to increased amount of activity in the task negative network (Mason et al., 2007). Con-
tinuous increase of BOLD activity in the occipital, frontal and temporal parts of the
defaults network is also found during the transition from eyes-closed wakefulness to
sleep (Olbrich et al., 2009). The higher occipito-parietal theta and fronto-central delta
during mind wandering could thus be related to increased BOLD activity in these ar-
eas.
We also observed a delta power increase during mind wandering, an increase
that we believe could be linked to decreased alertness. Spontaneous delta power in-
crease has been linked to decreased performance during cognitive processing (Har-
mony et al., 1996). Spontaneous delta power increase has also been associated with
decreased level of alertness in various experimental setups (Makeig and Inlow, 1993;
De Gennaro et al., 2001; Caldwell et al., 2003). Moreover, as reviewed by Laufs et al.
(2006) and shown in this report, delta power increase is associated with alpha power
decrease, which has been associated with low stages of vigilance (Loomis et al., 1937;
Roth, 1961). Note that 6 of the 12 subjects reported some level of drowsiness during
the experiment, but as we have shown in figure 3.4 this does not seem to have af-
fected our data. The meta-consciousness event allowing the transition from the mind
wandering to breath focus is finally marked by a transient increase of about 1Hz of
the alpha peak frequency and also by a more long lasting increase in alpha power.
Re-directing the attention to the task requires increase working memory activity and
that has been shown to be correlated with alpha power increase (Jensen et al., 2002),
a power increase that may index re-activation of thalamo-cortical pathways (Schreck-
enberger et al., 2004). The alpha-peak frequency increase may also be a marker of
the attentional switch between mind wandering and the focused task since Angelakis
et al. (2004) suggests that increase of peak alpha frequency might represent a state of
"cognitive preparedness".
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Interestingly, Hasenkamp et al. (2011) have adapted our protocol in an fMRI study,
using meditation practitioners as subjects. Participants in Hasenkamp et al. (2011)
study had to do a 20 minutes meditation period within the scanner, focusing their at-
tention on the breath and pressing a button when noticing that their mind has gone
completely off the breath. These authors report activity of brain regions implicated in
the default mode network (posterior cingulate cortex, medial PFC, posterior parieto-
temporal cortex and parahippocampal gyrus) during mind wandering while the pe-
riod of awareness of mind wandering is associated with activation of brain areas usu-
ally involved in the detection of environmentally salient external events, that is bi-
lateral anterior insula and dorsal ACC. The following shift to desengage from mind
wandering and redirect the attention on the breath is characterized by activation of
the frontoparietal executive network. During sustained attention to the breath, there
is persistence of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activity. Thus, Hasenkamp et al. (2011)’
s study supports the existence of shifts in activity between areas of the default mode
and attentional networks. Additional combined EEG-fMRI studies would be needed
to establish a clearer link between EEG and BOLD signature of the mind wandering
state and its relation to the default mode network, in particular regarding localization
of the neuronal sources of the EEG rhythm correlated with the BOLD signal.
3.4.2 MMN, attention, alertness, and mind wandering
The study of evoked related potential shows an increased negativity at frontal elec-
trode sites for the ERP of oddball compared to the ERP of standard stimuli from 90
to 120 ms after stimulus presentation. This result corresponds to the mismatch neg-
ativity (MMN) usually described as negative brain response to the sensory detection
of a sudden change in the flux of auditory perception (Näätänen et al., 2007). The
MMN typically occurs approximately 100 to 150 ms after stimulus presentation and
is centered on fronto-central electrodes sites (Näätänen et al., 2007). The amplitude of
the MMN is modulated by the direction of the subject’s attention (Sabri et al., 2006),
and is larger when the attention of the subject is directed toward the auditory stimuli
(Alain and Woods, 1997). Our results show the MMN amplitude is lower during mind
wandering compared to breath focus, which suggest a disengagement of the attention
from stimuli processing during mind wandering. The reduction of the MMN is also
characteristic of drowsiness and the early sleep stages (Sallinen and Lyytinen, 1997;
Nittono et al., 2001) , which supports the idea that the mind wandering state is asso-
ciated with decreased vigilance. This also suggests that mind wandering may share
common traits with the decreased alertness characterizing the transition from wake to
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sleep (Sabri et al., 2003). Note that we did not observe in our data the late negativity at
about 300 ms after stimulus presentation that accompanies advanced states of drowsi-
ness leading to sleep or sleep itself (Winter et al., 1995; Campbell and Colrain, 2002) .
This suggests that our subjects were not deeply drowsy. Mind wandering could thus
correspond to an early state of drowsiness of decreased alertness and vigilance.
3.4.3 Late stimulus evoked activity and disengagement of attention
from stimuli processing during mind wandering
ERPs analysis also reveals that the amplitude of the positive component at about 200
ms (P2) is larger during mind wandering than during breath focus. This effect is
also present, although to a lesser extent, in Cahn (2007) who found a P2 component
larger for distracting stimuli when subjects were actively reactivating autobiograph-
ical memories – which may be considered similar to mind wandering - compared to
when they were practicing meditation. Increase of the P2 component to auditory stim-
ulus has also been associated with the disengagement of subjects’ attention toward
stimuli (Naatanen and Picton 1987) and is also characteristic of the sleep onset pe-
riod (Campbell and Colrain, 2002). Again, this result is consistent with attentional
disengagement toward stimuli processing during mind wandering. We did not ob-
serve a P300 ERP component associated with the presentation of the rare stimuli in
our passive auditory oddball task. P300 is best observed in active experimental de-
sign where the subjects have to respond to rare targets and is usually hardly visible in
passive oddball paradigms (Cahn and Polich, 2009). Using an active task, Smallwood
et al. (2008) showed a reduction of the P300 ERP during mind wandering. Consistent
with our MMN and P2 results, Smallwood et al. (2008) result suggest a disengage-
ment of attention towards external stimuli processing. The study of ERSP is harder
to interpret since it is rarely presented in literature. Increased evoked theta frequency
over frontal regions may be related to increased autobiographical memory engage-
ment during mind wandering (Jensen et al., 2002; Onton et al., 2005) . Note that the
ERP differential scalp maps from 180 to 280 ms were similar to the theta frequency
maps with strong changes over occipital regions. The ERP is a complex combination
of stimulus-locked phase synchronization and spectral amplitude increase (Makeig
et al., 2002; Delorme et al., 2007). We tested if ERP and ERSP activities were linked by
computing the correlation between the ERSP activity and the ERP at electrode site Fz
for the evoked delta, theta, alpha and beta frequency band activity shown in figure 3.5.
We did not find any correlation between the early ERP negative component between
90 and 120 ms after stimulus onset and any of the ERSP components. However, when
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pooling data for both types of stimulus and both attentional states, we did find a pos-
itive correlation (p<0.001; df=47; paired t-test) between the evoked delta (2.5 to 3.5Hz)
and high alpha (10-14Hz) activity 100 to 300 ms after stimulus onset and the late ERP
positive component at 180 to 280 ms. This indicates that both the late ERP complex
and delta ERSP activity may index similar processes in our passive auditory oddball
task.
In conclusion about this study, we have shown the neurophysiologic markers of
mind wandering. Based only on subjective reports about mind wandering, we have
established that two different attentional states correspond to two distinct brain states
underlying different modes of sensory processing. Our results suggest that mind wan-
dering correspond to a state of rest, a state of low vigilance where stimulus evoked
responses are reduced. This study is one of the first event-related neuroimaging study
to rely only on behavioral responses based on pure – not stimulus induced - introspec-
tive subjective reports. It further demonstrates that approaches based on subjective
experience are possible in neuroscience yet argues for the need of a more fine-grained
taxonomy of private mental states.
The next chapter will present our preliminary work on the phenomenology of mind
wandering.
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Phenomenological study of mind
wandering
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The methodology we use in our first study on mind wandering (chapter 3) allow
assessing frequency of occurence of mind wandering episodes but not provide infor-
mation on their content. This chapter presents our preliminary work to include phe-
nomenological data in future mind wandering studies. The first section present phe-
nomenological protocols integrated in neuroimaging studies and the second section
will present our preliminary work using the explicitation interview technique. This
chapter aims more at introducing our exploration of methodological leads rather than
at presenting well-established results. We thanks Claire Petitmengin for her help and
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support in the training of the explicitation interview technique and its application to
the study of mind wandering.
4.1 Explicitation interview
The main goal of an explicitation interview is not to retrieve the semantic content of
an experience but the inner structures, or gesture, of that experience.
The main steps in a standard explicitation interview are described in Petitmengin
(2006) and briefly detailed below:
• The first step consists in finding a particular situation to be elicited, which is
generally a past experience.
• The second step consists in questioning the interviewee about the sensory char-
acteristics of the situation to guide him/her into a state of evocation involving
the interviewee’ s autonoetic consciousness 1 of the event.
• A third step consist in distinguishing between general descriptions and descrip-
tions of inner actions and sensations. During the interview, the questions are
more directed towards the “how” than the “what” of the experience, in order
to help the interviewee focus more on describing the structure of the experience
rather than its semantic content.
Following training in the explicitation interview methods with Claire Petitmengin,
I applied it to the study of the inner gesture accompanying a mind wandering episode.
4.1.1 Interview setting
We chose to use again the breath counting task presented in chapter 3: the subject sit
at a table and has to count his breaths from 1 to 10 in a loop, with his eyes closed.
Whenever he/she realizes that he/she is not doing the task anymore, meaning that
he/she does not know the next count or stopped counting, he/she has to signal it by
knocking on the table. The explicitation interview then starts. With the agreement of
the subject, an audio recording is made of the interview.
1developed in the human memory literature, the concept of autonoeitic consciousness refers to the
capacity of both mentally represent and becoming aware of our subjective experiences in the past,
present or future (Tulving, 1985; Wheeler et al., 1997)
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4.1.2 Guidelines
To help focus the interview and questions as to which experience to explore, prelimi-
naries explicitation interviews were realized and 3 key moments of a mind wandering
experience were identified and for each, potential interesting directions to explore dur-
ing the interview
• the concentration on the breath: the concentrative process (how does the subject
to focus) and the state of concentration (what was the attention directed to, was
there a feeling of the breathing, or any other physical sensation).
• the mind wandering episode: the appearance of the thoughts (its localization, dis-
tance, size, colours), the trigger of the drift (was it from an external or internal
source) and the diminution of the attention turned toward the breathing (what
was the importance given to the thought compared to the breathing).
• the realization of the mind-wandering occurrence: determination of its timing, (was
it immediate or progressive ?).
4.1.3 Analysis of an explicitation interview
Analysis of the data collected during an explicitation interview starts with the tran-
scription of the interview. The transcript is then read and anecdotal contents and gen-
eral description are put aside while the information regarding the experience itself
is emphasized. Then the different events marking the different stages of the experi-
ence are identified. This process allows to determine the diachronic structure, that
is the temporal unfolding of the experience, with its successive stages. As a second
step, experiences characterizing each stages are identified: the sensations, quality of
attention, emotion, etc. accompanying each stages. These experiences are called expe-
riential categories and they allow defining the synchronic structure of each phase, that
is, its non-temporal dimension corresponding to the subject’s experience. Finally, for
each subject, an individual model of the structure of the mind wandering episode is
created. The observation of invariants across the different models allows constructing
a general representation of the experience of mind wandering.
4.1.4 Preliminary results: diachronic structure of a mind wandering
experience
We will present here the analysis of data collected with 4 subjects. One subject did
the interview twice, with two different mind wandering episodes. Appendix A is an
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example of the transcription of an interview, in french.
Here we will focus on the mind-wandering episodes from their onset until their
end, and present their diachronic structure.
As mentioned earlier, before the occurrence of mind wandering all subjects were
counting their breath, seating with their eyes closed.
Based on the descriptions, we identified the different phases of a mind-wandering
event: (1) the apparition of a distractor, (2) the attention starting shifting toward this
distractor, (3) the attentional lapse and (4) the detection of a change or conflict, which
terminates mind wandering episodes. All interviewees described phases 1, 3 and 4.
One out of the 4 interviewees did not described phase 2. Still based on the subjects’
description we identified experiential categories that were present throughout the dif-
ferent phases: the direction of the attention and the mental content. Below we present
our principal findings. Interviews were realized in french language and we translated
into english the excerpts included here.
1. Apparition of a distractor
• Mental content: among the experience associated with the breath counting
task, a distractor appears. It can either be mental images, body sensation
or physical stimulation from the external environment. Inner dialog can be
present.
• The direction of attention: at this stage, the interviewees report that their at-
tention is still primarily focused on the breath counting task.
“At first I can keep track of the count, in between two thoughts that are interrupting the
process. ” M.R1
“I paid attention to this noise, but I kept on counting ” G.B.J
“I was on my 3rd cycle counting and I started to, I don’t know how to say, to feel an
oppressive feeling of having the eyes closed. It came progressively” M.R2
2. The attention start shifting
• Mental content: the distractor is more and more present and its character-
istics are changing. In the case of a mental image, it may start moving, a
sound might be perceived louder, inner voices dialogues might occur.
“ideas come to life .. it is now images in movement. Instead of images that overlap,
you can think of a movie that unfold.” M.R1
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“I don’t know who’s voice .. the voice of someone. I heard it inside me, as if the
sound told me ‘Hi, I’m going to bother you a little bit.’” G.B.J
• The direction of attention: the attention is now turning more towards the dis-
tractor than the counting task.
“all that noise around, like the building work, I stopped hearing it. I was more
focused on the noise I was making myself [...] I started focusing only on just the act
of breathing and not counting anymore” H.M
“At 8 60% [of my attention was] on the count and 40% outside, 9 too but I feel
that 11 was more more outside, I increased the percentage of attention toward the
noise outside” G.B.J
“The impression of having a counter before me and after a while I lose the focus on
the counter and I end up watching something that is around .. my thoughts are
around” M.R1
3. Attentional lapse
• Mental content: the phenomenal contents varies wildly in that phase. 2 of
the 4 subjects reported experiencing a “blank”. The others got absorbed in
the experience of the distractor.
“It is a time of blank, this is a time where it is empty.” M.R2
“the colours [of the mental images] came once I lost track of everything else” M.R1
“then I think at number 10... I don’t remember number 10, I don’t see myself count-
ing the 10” G.B.J
• The direction of attention: the attention was entirely captured by the distrac-
tor. Based on the data we collected, it was not possible to retrieve the
description of a specific movement of the attention corresponding to this
phase.
“the impression of a total slip. The numbers [from the breath counting task] were
gone” M.R1
“I had forgotten I was here and I was only on my breathing” H.M
4. Detection of a change: end of mind wandering
• Mental content: the subjects become conscious of a change in their attitude,
body sensations or of a conflict taking place between what they are doing
and what they are supposed to do.
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• The direction of attention: subjects tend to report that their attention is “going
back to themselves”
“When I felt that I was not breathing deeply anymore, I opened the eyes. I realized that I
was not doing what I should be doing.” M.R1
“I came back to the task without realizing at first that I had drifted away and when I
started counting again I had the impression that something was wrong. In the unfolding
of my logic, there’s something missing. So I wondered: is it that I went from ‘5’ to ‘7’,
did I though of saying the ‘6’? .. I realize that there is a moment where I was not really
present.” M.R2
“After, I said ‘12’ and suddenly I thought: ‘it’s nonsense G., you must come back to 1 ’”
G.B.J
4.1.5 Discussion
Although these results are preliminary, they provide for the first time to our knowl-
edge an account of the different phases structuring a mind-wandering event, based on
pure phenomenal descriptions. The main components of a mind wandering episode
are: the apparition of a distractor, the attention starting shifting toward this distractor
and the attentional lapse. Detection of a change or conflict terminates mind wandering
episodes.
We have seen that in the course of a mind-wandering episode, the phenomenal
characteristics of the distracting stimulus evolve. Mental images may contain colour
and be animated, an inner voice may be heard etc. Although these are only a few
characteristics collected over a limited number of subjects, it already highlights the
large variety of experiences from subject to subject and from one episode of mind
wandering to another. Note that one of the subject gave a very complete description
of the mental images and the changing occurring to them as he was becoming less and
less focus on the task, so recollection without awareness of not performing the task at
hand, is possible.
What could be the utility of this approach to the study of mind wandering ? First,
we have to confirm our preliminary diachronic analysis by confronting it to the expe-
rience of more subjects, to ensure that we have correctly identified it. Then with more
data we could also analyze the subject’s report depending on the class of mind wan-
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dering episode. For example we could have classes of mind wandering corresponding
to the type of distractors “mental images”, “external sound” and “body sensation” and
analyze the diachronic and synchronic structure of the mind wandering event for each
class. Another possibility could be to group interview data according to the character-
istics of the phase “attentional lapses”, depending on whether the subject is reporting
“a blank” or explicit mental content.
We believe such data would contribute to our knowledge of the inner structures
underlying the so familiar mind wandering experience and would also opens news
ways of refining its study in neuroimaging experiment.
4.2 Methodology for online collection of phenomenolog-
ical data
The explicitation interview is obviously not suited for being used directly in neu-
roimaging experiments. To be able to correlate the brain EEG activity with online
reports of the characteristic of mind wandering episodes, we designed questionnaires
that the subject could fill in an online fashion during the experiment.
This questionnaire has been designed in collaboration with Romain Grandchamp
and we also wish to thanks Claire Petitmengin for her valuable feedback on the ques-
tionnaire structure. The task for the subjects was again to perform the breath counting
task (see chapter 3). Subjects were facing a computer screen and holding a mouse in
their right hand. Upon realizing they were mind wandering, they had to press the
mouse left button and the questionnaire screen was then presented. If they mistak-
enly pressed the left mouse button - without having experienced mind wandering -
subjects could press on the mouse right button to exit the questionnaire. Both our sub-
jects were meditation practitioners, and thus particularly sensitive to the detection of
mind wandering episodes. They were explicitely told to signal both the occurrences
of simultaneous thoughts in parallel to the execution of the task and the moments
where they had lost the count of their breaths. The questionnaire, shown in figure 4.1,
is composed of eleven questions with multiple choice. For each question, there is a
single answer possible. Before starting the experiment subjects had time to familiarize
with the questionnaire, so they can respond to it quickly during the experiment.
1. Involvement in the task : this question relates to how much the subject was
involved in the breath counting task during the mind wandering. We made here
the distinction between three types of possibilities:
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Figure 4.1: Screenshot of the questionnaire for the online evaluation of the character-
istics of a mind wandering episode
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• lost track of the count : the subject did not know anymore the count of his
breaths
• uncertainty: the subject was hesitating between two numbers when counting
• simultaneous thoughts: the subject did not lost track of the count, but expe-
rienced simultaneous thoughts that he could follow without disturbing the
primary task
2. How clearly do you remember of the contents of the thoughts: this question
relates to the capacity of the subject to remember his experiences during the mind
wandering episode. The answer must be provided on a scale of I forgot (0) to Very
clearly (8). An additional button I don’t know gave the possibility for the subject
to indicate his uncertainty.
3. What was the form of the thoughts ?: this question aims at characterizing the
phenomenal content of the thoughts during mind wandering. The following
choices were given:
• images
• inner dialogue
• both images and inner dialogue
• neither one nor the other
4. Content of the thoughts : what were the thoughts about ?
• the task : the subject was thinking about the task
• boredom
• yourself as a protagonist : the subject thoughts of future or past situations in
which he sees himself as a protagonist
• an external distractor: an external sound or stimulation disturbed the subject
• plannification: the subject was making plans for the future
• passive observation: the subject was not taking any active role in the situations
he thought about - as if watching a scene from a movie.
5. Predominant feeling : what was the general state of the subject ?
• discomfort: the subject experienced physical discomfort
• tiredness: the subject was getting tired
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• well being: the subject was feeling well
• none of the three
6. Vigilance level :
• drowsy: the subject was getting sleepy
• agitated: the subject was restless (wanting to move etc..)
• calm: the subject was calm
• lucid: the subject was very aware of his sensation and mental contents
7. Time-lag between the experience of mind wandering and the button press ? :
this questions aims at identifying situations in which there is a time-lag between
the termination of a mind wandering event and the realization of the subject that
he has been mind wandering.
• Yes
• No
8. Duration of the mind wandering episode:
• Very short (less than 2 secondes)
• Short (less than 10 secondes)
• Average (less than 30 secondes)
• Long (more than 30 secondes)
9. Spatial distance with regard to your current position ? : this question attempts
to characterize the spatial projection during the mind wandering, whether the
subject thought of events taking place in the lab or in far away places. Answers
were given on a scale from null (0) (the setting of the thought content was the
experimental room) to very far (8).
10. How do you situate in time the content of your thoughts ?: this question taps
into the temporality of the thought content. Answers were given on a scale from
Far in the past (-4) to Far in the future (4). Zero indicated the present. An additional
button Non temporal was provided to indicate thoughts that were not marked by
a distinctive temporality.
11. How do you judge the emotional content of your thoughts ?: Answers were
given on a scale from Negative (-4) to Positive (4). Zero indicated neutral emotion.
An additional button I don’t know was also provided.
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4.3 Preliminary results
The questionnaire has been used in a EEG/eyetracking experiment aiming at corre-
lating physiological signal with the content characteristics of mind wandering occur-
rences. In addition, in this experiment, we also wanted to assess the reliability of the
results in a same subject across sessions. Thus two subjects undertook the experiment
11 times over a month (one session of the experiment itself lasted 20 minutes). Data
from the eyetracking recording have been analyzed and presented in Grandchamp
et al. (2011) and the EEG data is currently been analyzed. We present below prelimi-
nary accounts for the responses on the questionnaire.
4.3.1 Frequency of mind wandering
Over the 11 sessions, we collected 415 and 413 occurrences of mind wandering for
subject 1 and 2 respectively, which makes about 38 mind wandering episodes for each
subject over the 20 minutes of a session (about 1.8 mind wandering event per minute).
4.3.2 Analysis of the answers
Figure 4.2 shows the answers of each subject to the questionnaire across the sessions.
We observe that for both subject the majority of mind wandering reports concerned
the occurrence of thoughts simultaneous to the execution of the breath counting task.
Most of the time there was no time lag between the occurence of the mind wandering
event and its report by the subject. The majority of mind wandering episode lasted
for about 10 secondes. Regarding thoughts content, for both subjects most thoughts
involved both mental images and inner dialogue and where related to events taking
place in the close environment of the subjects. The thoughts content concerned in
majority thoughts relative to the task or the passive observation of a situation. The
thoughts were almost never about events taking place very far in the past or in very
far in the futur. Most had temporal quality close to the present time of the subject
or did not have any distinctive temporal characteristic. The emotional content was
mostly either slightly negative or neutral. The subjects level of vigilance was mostly
either normal (calm) or lower than normal (drowsiness). Subjects differ in the quality
of feelings they report, subject 1 experiencing more discomfort than subject 2, while
subject 2 was ore tired than subject 1.
In overall these preliminary results inform about the characteristics of mind wan-
dering of 2 subjects during the breath counting task, in the conditions of a simulta-
neous EEG-eyetracking experiment. Of course more subjects would be needed before
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we are able to draw general conclusions about the characteristics of mind wander-
ing. The data concerning the vigilance state will also be very helpful in the analysis of
physiological data.
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4.4 Possible improvements and perspectives
There are potential improvements that can be done to the actual questionnaire. For a
future utilisation we plan to remove the scales and replace them by qualitative vari-
ables to facilitate data processing and give more homogeneity to the questionnaire.
It also took a certain time for the subjects to familiarize enough with the question-
naire and the meaning of the questions to answer them accurately. In our preliminary
data subjects were meditation practitioners that were already sensible of the different
characteristics their thoughts could take. For subjects that are not meditators it might
be more difficult at first to grasp the characteristics of the content of their thoughts.
In this case it might be useful to consider giving an examplar of the questionnaire
to meditation-naive subjects a few days before the experiment to allow them to fa-
miliarize with the process of paying attention to their mind wandering thoughts and
especially to the characteristics that are assessed in the questionnaire.
In another experiment we adapted the questionnaire for using it in the context of
an fMRI study, with a response pad with only 6 possible keys. For that purposed we
simplified it and used pictogrammes, as shown in figure 4.3. The task was a classical
Sternberg working memory task, where subjects had to memorize strings of letter and
indicate after a 20 secondes retention interval wether a given letter was present or not
in the string. Subjects were then probed with a questionnaire to indicate the main
content of their thoughts during the retetntion interval. There was 6 possible answers:
button 1: thinking of the task, i.e. . rehearsing the letters (top left figure), button 2:
thoughts that were related to the task (top right figure), button 3 : thoughts about
external distractors, such as the sound of the MRI scanner (middle left figure), button
4: mind wandering, i.e. . thinking of something not related to the task or to a stimulus
of a current environment (middle right figure), button 5: feeling drowsy (bottom left
figure) and button 6: having short periods of “micro sleep” as it can happen when lying
in the scanner (bottom right figure).
We believe the use of online questionnaires for the study of mind wandering in
neuroimaging will develop in the coming years and contribute to better analysis and
understanding of the mechanismes of mind wandering.
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...# A B # C...
°C
...# A B # C...
ZZZ
Figure 4.3: The questionnaire designed for being use in fMRI during a Sternberg task.
Top left figure: thinking of the task ; top right figure : task-related thoughts; middle left
figure: thinking of external distractors; middle right figure: mind wandering; bottom
left figure: drowsiness; bottom right figure: periods of “micro sleep”.
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Chapter 5
An introduction to the scientific study
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In this second part of the manuscript, I turn towards the study of meditation. First
I am presenting a state of the art review of the effects of meditation on the body and
brain and then I report a study aiming at carefully comparing the brain EEG activity
of 3 different meditation traditions, compared to a meditation-naive control group.
But first, I will go more in details about the inscription of meditation in scientific
paradigms and the diversity of meditation practices.
5.1 Meditation and its scientific paradigm
Meditation has been the subject of scientific research for about the past 40 years but
only started to gain popularity in the late 1990s (see Figure 5.1).
Based on the assumption that different conscious states are accompanied by differ-
ent neurophysiological states, the neuroscientific approach to meditation focuses on
altered sensory, cognitive, and self-awareness experiences. Meditation-induced neu-
rophysiological changes may be of two kinds: changes that occur during meditation
practice are referred as state changes, changes which build up over months or years
and persist even when the mind is not actively engaged in meditation are referred to
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as trait changes (Cahn and Polich, 2006).
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of the numbers of publication having the term “meditation”
either in its title or abstract and referenced in PubMed from 1970 to July 2012
5.1.1 A working framework
There are a large number of distinct meditative practices (see5.2), and only recently an
operational framework have emerged to facilitate the scientific study of meditation by
providing a common ground for an operational definition of the practices (see Bishop
et al., 2004; Cahn and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2008b; Josipovic, 2010). Given that self-
regulation of attention is a major component that is common among all meditative
practices, meditative styles can be classified on a continuum depending on how atten-
tional processes are directed, from focused to unfocused practices (Lutz et al., 2008b).
Concentrative - or focused attention — techniques involve continuous sustained atten-
tion on a selected object: the object of focus may be breath or body sensations, a subvo-
cal repeated sound or word (mantra), or an imagined mental image. Focused attention
meditation requires the narrowing of awareness so that the mind only contains the ob-
ject of focus. If distraction occurs, such as mind wandering, the practitioner has to shift
his attention back to the selected object of meditation. On the other hand of the con-
tinuum, mindfulness (unfocused) meditation practices, also called open-monitoring,
open awareness or insight meditation, involve the expanding of awareness with no ex-
plicit focus (except awareness itself). In open monitoring, practitioners are instructed
to allow any thought, feeling, or sensation to arise in consciousness while maintaining
a nonreactive awareness to what is being experienced. Mindfulness may be described
as sustained awareness aimed at nonreactive and nonattached mental observation,
without cognitive or emotional interpretation of the unfolding moment-to-moment
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experience (Cahn and Polich, 2006; Gunaratana, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 2003; Lutz et al.,
2008b). To this operational framework, we can add “passive” meditation which in-
cludes meditation practices marked by the absence of focus and of individual control
or effort (Lutz et al., 2007).
In addition to these considerations regarding attentional direction, the affective di-
mension of the practice can also be taken into account. Indeed many practices include
the wish of happiness for others (loving kindness) and/or the wish to relieve other’ s
suffering (compassion) (Lutz et al., 2008a).
At this point it is important to note that although the criteria exposed above are
useful tools for the scientist they are not mutually exclusive in practice. One may start
a meditation session by focused attention then switch to open awareness and finally
transcending the object of his meditation. Or these different aspects can be reached as
one gained experience and training in a meditation practice. For example, as describe
in figure 5.1.1, the Chag-zôg Tibetan practice of open monitoring starts by a meditation
focused on an object before moving towards more and more detachement to finally
observe awareness itself.
In the majority of studies at the time being, the instruction given when learning a
practice serves as guidelines to define on which side of the continuum a given practice
falls. The use of this criteria will certainly evolve as we gain more knowldege on the
meditative state neuronal and phenomenological correlates.
5.1.2 How to define meditation expertise ?
Assessing the meditation expertise of practitioners is another fundamental problem-
atic that should not be overlooked. Recent studies have taken the length of meditative
experience in hours and years as a criteria for meditation expertise as well as judge-
ment from the meditation teacher or community on the qualities of the practitioners
(Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008a). Dayli practice, even for short peri-
ods of time seem to be also preferrable than occasional extensive practice.
5.2 The different types of meditation
Meditation traditions exist all over the world. An encyclopedia would be necessary
to attempt to describe each and every one of them. Here I will focus on only a few of
them, mostly meditation practices from Asian traditions, since these are the traditions
that have been studied the most by Western scientists and the ones I studied in this
PhD work.
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Stage Object Subject
Reflexive
Awareness
1 + - -
2 - + +
3 - - +
4 Ø ø ++
-”= de-emphasis; “ ”= emphasis; “ø”= absent.
Figure 5.2: Schematic representation of the different stages in the practice of open
monitoring meditation in the Chag-zôg Tibetan practice. This style of practice starts by
developing concentration on an object (stage 1), before cultivating awareness of sub-
jectivity in a manner that de-emphasizes the object. The practitioner then gains phe-
nomenal access to reflexive awareness (stage 2). Subjectivity is then de-emphasized as
well to enhance the acess to reflexivity (stage 3). Finally one moves to the point where
the invariant aspect of awareness is fully realized in meditation. Taken from Lutz et al.
(2007).
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5.2.0.0.1 Soto Zen is a tradition based on mindfulness and open monitoring. One
practices it while sitting, usually facing a wall with open eyes. Practitioners are in-
structed to observe their thoughts and emotions as they arise in their minds and not to
cling to them or engage in narrative thinking but simply let these thoughts or emotions
go and remain purely aware of sitting. Every time practitioners realize that the mind
has started to wander (i.e., they identified with a thought), they have to bring their at-
tention back to the present moment. This practice is also called Shikantaza, a Japanese
term that means"nothing but precisely sitting." In Rinzai Zen, the other major form of
Zen practice, practitioners are instructed to concentrate on koans. Koans are riddles
that cannot be solved with knowledge or thinking."What is the sound of one hand
clapping?" is a popular Zen koan. Zen students are given a koan by a Zen teacher,
depending on their level of development in the practice and their personality. They
are then instructed to meditate on it until they can solve it. They regularly present
their solution to their teacher and, if successful, are given a new koan. Koans are ways
to help meditators get out of the thought-based state of ordinary consciousness and
access pure awareness of the present moment.
5.2.0.0.2 Vipassana meditation is another open monitoring meditation technique
that is now widespread in the West. In Vipassana, practitioners begin by observing
their breath around the area of the nostrils to help the mind develop sustained, focused
attention. Every time the mind wanders, they have to bring it back to the sensation of
breathing. As they do so, attention gets sharper and sharper. Then practitioners have
to mentally scan sequentially and meticulously each part of the body and feel the
sensation in each of these body parts . They continuously keep their attention moving
down from head to toes and then up in the reverse direction. At first, they find it
hard to experience sensation in each and every part of the body, but with practice,
they progressively come to feel sensations in more parts of their bodies. Participants
are only instructed to keep their attention moving and observe, objectively and with
equanimity, the sensations that they are experiencing. Practitioners should try to avoid
developing feelings of aversion or cravings for specific sensations, as this is believed
to disturb both body and mind. Vipassana is a good example of a meditation practice
in which focused attention and open monitoring are both incorporated.
5.2.0.0.3 Mantra or prayer meditation might be the most popular type of medita-
tion worldwide and is present in Tibetan Buddhism, Sufism, Hinduism, and many
other traditions. It is a type of concentrative meditation. Matra meditation became
widespread in the West in the 1960s with the development of the Hare Krishna soci-
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ety. A mantra is a religious or mystical sound, word, or poem that can be either recited
aloud or subvocally. For instance, Hare Krishna practitioners are instructed to repeat
the 16-word Hare Krishna mantra,"Hare Krishna Hare Krishna, Krishna Krishna Hare
Hare, Hare Rama Hare Rama, Rama Rama Hare Hare," 1,728 times a day, keeping
the correct count with the help of prayer beads. The particular body vibration that a
mantra induces is believed to calm and focus the mind and body without the need for
intense concentrative efforts. When meditators repeat the mantra, they are instructed
to focus their full attention on the recitation, and also sometimes on its meaning if it
has one.
Mantra meditation is in many ways similar to slow reading or chanting of sacred
texts while one absorbs their meaning. These practices are present in all religions
and spiritual traditions. Texts involved may be sutras in Buddhism (discourse from
the Buddha). Christian practices, for instance, involve recitation of a prayer phrase
or the study of Scripture, which involves the slow reading of the Bible as the reader
considers the meaning of each verse, and is practiced by monks of various orders.
Although these practices are usually not specifically referred to as meditation, they
involve focused attention and going beyond dialectic thinking, two traits they share
with meditation.
5.2.0.0.4 Himalayan Yoga Tradition is an ancient tradition consisting of many steps
and paths that are integrated with each other. For example: (1) deep relaxation tech-
niques performed in ‘corpse position’, finally leading to yoga-nidra (the sleep of the
Yogi). (2) correct position of spine in sitting for meditation, together with diaphrag-
matic breathing and number of other breathing exercises. (3) Breath awareness prac-
tices. (4) Mentaly repeat a sound or series of sound (mantra) and at the same time
focus on their breathing and, in more advanced practitioners, specific body energy
centers (chakras). In the Himalayan Yoga tradition, the mantra is made of Sanskrit
syllables chosen by their meditation teacher and may or may not have a specific trans-
lation into regular language. The mantra may also be used only as a thought without
breath awareness. The vibrations that a particular mantra induces are considered to
calm and focus the mind and body without the need for intense effort of concentra-
tion. During the course of a meditation session, when a certain level of transcendance
is felt, the practioner can let go of the mantra repetition.
5.2.0.0.5 Transcendental meditation pertains to the passive class of meditative
practices. A mantra is given to the practitioner and he/she has to repeating it while
seating with eyes closed and letting his/her mind drift and not concentrate on any-
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thing in particular (Morse et al., 1977). This technique is described as “easy, enjoy-
able and does not involve concentration, contemplation or any type of control” (Wal-
lace, 1970). Transcendental meditation is among the most popular form of meditation
among Westerners and has in fact be adapted for them based on Indian meditative
traditions.
5.2.0.0.6 Isha Yoga Isha meditators practice a form of yoga called Isha Yoga, which
includes Asanas (yoga postures), Kriyas (specific breathing techniques and body pos-
tures) and sitting meditation (Shoonya and Samyama meditations). The Isha Yoga
practices are designed to purify, balance and enhance one’s energy system. During the
Asanas and Kriyas, practitioners focus on the breath and body sensations; during the
meditations, the practitioners maintain awareness of their thought process and – with
the Samyama meditation – also their breath. When practicing Shoonya meditation the
meditator goes through a process of conscious non-doing that creates a distance be-
tween one’s self and one’s body and mind. For the duration of the meditation, the
practitioner consciously does not respond to any internal or external stimuli. Shoonya
meditation can be realated to the passive meditation practices.
5.2.0.0.7 Other forms of meditation may involve generating and focusing on feel-
ings of loving-kindness or compassion toward all living beings (one of many Tibetan
Buddhism practices). Mental visualization and careful examination of sacred objects
is another common mediation practice in Tibetan Buddhism. Different practices can
also be done while one is moving. In the case of walking meditation, one has to walk
slowly, keeping breath coordinated with each step, and remain aware of every body
sensation and movement. While working or doing simple tasks, one may simply be
present and focused on the action being done now, that is, giving the present moment
one’s undivided attention, without thinking about past or future events. Walking and
work meditation are an important part of Zen practice. Yoga is also a form of medi-
tation in movement. It combines specific physical postures, breath patterns, and body
awareness.
In most meditation traditions, daily practice is supplemented by retreats that in-
volve intensive practice. These retreats are often held in complete silence. They can
last from a few days to several months or even years. In the Tibetan meditation tradi-
tion, for instance, it is not uncommon to see dedicated practitioners engage in monastic
life spending several years of their lives in complete silent isolation.
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5.2.0.0.8 Clinically-derived meditation practices Meditation as mental training for
regulation of attention finds clinical applications. Deficit of attention have been found
in numerous mental disorder ADHD (Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity Disorder)
(Pasini et al., 2007), unipolar and bipolar depression (Williams et al., 2000; Gruber
et al., 2007; Jongen et al., 2007), anxiety disorder (Dupont et al., 2000; Shapiro and Lim,
1989) and schizophrenia (Liu et al., 2006; Luck et al., 2006). Since about twenty years,
type of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) developed that are integrating attention
reeducation based on the practice of mindfulness, a way of paying attention to the
present moment that can be acquired through meditation practice (Baer, 2003). These
mindfulness-based therapies reveal helpful in the treatment of numerous mental dis-
orders (Baer, 2003; Grossman et al., 2004; Hayes and Feldman, 2004; Ma and Teasdale,
2004; Teasdale et al., 2000). Mindfulness training is also offered in stress-reduction
program (Kabat-Zinn, 1990).
In the next chapter we will review experimental work showing the effects of med-
itation practice at the brain and body levels. We will see that although there seems
to be good evidences for an implication of meditation in cognitive and physiological
changes, little is known on the actual mechanisms of action of meditation and that
there are still important methodological flaws in meditation research. Chapter 7 will
present our comparative study of EEG oscillatory activity in 3 different types of med-
itation.
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This chapter is inspired from a book chapter published in 2010, Braboszcz et al.
(2010). Here, I present the state of the art scientific knowledge on the effects of medi-
tation on the brain and body.
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6.1 Meditation and the peripheral nervous system
Since meditation is often considered to be a relaxation technique, it is reasonable to
assume that meditation practice affects the functioning of the body. The mechanisms
underlying the effect of meditation on the body are not yet understood, and as for cog-
nitive and brain activity correlates of meditation, we currently lack formal evaluation
procedures for the diverse meditation types and methodologies being used (Cahn and
Polich, 2006). Only a brief overview of interesting research directions is provided here.
6.1.1 Body Representation
Meditation induces long-lasting changes to one’s body perception that can be ob-
served both at low-level cortical representations and at higher-level representation as-
sociated with the sense of self (Cahn and Polich, 2006). Meditation-induced changes
in cortical areas devoted to process inputs from the body are reported by Lazar et al.
(2005) and could account for increased awareness of the sensory field. Lazar et al.
(2005)’s study shows that regular practice of open-monitoring meditation—which fo-
cuses on both internal and external sensations—increases the thickness of the cortex
in somatosensory areas of the brain. This increase in cortex thickness was positively
correlated with meditation experience, so we may hypothesize that it functionally
corresponds to an increase in body awareness. Testing this hypothesis, Khalsa et al.
(2008) had long-term meditators in both active (yoga) and sitting forms of meditation
and non-meditators perform a heartbeat detection task in which participants had to
tell whether or not short sounds were displayed synchronously to their own heart-
beats (they had to try to feel their heartbeats without using their finger on peripheral
arteries). They found that the meditators did not perform any better than the non-
meditators. This suggests that changes in meditators’ body representation are not
functionally correlated with better perception of physiological sensation. However,
in this study, meditators systematically rated their experience of interoceptive percep-
tion higher than did control subjects. Collection of their subjective experiences also
revealed that they found the heartbeat-counting task to be easier than non-meditators
did. It is relevant to note that attention to the heart beat is generally not employed
in meditative training. A different study by Farb et al. (2012) studied changes in in-
teroceptive attention during a breath awareness task, which is the most basic practice
usually given when starting to meditate. They found that attention to the breathing
involved greater activation of interoceptive attention related part of the insula in a
group of subjects after mindfulness-based stress reduction training compared to sub-
jects from the waitlist (Farb et al., 2012). Lazar et al. (2005)’s results might then directly
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index improved body awareness without general improved of body representation.
Following meditation training there would be better perception of only those sensa-
tions that are the object of specific attention during the practice of meditation. toward
an "impersonal beingness" (Cahn and Polich, 2006).
6.1.2 Effect of Meditation on the Autonomic and Immune System
Meditation affects bodily functions in two different ways: standard daily meditation
practice creates a low arousal state, and peak meditation experience fosters a high
arousal state. According to early theoretical models, infrequent peak experiences have
quite a different high arousal tone than the more common meditative states (Cahn and
Polich, 2006), but it is difficult to study such experiences because of their rarity. This
section will thus only review data concerning the usual trait commonly experienced
during meditation practice. Based on early studies of transcendental meditation, Jevn-
ing et al. (1992) qualify the common meditation state as a “wakeful hypometabolic
state”.
The autonomic nervous system controls the activity of organs and viscera in the
body. It is composed of the sympathetic and parasympathetic neural pathways. Al-
though this is a schematic view and the reality is far more complex, these two compo-
nents are usually believed to have opposite actions on their targeted organs or tissues.
The sympathetic system is most often involved in energy mobilization, preparing the
organism to react (flight-or-fight response, response to stress), whereas the parasym-
pathetic component is responsible for most resting and restoration functions (rest and
digestive functions) of the organism (Jänig, 2003).
One possible way for meditation to act on autonomic activity is through respira-
tion control. Respiration is one of the body’s few autonomic functions that can be
controlled and can affect functioning of the autonomic nervous system (Badra et al.,
2001; Eckberg et al., 1985). Many meditation traditions consider breath, body, and
mind to be linked and thus have given, whether explicitly or not, the breath a central
role in meditation practice. Voluntary control of the breath may be achieved through
specific inhalation-exhalation rhythmic patterns, as in pranayamic practice and the
slow diaphragmatic breathing practiced in yoga that involves specific movement of
the thoracic cage. Breath also tends to involuntarily slow down during mantra chant-
ing (Bernardi et al., 2001), breath-counting meditation, and simple awareness of the
breath (Lehrer et al., 1999).
Slower respiration rate during meditation practice induces changes in cardiovas-
cular activity that correspond to an increase in the activity of the restorative parasym-
71
Meditation and the peripheral nervous system
pathetic system (Saul, 1990). This increased parasympathetic activity has also been
assessed through the slowing down of basal heart rate in meditators (Pal et al., 2004)
and the increased synchronization, or respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), between the
breathing cycle and the heartbeat during meditation (Cysarz and Bussing, 2005; Ditto
et al., 2006). RSA corresponds to high variability in heart rate as heart rate becomes
faster during inhalation and slower during exhalation. Mechanisms behind human
RSA are not yet well understood (Grossman and Taylor, 2007; Tzeng et al., 2009) but
might be important to meditation research, as RSA could be used as an index of suc-
cessful emotion exposure during meditation (see 6.3). Slow breathing has also been
associated with increased baroreflex sensitivity (Joseph et al., 2005; Reyes del Paso
et al., 2006). Decreased blood pressure is often reported after meditation practice by
both healthy individuals and hypertension patients (Carlson et al., 2007; Manikonda
et al., 2008). Improved control of blood pressure is usually considered a sign of balance
between parasympathetic and sympathetic activity. Finally, since one role of sleep is
to restore the balance in these autonomic systems, the fact that meditators typically
require less sleep than control subjects (Ajaya, 1976) suggests a better balance between
these two systems.
Although few studies have been conducted, there is increasing evidence that med-
itative practice also affects the immune system. Psychological states such as stress
affect the functioning of the immune system (Segerstrom and Miller, 2004). The im-
mune system is indirectly under the influence of the central nervous system via hor-
monal signaling and through activity of the autonomic nervous system (Dantzer and
Kelley, 1989; Jänig, 2003). Davidson et al. (2003) found faster peak rise for the an-
tibody response to a flu shot among healthy meditators who underwent an 8-week
mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) training course in open-monitoring med-
itation than among non-meditators. Increased number and increased activity of lym-
phocyte T and other natural killer cells have also been found in HIV patients after
MBSR training (Robinson et al., 2003; Taylor, 1995).
Finally, in a recent study, Pace et al. (2009) assessed the effect of compassion med-
itation (in which one works at developing altruistic emotions and behaviors towards
all living beings) on the immune response and found a negative correlation between
the amount of meditation practice and induced stress immune response.
We should develop a better understanding of meditation effects on the autonomic
and immune systems as we improve our understanding of these systems’ relation-
ship and their dynamic links to the central nervous system. Study of slow oscillatory
activity in both the central and autonomic systems would likely shed light on cou-
pling mechanisms between the brain, vegetative functions, and the mind (Basar, 2008).
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Jerath et al. (2006) built a model of synchronization between the cardiopulmonary
and the central nervous systems to explain how slow, deep pranayamic breathing
practiced in yogic meditation can influence the autonomic nervous system. David-
son et al. (2003) also found that left-sided anterior oscillatory activity of the brain is
positively correlated with activity of the immune system after meditation practice, as-
sessing through the quantity of natural killer cells. This type of hemispheric activity
has also been correlated with both the autonomic system activity and emotional regu-
lation (Craig, 2005), as we will see in the section dealing with emotions.
Thus, although a growing body of evidence showing a link between mind and
body states has accumulated over the years, more research will be needed to unravel
the mechanisms underlying the effects of meditation on the autonomic and immune
systems.
6.1.3 Meditation and Aging
As we have seen, meditation training seems to protect against stress and boost the
immune system. It has also recently been shown to reduce neuronal decay due to
normal aging. Pagnoni and Cekic (2007) found greater prefrontal cortex thickness in
middle-aged meditators than in non-meditators, as well as a decline in cortical thick-
ness associated with age, a result that is also reported by Lazar et al. (2005). Nagendra
et al. (2008) also showed that expert Vipassana meditators did not present sleep pat-
terns associated with aging. Both the length of the slow waves sleep period before the
occurrence of the first rapid eye movement (REM) sleep episode and the total length
of REM episodes typically decrease with age. Nagendra et al. (2008)’s study showed
that this decrease was drastically smaller in meditators of age 50–60 than in control
subjects of the same age. This suggests that meditation slows down the brain-aging
process through a mechanism that has yet to be discovered.
6.2 Meditation and attention
The cognitive function that meditation may affect the most is attention, since medi-
tation is a form of attention training. Meditation is a skill and as such it may train
attentional systems. As physical training strengthen body muscles, mental training
involved in meditation reinforces brain attentional circuits. Meditation recruits atten-
tional brain areas involved in learning.
Using fMRI, a technique that monitors metabolic activity in the brain as reflected
by variations in blood flow, Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007) found that in a group of
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Tibetan Buddhist meditators, focused attention meditation is associated with greater
activation in multiple attention-related brain regions (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex,
superior frontal sulcus, and intraparietal sulcus). Interestingly, brain activation var-
ied based on the person’s level of expertise. Expert meditators had less activity in
attention-related brain regions, whereas greater activity among less expert meditators
was associated with skill acquisition. This reduced metabolic activity in attention-
related regions of highly expert practitioners suggests an effortless — though efficient
— strategy for attentional resources allocation. This is supported by traditional Bud-
dhist descriptions of a decreased need for voluntary attentional effort to attain concen-
tration for expert practitioners.
Using electroencephalography, Lutz et al. (2004) also found that brain activity varies
based on expertise. These results suggest that meditation is a technique that is learned
and perfected over years of practice.
According to Lutz et al. (2008a), meditation practices involve at least three attention
regulation subsystems. First, meditation may involve intense object-based concentra-
tion. Selective attention—or orienting—is the selection of specific information from
the flow of sensory input and involves cortical structures known to gate information,
such as the temporal-parietal junction, the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the frontal
eye field, and the intraparietal sulcus (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). Second, medita-
tion imposes continuous monitoring of the focus of attention. Sustained attention—or
alertness—is the maintenance of a state of high sensitivity to a perceived stimulus or
mental object over time and most likely involves sustained synchronous activity be-
tween the thalamus and the right frontal and right parietal cortical structures—also
known as the thalamo-cortical loop (Berger et al., 2007; Coull, 1998; Posner and Roth-
bart, 2007).
Finally, meditation also involves transient attention shifts, as when one disengages
attention from a source of distraction and redirects it to the intended object of concen-
tration (Cahn and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2008b). This involves executive attention
— or conflict monitoring — which is the monitoring and resolution of conflicts among
thoughts, feelings, and mental plan. Increase of executive attention capacities follow-
ing meditation training is supported by behavioral data of meditators performing the
Stroop task. The Stroop task requieres indicating the ink color of stimuli made of
color names that could be written in a matching or mismatching ink color. When pre-
sented a color name written in a mismatching ink color, naming the ink color requieres
executive attention capacities to overcome the automatic processing of the linguistic
material. Performing the Stroop task meditators are faster and make less errors than
control subjects (Moore and Malinowski, 2009; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Executive atten-
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tion is managed by the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, structures that have also been shown to be activated when one is self-conscious
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Weissman et al., 2006).
6.2.1 Meditation Improves Perceptual Attention Capacity
Perceptual pre-attentive processes are sometimes under voluntary control—as, for in-
stance, when we focus our attention on an object or sound—although they may also
be affected by environmental cues. Selective visual attention focused on an object may
be involuntarily influenced by the surrounding objects; for example, distracting visual
stimuli of high contrast have been shown to automatically redirect this type of atten-
tion (Friedman-Hill et al., 2003). Below, we show how meditation affects involuntary
allocation of low-level attentional resources.
In the auditory domain, pre-attentive processes involve the automatic detection
of environmental changes and can be studied in the laboratory through the brain’s
electrical response (event-related potential) to a flow of frequent auditory stimuli in-
terspaced with infrequent ones. The amplitude of the differential electrical activity
between frequent and infrequent stimuli, called mismatch negativity, was found to
increase immediately among expert practitioners after a focused attention meditation
session (Srinivasan and Baijal, 2007).
Similar findings were found for Vipassana meditation (Cahn, 2007). Focused at-
tention training and the higher degree of awareness of the body and sensations in-
duced by meditation might be responsible for increased sensory cortex sensibility. Ac-
cording to one interpretation, neuronal populations tuned to different stimuli inhibit
each other and compete for attentional resources (Näätänen, 1992). Neuronal popu-
lations tuned to properties of the standard stimulation respond less vigorously upon
repeated stimulation and become desensitized. Thus when a deviant activates a dis-
tinct new neuronal population, these fresh afferents respond more vigorously, eliciting
mismatch negativity. Meditation would make these perceptual systems sharper and
more sensitive.
Experimental work also shows that open-monitoring meditation increases process-
ing capacity in the visual system. This evidence comes from a study using the atten-
tional blink paradigm. In this paradigm, two stimuli are presented in close succes-
sion. As a result of allocation of all attention resources to the first stimulus, the second
one is often not perceived. However, both behavioral and event-related potential re-
sults show that intensive 3-month open-monitoring retreats decrease the attentional
engagement in processing the first target, thus allowing subjects to process and per-
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ceive the second one (Slagter et al., 2007).
These results indicate that meditation tends to boost low-level attention. This could
be due to increased attentional resources. Meditation could recruit new attention-
dedicated neuronal networks or strengthen existing ones. Another hypothesis is that
attentional resources are constant. However, since meditation tends to quiet the mind,
we may observe a disengagement of attention from higher cognitive and verbal ar-
eas. If attentional systems are not dealing with thought affects, they might have more
resources to deal with low-level perceptual systems.
6.2.2 Meditation Decreases Perceptual Habituation
Neural and perceptual systems tend to habituate to repetitive presentation of stim-
uli, to which early responses are larger than later ones. Meditation has been shown
to decrease perceptual habituation to repetitive stimuli. This type of effect has been
mostly observed in open-monitoring meditation, in which the practitioner develops
attention to the present moment-to-moment experience without allowing his or her
attention to wander. In this meditation, each stimulus is seen as fresh and new in the
present moment. As an individual practicing open monitoring works on perceiving
each experience as it arises in the moment without judging, it might cut off automatic
brain mechanisms responsible for habituation, establishment of routines, and action
scenarios. A classical habituation paradigm involves repetitively presenting the same
stimulus and observing the decrease in the induced 10-Hz brain alpha wave amplitude
with the number of stimulus presentations. Non-habituation was demonstrated with
open-monitoring meditators where the electroencephalographic alpha rhythm ampli-
tude did not decrease after repeated stimulus presentations (Deikman, 1966; Wenger
and Bagchi, 1961). These findings are also consistent with Cahn and Polich (2009)
study showing less automated recruitment of frontal attentional circuits when rare
and salient auditory stimuli are processed during Vipassana open-monitoring medi-
tation practice.
Open-monitoring meditation also allows for faster reallocation of attentional re-
sources. Valentine and Sweet (1999) used an auditory sustained attention task in which
participants had to mentally count the number of beeps in several series of tones pre-
sented at different rates. In general, fast series came unexpectedly. Open-monitoring
meditation resulted in better counting performance in the unexpected fast series. In-
terestingly, this effect was not observed with focused attention meditation. One expla-
nation is that practitioners of concentrative meditation might have focused intensively
on the slow series and may have difficulty shifting their attention to start counting the
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faster series. On the other hand, open-monitoring practitioners, who only partially
practice engaging their attention, could more easily shift their attention to the fast pre-
sentation rate. These results indicate that meditation allows for non-habituation and
faster reallocation of attention. Beyond low-level attention allocation, we will see now
that meditation also has unexpected effects on the activity in higher perceptual areas.
6.2.3 Meditation Reduces Neural Population Competition in Higher
Perceptual Areas
Carter et al. (2005) reported results of a study of 23 Tibetan Buddhist monks who
have been engaged in either focused attention or open-monitoring meditation. These
monks were asked to perform a"binocular rivalry" task during which they were pre-
sented with two images, one before each eye. Under these circumstances, they were
randomly experiencing either both images simultaneously or each of them alterna-
tively for 2–3 seconds as the images competed for attentional resources in the visual
system. No effects of open-monitoring meditation were observed either during or af-
ter the practice. However, monks practicing focused attention meditation were able
to maintain a stable, superimposed percept of the two competing images for a longer
than normal duration. These results suggest that selective and sustained attention
allows conflicting stimuli to be perceived simultaneously by long-term expert practi-
tioners both during and following focused attention meditation. This also points to the
remarkable influence of meditation training on the brain, as no other mental training
has been shown to affect allocation of attentional resources responsible for binocular
rivalry.
Open-monitoring meditation also seems to allow meditators to more efficiently
process stimuli competing for attentional resources. The Attention Network Test has
been used to assess open-monitoring meditation influence on attentional subsystems.
The test has subjects indicate the direction of a target arrow surrounded by flanker
stimuli that either point in the same or reverse direction, thus inducing perceptual
conflict (Fan et al., 2002). Results show that after 5 days of open-monitoring medi-
tation training, participants improved their performance in responding to trials with
conflicting conditions (Tang et al., 2007). Both of these experiments show that medita-
tion helps to efficiently process different conflicting stimuli.
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6.2.4 Meditation and Higher-Level Attention for Monitoring Mind
Wandering
While meditation practice benefits psychological well-being, mental states with a high
frequency of mind-wandering episodes, such as depression or boredom, are experi-
enced negatively. Carriere et al. (2007) found that frequent brief lapses of attention,
that is, lack of conscious awareness of one’s action, is associated with proneness to
boredom and depression among students. More frequent and intense periods of mind
wandering during a word-encoding task have also been linked to dysphoria (Small-
wood et al., 2008). On the other hand, an open-monitoring meditation offered to stu-
dents during a month of MBSR intervention reduced their psychological distress as
well as their ruminative thoughts (Jain et al., 2007).
In favor of this hypothesis, Farb et al. (2007) revealed distinct fMRI neural acti-
vation patterns in control subjects with no meditation training compared to subjects
who followed an 8-week open-monitoring MBSR program. Control subjects were pri-
marily experiencing a mental narrative state, where one allows one’s attention to be
caught by a given train of thought, whereas meditation practitioners were aiming at
experiencing moment-to-moment awareness of the self. Mental narrative led to strong
activation of the mPFC, and awareness of present experiences led to decreased activa-
tion of the mPFC and increased activity in right lateral PFC and right viscero-somatic
areas (Farb et al., 2007). Thus there might be two possible types of experience of the
self: one—engaged during mind wandering—based on thoughts dealing with past or
future experiences of the ego, and one based on the moment-to-moment experience
of the self, involving awareness of sensory information from the body. This indicates
that the experience of self in the present moment is dramatically different both expe-
rientially and in terms of brain activity from the experience of self as projected in the
past or the future, as in mind wandering. This hypothesis is further supported by the
findings that during the practice of meditation, experienced meditators show less ac-
tivity of the default mode network than novice meditators, indicating alteration of the
brain functionning that is consistent with the decrease of mind wandering in expert
meditators (Brewer et al., 2011).
6.3 Meditation and emotion
Regardless of the specific meditation technique, meditation leads to state and trait
experiences involving a deep sense of peace and calm. In fact, achieving enduring
happiness by freeing oneself from affliction is the central doctrine of Buddhism (Ek-
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man et al., 2005). The fact that meditation affects the way emotions are experienced
and allows for better regulation of negative and distressing feelings is in part an out-
come of meditation-induced changes on body, brain, and cognitive functioning. On a
side note it is interesting to remark that Buddhism, from which originated most Asian
meditation practices, have evolved in cultures of Pali, Sanskrit and Tibetan languages,
which do not have a specific word for “emotion” (Ekman et al., 2005).
Emotions may be seen as a set of interrelated changes in the body in response to a
real or imagined situation or stimulus. Emotions are experienced as feelings and may
interrupt ongoing behavior or mental processes in the form of an urge to engage in
action (e.g., flight for fear, outburst of anger), depending on the emotion felt (Hamm
et al., 2003). Emotions elicit responses and changes both in the body and in the atten-
tional systems. Increased processing of body sensory inputs might also affect the way
emotions are first perceived through somatosensory information. Increased concentra-
tion results most likely in better control of mind wandering; that is, enhanced attention
and better resistance to distraction might reduce emotional reaction by reducing neg-
ative emotions’ propensity to interrupt the ongoing stream of thoughts and behavior.
Changes in attentional capacities are also most likely linked to changes in brain ac-
tivity, especially in the anterior areas, in which neural activity has been linked to the
functioning of the autonomic and immune systems, which are known to be affected
by meditation.
6.3.1 The Links Between Brain, Body, and Emotion
In the last 20 years, asymmetries in brain electrical activation have been linked with
the way people react to emotional situations and regulate their emotions (Allen and
Kline, 2004; Wheeler et al., 1993). In individuals who tend to react positively and let
go quickly of negative emotions, the baseline electrical activity of the brain exhibits
greater left-sided anterior activation than recordings of individuals who are more
prone to nourishing negative emotions (for a review see Davidson, 2004). After 6
months’ practice of mindfulness and MBSR meditation, healthy participants showed
enhanced left-sided prefrontal electrical activity in the alpha band after induction of
both positive and negative feelings (Davidson et al., 2003). The same study found
increased left-sided PFC activity to be associated with reduced anxiety and negative
affect as well as increased experiences of positive affect. These results correlate with
previous ones demonstrating that people with more left-sided baseline activation in
the PFC have a more positive outlook on life than individuals with right-sided PFC
activation (Davidson, 2000).
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The relationship between positive affect and anterior brain areas activity is strongly
supported, as reviewed by Craig (2005), by the anatomical connectivity between the
autonomic system and anterior brain areas. Craig demonstrates clearly how the left
anterior part of the brain interacts more directly with the parasympathetic system and
the right anterior part interacts more directly with the sympathetic system. Activity in
either of the hemispheres is thus associated with behavior and emotions in accordance
with the opposite actions of these two components of the autonomous nervous sys-
tem. Thus left-sided activation would correspond to more enriching emotions, that is,
those eliciting positive, group-oriented behaviors, whereas right-sided activity would
imply activity of the sympathetic system and thus reactions associated with negative,
aversive behaviors.
6.3.2 Meditation and the Regulation of Emotions
During most meditation practice, practitioners are encouraged to keep a balanced,
nonjudgmental state of mind. Practitioners can achieved this by experiencing feel-
ings arising in their mind, then stay for a period of time, and later pass away. While
meditating, practitioners in most meditation traditions are instructed to keep a calm,
balanced mind, noticing affects with no feeling of aversion toward unpleasant emo-
tions or feelings of desire for pleasant, enjoyable ones.
Contemporary research on emotion outlines two means through which emotion
regulation may be achieved: attentional control and cognitive control (Ochsner and
Gross, 2005). Attentional control involves manipulating the amount of attention that is
naturally allocated to process emotional stimuli. Exercising cognitive control involves
changing expectations or judgments about emotional stimuli. Both of these strategies
are supposedly present in meditation, whether attention is focused away from the
emotion (such as in concentrative practices) or the emotion is simply being observed
(such as in contemplative mindfulness practices). Cognitive control is also achieved
indirectly: as meditators gain insight into their minds and bodies, their appraisal of
emotion automatically evolves. In addition, meditation may also change emotion’s
appraisal by changing the practitioner’s beliefs about the world.
The way meditation modulates pain perception may provide a good overview of
how meditation affects the process through which emotions give rise to specific feel-
ing. Pain is defined as an"unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated
with actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage" (IASP,
1994). Recently, pain has been described in terms of a homeostatic emotion, that is, as a
feeling from the body (like thirst or hunger) that elicits a specific behavior to preserve
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body equilibrium (Craig, 2003).
Numbness and pain that arise from long periods of sitting without moving is a
common side effect of meditation practice during retreats. Constantly changing posi-
tion whenever pain arises would disturb meditation, so meditators are asked to use
different strategies to cope with pain. According to Gunaratana (2001), it is best to
adopt a voluntary and focused attitude of simply watching the pain—that is, experi-
encing the pain without identifying with it. Practitioners may also try to lessen the
importance of the pain by comparing it with the pain that one experienced previously
in one’s own life, or pain that others are experiencing. Another strategy would be to
divert the attention toward another object, such as the breath, and as a last resort to
slowly stretch the muscles to see if the pain can be lessened. It is said that with prac-
tice, it takes more time for pain to arise and that it becomes less intense. This resistance
to pain, which is a major component of meditation retreats, probably helps meditation
practitioners cope with their own suffering in a more detached way after the retreat is
over.
Treatments of chronic pain based on diverse meditation practices, such as MBSR
programs (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1985; Morone et al., 2008) and loving-kindness medita-
tion (Carson et al., 2005), have revealed positive outcomes associated with improve-
ment of overall quality of life. Enhanced tolerance of acute pain has also been assessed
in different studies with both focused attention and open-monitoring meditation. Lon-
gitudinal study of transcendental meditation (TM) shows decreased brain activation
in the thalamus, prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulated cortex in response to acute
pain (immersion of the hand in hot water) after 5 months of TM daily practice in par-
ticipants who were new to meditation (Orme-Johnson et al., 2006). This study further
suggests that TM practice does not change actual pain sensations (as pain rating didn’t
change pre– or post–TM practice and never significantly differed between beginners
and long-term practitioners) but does reduce emotional distress associated with pain,
resulting in enhanced tolerance of acute pain. Results of this last study are of particu-
lar significance, as they highlight meditation’s effects on the regulation of the distress
associated with painful feelings. Thus meditation practice changed the way individ-
uals reacted to the emotion related to pain. In fact, meditation seems to be acting at
the feeling level, in the way pain sensations are experienced subjectively as emotions.
One hypothesis is that meditation training that involves developing a nonjudgmental
attitude leads to change in emotion representation, resulting in less body and mental
disturbance.
In fact, the different forms of self-consciousness experienced during meditation
(Farb et al., 2007) and the emphasis placed on equanimity and body sensations suggest
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that meditation leads to a different appraisal of somatic markers than the common nor-
mal state. According to the somatic marker hypothesis of Damasio (1994), emotions
mark our experiences in terms of body representation, and these somatic markers are
then used to evaluate new situations and experiences. Feelings are based on bodily re-
sponse and precede emotions, which are viewed as mental reactions to feelings. In this
framework, keeping a nonjudgmental state of mind during meditation could delay or
attenuate emotional reactions to feelings.
6.3.3 Meditation, Emotion and Brain Imaging
The regulation of emotions, especially of negative ones, has been extensively studied
using brain-imaging techniques. Studies show that meditation actually affects at least
three important areas of the brain emotion circuitry: the amygdala, the PFC and the .
The amygdala is engaged in producing autonomic, endocrine, and somatic responses
as well as directing attention toward affective stimuli that are potentially important,
such as potential threats or potential sources of food (Davis and Whalen, 2001). The
PFC down-regulates neural activity in the amygdala and the two areas share recipro-
cal connections (Banks et al., 2007; Davidson, 2002) and the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) is involved in the self-regulation of emotion and behavior (Rothbart et al., 2011).
In the past few years successive studies have shown that a few days of a mindfulness-
based traditional chinese meditation increases the activity of the ventral part of the
ACC (Tang and Posner, 2009) and that after 11 hours of practice over 4 weeks, the
white matter connectivity of the ACC improved through increase myelinisation (Tang
et al., 2010, 2012). In addition, Less body arousal and EEG brain activation has been ob-
served in response to negative affects for yoga practitioners (Aftanas and Golosheykin,
2005). Consistent with this, when one is engaged in focused attention meditation,
fMRI studies show that amygdala activity in response to emotional negative or posi-
tive sounds is decreased in long-term Tibetan expert practitioners compared to novice
ones. Interestingly, the more hours participants have spent meditating in their life-
times, the more important is the decrease in amygdala activity (Brefczynski-Lewis
et al., 2007). However, fMRI studies show that when engaged in focused compassion
meditation, expert meditators from the same tradition exhibited greater amygdala ac-
tivation in response to emotional stimuli than novice practitioners (Lutz et al., 2008a).
These seemingly opposite results suggest that meditation allows for a wider range
of emotional experiences, and that these experiences can be modulated through the
practice of specific meditation techniques. Greater embodiment or disembodiment of
emotions can be achieved through voluntarily modulation of dedicated attentional cir-
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cuits that have been intensively trained through meditation practice. Consistent with
this hypothesis, subjective reports indicate that meditation seems at first to intensify
the experience of positive as well as negative feelings. Then through practice, these in-
tense feelings are accepted and might contribute to the experience of a richer internal
life, as reported by meditation practitioners.
Taken together, brain-imaging results support the empirical hypothesis of meditation-
induced emotion regulation and suggest that it involves brain plasticity. The regular
practice of meditation affects the connections between the emotional limbic system
and the neocortex in such a way that it would change the individual’s thoughts about
and interpretation of negative emotions (i.e., his appraisal of his emotion).
6.4 Challenges in meditation research
In this chapter we have seen that meditation affects the physiological, neuronal and
cognitive levels. Given the large diversity of meditation practices, it may be asked
wether all types of meditation lead to the same effects. However, studies directly
comparing groups of meditation practitioners from different traditions are scarce, al-
though the existing few indicate different outcomes from different meditation practice
(see Carter et al., 2005; Valentine and Sweet, 1999). In addition, there are still impor-
tant methodological flaws in a lot of studies of meditation. A report from the United
States National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine dated from June
2007 examined 813 studies published since September 2005 stated:
Scientific research on meditation practices does not appear to have a com-
mon theoretical perspective and is characterized by poor methodological
quality. Firm conclusions on the effects of meditation practices in health-
care cannot be drawn based on the available evidence. Future research on
meditation practices must be more rigorous in the design and execution of
studies and in the analysis and reporting of results. (Ospina et al., 2007,
pg.6)
In the next chapter, in an attempt to fill some of the methodological and experimen-
tal gaps presented here, I present an experiment comparing the brain EEG activity of 3
groups of meditators practicing 3 different meditation traditions and a control group.
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Context of the study
This chapter presents a study that we have conducted in Rishikesh, North-East of
India, between the winter 2009 and the spring 2011. Our host laboratory, the Medita-
tion Research Institute (MRI), is part of the Swami Rama Sadhaka Grama ashram, a
meditation school held by Swami Veda Bharati that aims at teaching the Himalayan
Yoga meditation tradition. The MRI acquired a Biosemi Active Two EEG system in
2007 and then contacted Arnaud Delorme, my PhD supervisor, and offered him to
use it to conduct scientific studies on meditation. This was made possible by the BIAL
foundation which awarded A. Delorme a small grant for a comparative study of medi-
tation practices. This was in the summer before the start of my PhD. Between February
2009 and February 2010 I spent 7 months at the MRI recording two of the four groups
of subjects for the experiment. The other 2 groups have been recorded in the win-
ter and spring 2011 by Jonathan Levy and Manuel Fernandez. This study required
to develop contacts with 3 meditation traditions in India, to recruit and organize the
recordings of the subjects in our Rishikesh laboratory. Swami Veda was helpful for
recruiting Himalayan Yoga meditators, Bhavani Balakrishnan was helpful for the re-
cruitment of Isha Yoga meditators and Swami Aman, ajay Khatri, Mr. Sharma and
Dr. Ravindra Pattanashetti were helpful for their help recruiting the Vipassana med-
itators. In addition contacts had to be made with the local population not practicing
meditation to recruit control participants. I want here to acknowledge the help of lab-
oratory assistants Mina Bhatt, Pooja Badoni, Stéphanie Pornin and Vinthia Wirantana
for recording the subjects and recruiting control participants.
7.1 Context of the study
Electroencephalography is one of the major neuroimaging tools used to study med-
itation. One reason is the ease of use of EEG and relative low cost of such systems
compared to other brain imaging modality. In addition, historically, EEG has been the
principal neuroimaging technique available in the year 1960s when scientific studies
of meditation started. Since then meditation has been shown to affect many EEG fre-
quency bands Fell et al. (2010) with lasting trait changes Aftanas and Golocheikine
(2001); Khare and Nigam (2000); Travis and Wallace (1999). However, as outlined in
the much detailed review of Cahn and Polich (2006), it is very difficult to get a clear
picture of the effects of meditation practice on the EEG, since these effects may vary
from one study to the other and thus does not seem to be reliable.
What is the source of this variability ? It is not yet clear wether it originates from
individual differences in the practice of meditation itself or if it is due to differences in
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the experimental set up and recordings.
Travis and Shear (2010) made an attempt to organize EEG results from existing
studies of meditation within each of the three categories described above, focused
attention, open monitoring and “automatic self transcendence”, which corresponds to
passive meditation - based on current knowledge on cognitive states associated with
each frequency band. They suggested that focused attention might be associated with
gamma and beta EEG frequency activity, while open monitoring more associated with
theta power, and passive meditation with alpha coherence. Although Travis and Shear
(2010) tried to include studies that were comparable in terms of subject’s meditation
expertise and experimental control, it is still questionable whether the reported EEG
findings they summarize are specific to the meditation practices or are more influenced
by differences in the protocols or in the population of the various studies assayed,
and only studies using the same protocols and recording conditions across different
meditative groups can resolve this question satisfactorily.
This chapter presents an attempt to clarify the EEG correlates of meditation by
recording within the same experimental setting and using the same recording mate-
rial 3 groups of meditators from different meditation traditions and a meditation-naive
control group. In this chapter I address the hypothesis that different types of medita-
tion lead to different neural correlates. The goal of this report is to compare 3 types
of meditations, a focused meditation on mantra repetition, breath and body parts (Hi-
malayan tradition), an open monitoring meditation based on body sensations (Vipas-
sana) and a passive meditation (Isha Yoga). In addition, we are including a control
group of meditation-naive participants. In an attempt to go past the shortcomings
of earliest studies, we designed a study in which meditators from different traditions
and meditation-naive control subjects are going through the same study protocol. We
intend to compare and contrast brain activity from these different traditions.
7.2 The choice of a control mental state
Meditation practice requires to disengage from the processing of the spontaneous
thoughts that are considered as naturally produced by the brain in a resting state
(Christoff et al., 2009; Raichle et al., 2001; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). An ideal
control state would be to let our participants engage into mind wandering while rest-
ing , since according to our previous study, neural correlates of mind wandering are
quite distinctive from those of a meditative activity (see 3).
In fact, the resting state is a control condition often used in the meditation littera-
ture (for example Travis and Wallace, 1999; Khare and Nigam, 2000; Arambula et al.,
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2001; Aftanas and Golocheikine, 2001; Lutz et al., 2004). However, experienced medi-
tators also often report spontaneously engaging into meditation when sitting with no
specific task to execute. In addition, mind wandering can contains thoughts about
both past and future events, a distinction that could affect the EEG activity.
To optimize our chances to obtain a mental state contrasting from the meditative
state and that would be similar for all subjects, we chose an instructed mind wan-
dering task (Cahn et al., 2010; Cahn and Polich, 2009) requiring subjects to keep on
generating and paying attention to non-emotional memories. In addition, this control
task can be executed in similar conditions (sitting with the eyes closed) as meditation.
The recording protocol consisted in two main blocks: one in which subjects en-
gaged into meditation practice and the other in which subjects were instructed to let
their mind freely wander through autobiographical neutral memories.
7.3 Methods
7.3.1 Participants
Recordings took place at the Meditation Research Institute (MRI) in Rishikesh, India.
Subjects coming from the neighborhood of the institute received about 10 US dollars
(500 Rupees) as a compensation and subjects that had to travel from different parts
of India received about 20 US dollars (1000 Rupees) in addition to coverage of their
travel fees, stay and meals in Rishikesh. Participants all provided written consent to
participate in the study. The project was approved by the local MRI Indian ethical
committee and the ethical committee of the University of California San Diego (IRB
project # 090731).
Our participants were from 3 different meditation traditions: Vipassana (VIP), Hi-
malayan Yoga (HT) and Isha Yoga (ISY). We gave detailed description of these medi-
tation practices in section 5.2.
7.3.1.1 Vipassana participants
The Vipassana meditation technique practiced by all our Vipassana participants was
the one taught by SN. Goenka 1 and in the following Vipassana meditation will refer
to this technique. We recorded 20 Vipassana meditators and used data from 16 of
these meditators. Meditators were chosen for inclusion in the study based on age,
gender and years of practice of Vipassana meditation compared to meditators from
other traditions and control subjects.
1http://www.vridhamma.org/VRI-Introduction
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7.3.1.2 Himalayan Yoga participants
For the purpose of the experiment, Himalayan meditators were instructed to go though
the relaxation stage while sitting and then repeat mentally their Mantra with or with-
out the awareness of breath, and in case they felt they attained some level of tran-
scendence, to let go of the repetition of the mantra. We recorded 27 meditators in the
Himalayan tradition and used data from 16 of these meditators. Meditators were cho-
sen for inclusion in this study based on age, gender and years of experience in the
practice of the Himalayan meditation tradition.
7.3.1.3 Isha Yoga participants
For the purpose of the experiment, Isha meditators practiced only the passive silent
meditation called Shoonya meditation. We recorded 20 meditators in the Isha tradition
and used data from 16 of these meditators. Meditators were chosen for inclusion in
this study based on age and gender and years of experience in the practice of Isha
meditation.
7.3.1.4 Control participants
Control subjects did not have a meditation practice. However some of the subjects
were used to chant prayers as part as their religious rituals. During the MED condi-
tion, control subjects were instructed to keep paying attention to their breath for the
whole duration of the recording period. The exact instruction given to them was “keep
paying attention to the sensation breath, of the inhale and the exhale. If you start mind
wandering, come back to your breath”. They were allowed to ask questions about the
practice. We recorded 32 control subjects and used data from 16 of these subjects.
Control subjects were chosen for inclusion in this study based on age and gender.
7.3.2 Tasks description
Participants sat either on a blanket on the floor or on a chair. Participants were asked to
keep their eyes closed and the room was kept dark during the recording. An intercom
allowed communication between the experimental and the recording room. Partici-
pants performed two blocks of 20 minutes, one of ’Meditation’ (MED) and the other
one of ’Instructed Mind Wandering’ (IMW). In the MED block, participants were first
instructed to pay attention to their breathing (MED1): they were told to focus on notic-
ing the air flow in and out their nose, or if this was too difficult for them to notice how
their abdomen moves along with their breathing rate. After 10 minutes participants
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were told through the intercom to perform to their regular meditation practice for the
remaining 10 minutes (MED2; see below). In the IMW blocks, participants were in-
structed to remember autobiographical events from childhood to the most recent past.
They were given a list of potential events to remember before the recording session as
examples (the list involved birthdays, daily childhood life, travels, etc...). They were
explicitly told not to think of a strongly emotionally charged event. To keep the IMW
condition as close to the MED condition, after the first 10 minutes (IMW1) participants
were told through the intercom to keep on doing the thinking task for the next 10
minutes (IMW2).
In addition, after each period of IMW and MED recording of spontaneous EEG
activity participants were performing the following psychophysic tasks which results
we will not report here: listening passively to an auditory oddball protocol, passively
watching a steady-state visual evoked potential (SSVEP) protocol and watching emo-
tionnaly charged images from the IAPS database, while performing an emotional cat-
egorization task. In addition, at the end of the last block participants where listening
again to the oddball protocol but in an active way this time as they had to count and
report the number of oddball higher pitch tones.
Immediately after each blocks participants completed a questionnaire and were
allowed to stand up, stretch and walk. The questionnaire was made of 11 general
questions about the quality of the meditation to be answered on a scale from 0 to 10
and 16 items from the subscales “concentration and awareness”, “hindrance” and “re-
laxation” of the Meditation Depth Questionnaire (MEDEQ, Piron (2001)). Order of the
blocks were counterbalanced between participants to prevent from an eventual order
effect. The day preceding the study, participants were invited to visit the experimental
room and to practice the tasks for 10 minutes (5 minutes IMW and 5 minutes MED).
Participants entering the study as meditators were asked not to meditate before com-
ing to the laboratory on the day of the experiment. Figure 7.3.2 describe the protocole
timeline.
Groups constitution : Groups of subjects were matched based on gender and age,
although perfect matching could not be achieved. Following this matching procedure
we could constitute 4 groups of 16 subjects each. Because the ISY and VIP groups did
not contain as many subjects as the CTR and HT groups, the matching process implied
leaving out of the present analysis a large number of CTR and HT participants. The
control and the Vipassana groups contained 5 females, and the remaining groups 2.
In each groups, 8 of the subjects performed the mind-wandering task first and 8
subjects performed the meditation task first. Table 7.1 indicates the statistics for the
different traditions. A year of meditation indicates a daily practice of at least 20 min-
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 Instructed mind wandering block
instructed autobiographical mind wandering   33 min 
break
15-20min
questionnairepost-mind wander
eyes open
post-mind wander 
cognitive engage
closed eyes passive
closed eyes passive
 Meditation block
specific meditation practice
23 min 
break
15-20min
questionnairebreath focused 
meditation
10 min 
post-meditation 
eyes open
post-meditation 
cognitive engage
Figure 7.1: Protocole timeline of the EEG comparative study of meditation. The medi-
tation block started with 20 minutes of closed-eyes meditation with the 10 first minute
being a breath focused meditation and the 10 last minutes being the practice specific
to each groups while control subjects kept on doing the breath focused practice. Af-
ter the end of the 10 minutes, an auditory oddball protocol was played, and subjects
had to keep on doing their meditation practice. During all this period subjects were
instructed no to pay attention to the auditory stimuli. Next, subjects were told to
open their eyes and were presented a SSVEP protocol. Finally they were presented
emotionally-charged images and had to perform an emotional categorization task. The
instructed mind wandering block corresponded to the exact same tasks as the medita-
tion block, except that in the first part subjects were all performing autobiographical
memory recollection for 20 minutes followed by the 13 minutes of the auditory odd-
ball protocol. At the end of each block, subjects answered a questionnaire assessing
their experiences during the experiment.
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Vipassana Himalayan Isha Control
Age 47± 15 49± 13 40± 10 45± 10
Years of med. 15 (range 5 to 44) 21 (range 3 to 40) 7 (range 3 to 18) 0
Table 7.1: Subject groups mean age and years of meditation experience
Figure 7.2: A subject ready to start the experiment
utes per day.
7.3.3 Data recording
We recorded data using a 64+8 channels Biosemi Active-Two amplifiers system and
a 10-20 Headcap montage from the same company. The system also allowed record-
ing respiration and galvanic skin response. Using external electrodes not part of the
cap, we also recorded right and left mastoid electrodes as well as vertical and hori-
zontal electro-oculogram two periocular electrodes (EOG) placed below the right eye
and at the left outer canthus. The EKG was recorded by placing an external electrode
at the collar bone level. A respiration belt was placed just below the navel to record
breathing rate and we also recorded the galvanic skin response (GSR) by placing two
electrodes on the tip of the left hand index and middle fingers. The experimental room
was partially electrically shielded and partially sound proof. In order to ensure good
quality of EEG signal participants were asked to wash their hair before attending the
recording session and their scalp skin was carefully cleaned using an alcoholic solu-
tion just prior to the EEG cap set up. All electrodes were kept within offset 10 of the
BIOSEMI system metric for measuring impedance. Figure 7.3.2 shows the placing of
the recording equipment on a subject and the arrangement of the experimental room.
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7.3.4 Data processing and artifact rejection
Data processing was done using Matlab R2009b (The Matworks, Inc.) and the EEGLAB
public software version 10.2.5.5b Delorme and Makeig (2004). EEG data were first ref-
erenced to the right mastoid and down-sampled from 1024Hz to 256Hz.
We then applied a high-pass filter at 1Hz using an infinite impulse response (IIR)
filter. We automatically removed portions of the signal presenting non-stereotyped
artifacts. The data were first segmented in 1-second epochs with 0.5-second overlap.
Segments of 8 contiguous epochs in which the 0-10 Hz frequency band and the 35-128
Hz frequency band had an amplitude higher than 17 and 14 decibels respectively were
labelled has artefactual. In some cases, decibel thresholds were adjusted automatically
to match the tail of the probability distribution of the data. Rejection of low-frequency
segments help remove subject’s movements. Rejection of high frequency activity helps
reject muscular activity. We then manually removed bad electrodes (from 0 to 18 bad
electrodes per subject, average of 5 electrodes removed per subject). We finally used
Infomax Independent Component Analysis (Infomax ICA) on the pruned data to reject
eyes and muscle artifacts. For each subjects we visually identified and subtracted
from the data one to five well-characterized ICA components for eye blink, lateral eye
movements and temporal muscle noise. We used visual inspection of component scalp
topographies and power spectrum to reject these artifactual ICA components Delorme
et al. (2007).
In order to compare the effects of different reference montages on the EEG analy-
sis, we successively re-referenced our data to he average reference and the vertex Cz
electrode.
For each subject and each of the 4 conditions - breath awareness (MED1), medita-
tion practice (MED2), the first and the last 10 minutes of instructed mind wandering
(IMW1 and IMW2 respectively) - we applied a spectral decomposition to the contin-
uous data of each channel. We first segmented data into 1-second long epochs with
no overlap, and then performed a Fourrier transformation on these epochs. Fourrier
amplitude in different frequency bands was averaged for all epochs. Finally power
was visualized by taking 20 times the base-10 logarithm of the spectral amplitude to
obtain a scale equivalent to decibel (dB).
7.3.5 Statistics
Statistics were performed on the log transformed spectral power data across channels
using the permutation tests implemented in EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig, 2004).
A total of 8 000 resamples of the original data is used to assess significance. When
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0 10 20 min
0 10 20 min
Instructed mind wandering 1 
A. Meditation block
B. Instructed 
mind wandering block
Instructed mind wandering 2 
Breath awareness Meditation practice
Figure 7.3: Data analysis schematic. For the analysis the first 10 min of the meditation
block (Breath) were compared to the first 10 min of the instructed mind wandering
block and the last 10 min of the meditation blocks to the last 10 min of the instructed
mind wandering blocks.
conditions were compared within a group, permutations of paired t-test were used
and when comparisons were made in between 2 groups permutations of non-paired t-
tests were used. Finally, for comparisons made between more than two groups across
1 condition we used permutations of balanced 1-way anova and for comparisons be-
tween more than two groups and more than 2 conditions, permutations of balanced
2-ways anova. Correction for multiple comparisons was performed using Benjamini
and Yekutieli original implementation of the False Discovery Rate (FDR) algorithm
(Benjamini and Yekutieli, 2001).
During the recordings of a session, our subjects had to sit for 20 minutes in a row,
which were decomposed into 2 blocks of 10 minutes each. To account for any potential
effects on physiological measures of simply sitting still for a specific duration of time,
we compared blocks of EEG activity between conditions in which the subject has been
sitting for an equivalent amount of time (MED1 vs. MED2 ; IMW1 vs. IMW2), see
figure 7.3 .
7.4 Results
7.4.1 Subjective reports
Meditators were able to successfully enter a meditative state during the experiment, as
assessed by the subjective reports they gave immediately after the meditation block,
on a 0 - 10 scale (where 10 indicates the deepest meditative state they have experienced
and 0 not deep at all). The HT group reported an average depth of meditation of
6.31± 1.88, the ISY group 7.55± 1.15 and the VIP group 6.03± 1.81.
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7.4.2 Comparison between meditation (MED2) and thinking (IMW2)
7.4.2.1 Theta frequency band activity
During meditation (MED2), we found a significant increase in the fronto-central 6-
8Hz amplitude in the VIP group compared to the HT group only (p < 0.005 over all
electrodes). No statistically significant differences were observed between the other
groups.
We did not observe differences between groups in the instructed mind-wandering
period (IMW2) and we did not observe within groups differences between MED2 and
IMW2.
7.4.2.2 Alpha frequency band activity
The VIP group showed significantly higher 8-10Hz alpha frequency range during
meditation (MED2) compared to the control group (p < 0.05 at all electrodes sites
after correction for multiple comparisons), the ISY group (p < 0.05 at all electrodes
sites) and the HT group (p < 0.01 at all electrodes sites).
During the instructed mind-wandering period (IMW2), we observed higher 8-
10Hz activity between the VIP and the HT group only (p < 0, 05, at all electrodes
sites). In addition, the 10-11Hz frequency was significantly higher in the VIP group
than in the ISY group (p < 0.05, at all electrode sites).
Finally, in the HT group but not in the other groups, we observed lower fronto-
central and occipital 10-11Hz alpha power during the meditation period (MED2) com-
pared to instructed mind wandering period (IMW2) (p < 0.05) (figure 7.4 ).
7.4.2.3 Gamma frequency band activity
During meditation (MED2), comparisons between the controls and the meditators re-
vealed significantly higher 60-110Hz gamma power in two meditator groups than in
the control group: higher 60-110Hz gamma was observed over occipital electrode sites
in the ISY group (p < 0.05) and over the frontal, midline and occipital electrode sites
in the HT group (p < 0.05) (figure 7.6). In the VIP group the 60-110Hz EEG band
qualitatively displayed higher power than in the control group, and the difference in
topography between the CTR and VIP groups was similar to the difference in topog-
raphy between CTR and other meditation traditions, with greatest effects observed at
frontal and occipital sites (figure 7.6 C. However, the difference in gamma activity be-
tween the VIP and CTR group did not reach significance. Nevertheless, we observed
no significant difference in the 60-110Hz gamma band power between the VIP group
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Figure 7.4: Theta and alpha power during the MED2 meditation period. A. Differ-
ential scalp topographies between CTR, HT, ISY and VIP for the 6-8Hz, 8-10Hz and
10-11Hz frequency bands. A red dot indicates significance at p < 0.05, orange p < 0.01
and white p < 0.005. B. Spectral activity during meditation for each group at elec-
trode site Cz. Shaded area around the curves represents the standard error of the
mean across subjects. C. Scalp topographies for the 6-8Hz, 8-10Hz and 10-11Hz fre-
quency bands (corresponding to the grey area on the power spectrum plot) for each
group of subject.
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Figure 7.5: Differential maps of group HT 10-11Hz activity between the MED2 med-
itation period and the IMW2 instructed mind wandering period. Black dots indicate
no significant difference at the electrode site and a red dot indicates significance at
p < 0.05.
and the HT and ISY groups. In addition, when the data of all meditator groups were
pooled together, it differed significantly from controls in this frequency band (figure
7.6 B).
We did not observe significant differences between the instructed mind wandering
task (IMW2) and the meditation task (MED2) within any of the groups in this fre-
quency band. In addition, during the instructed mind wandering task, we did not
observe any significant difference between any of the groups.
Muscle activity is mostly visible at high frequencies, overlapping with the observed
effects we report here in the gamma frequency band. In order to assess whether the
increased power in the gamma band we observed in meditators was due to cortical or
to muscle and other artifactual non-brain activity during meditation periods we used
ICA approaches for assessing the data.
Temporal muscle artifacts often contaminate temporal electrodes when recording
EEG. 30 temporal muscle ICA components were identified in the 64 subjects (18 right
and 12 left temporal muscle artifacts, with between 0 and 2 components per subject)
(figure 7.7 B).
Note that these components were removed from the data at the preprocessing
stage, before computing the spectral transformation of figures 7.4 and 7.6.
It may be argued nevertheless that residual muscle activity not removed by ICA
could be responsible for the gamma effect we observed. However, no significant dif-
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around the curves represents the standard error of the mean. B. Scalp topographies
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phies of differential activity between the control group and the mean of all groups of
meditators is also shown. C. Scalp maps of differential activity between the CTR and
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these plots indicate control gamma power minus meditator group gamma powers the
darker blue represents areas of scalp with greater between group gamma power. A
black dot indicates no statistical significance, a red dot an electrode that is significant
at p < 0.05 at the electrode site and an orange dot indicates significance at p < 0.01.
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ference of activity between groups and conditions was found in the activity of the tem-
poral muscle artifact components. If muscle activity was responsible for the gamma
difference we observed between meditators and control subjects, it should have been
visible in these components.
Another hypothesis is that the increase in gamma activity may be generated by the
eyes microsaccades. Of our 64 subjects, 53 had one ICA component accounting for eye
movements (14 subjects in each CTR, VIP and HT group and 11 subjects in the ISY
group) (figure 7.7 A). Eye activity artifactual components are isolated using activity
at low frequency (less than 10 Hz). Specific ICA components for eye movement mi-
crosaccades did not appear to be isolated either because their amplitude is too small
or because their topography is identical to other eye movement components, which is
reasonable to consider since they originate from the same location.
Permutation statistics with FDR correction in the 1-120Hz frequency range indi-
cates that there was higher power over all spectral frequencies of the eye movement in-
dependent components in the CTR group during instructed mind wandering (IMW2)
compared to meditation (MED2) (p < 0.005). No significant difference was found in
spectral frequency power for the eye movement components between the IMW2 and
MED2 states for any of the 3 groups of meditators, nor did we find any significant
spectral frequency power differences for this ICA cluster between the 4 groups. If
eye movement-related artifacts were responsible for the increased gamma power ob-
served between groups in this dataset, we should have observed higher gamma power
in the eye movement independent components for meditators compared to the control
group.
These results show that it is unlikely that the gamma power increase we observe
in meditators in comparison to control subjects is due to either muscle or eye-related
artifacts. In addition, the scalp topography of the differences was greatest in occipital
and frontal areas as opposed to temporal areas, further indicating that classic temporal
muscle-related artifacts were not likely to be contributing to the observed effects.
7.4.3 Breath awareness (MED1) and instructed mind wandering (IMW1)
The results described below correspond to the first 10 minutes of meditation (MED1)
and instructed mind wandering (IMW1). The MED1 period involved the same in-
struction to focus on the sensations of breath for all groups. Nevertheless, we ob-
served differences between groups in the theta, alpha and gamma frequency bands.
We did not observe differences within groups between the breath awareness (MED1)
and instructed mind wandering (IMW1).
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7.4.3.1 Theta frequency band activity
During MED1, the amplitude of the 4-6Hz low theta frequency range in the HT group
was significantly lower than in the VIP and ISY groups (p < 0.05, over all electrodes).
The 6-8Hz high theta frequency activity in the VIP group during MED1 was signif-
icantly higher than in the CTR (p < 0.05, over fronto-central electrode sites) and HT
groups (p < 0.05, over all electrode sites).
During IMW1 also, the 6-8Hz amplitude in the VIP group was higher than in the
HT group (p < 0.05, over all electrodes) .
7.4.3.2 Alpha frequency band activity
The amplitude of the 8-10Hz alpha frequency band was higher in the VIP group than
in the HT group during both MED1 and IMW1 (p < 0.05 over all electrodes).
7.4.3.3 Gamma frequency band activity
In the 60-110Hz gamma range, we observed significantly higher amplitude during
MED1 in the ISY group than in the CTR group (p < 0.05, at all electrode sites).
7.4.4 Additional results
7.4.4.1 Intra-group comparison between breath awareness and meditation
The comparison between the breath awareness (MED1) and the meditation (MED2)
conditions within each group showed in the ISY group higher 8-10Hz alpha power
during MED1 compared to MED2 (p < 0.05, over all electrode sites).
In addition ISY, HT, and CTR groups all exhibited higher amplitude high alpha (10-
11Hz) power during MED1 compared to MED2: CTR (p < 0.01, over all electrodes),
HT (p < 0.05 on occipital electrodes), and ISY (p < 0.05 on parieto-occipital electrode
sites).
For the ISY group only, beta and gamma effects were found to differentiate MED1
vs. MED2. In this group the 12-20Hz beta activity was higher during MED1 than
during MED2 over all electrode sites except for a cluster of 7 fronto-central electrodes
(Fz, F1, FC1, FCz, FC2, CZ and C1) (p < 0.05). Similar effects specific to the ISY
group were found in the gamma (60-110Hz) range, for which the power was again
significantly higher during MED1 than during MED2 (p < 0.05, over all electrode
sites).
To sum up, the most consistent result was therefore that high alpha power de-
creases in the MED2 compared to the MED1 period for controls, HT and ISY medita-
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tors but not for VIP meditators, for which no significant difference appeared between
the MED1 and MED2 periods.
7.4.4.2 Intra-group comparison between instructed mind wandering 1 and 2
Comparison between brain activity in the instructed mind wandering periods 1 and 2
(see methods) revealed higher gamma activity (60-110Hz) within the VIP group dur-
ing IMW1 than during IMW2 (p < 0.005, over all electrodes). No significant differ-
ences were found in the alpha and beta range for any of the groups between the two
instructed mind wandering periods.
7.5 Discussion
The main results of our study are threefold: firstly we showed that, during the med-
itation period, meditators from 3 different traditions exhibited higher gamma (60-110
Hz) spectral activity over all electrode sites relative to control subjects attempting to
meditate. Although it did not reach significance for VIP meditators, a clear trend was
observed and the scalp topography difference with the control group was similar to
the other meditation traditions. Of note, it is unlikely that this gamma effect was due to
eye and muscle artifacts as demonstrated by our analysis of independent components
attributable to eye movement and muscle activity showing no difference amplitude
across groups. Our second result reflected that Vipassana meditation practitioners
exhibited higher power in the theta and alpha frequency bands compared to other
meditation groups and control subjects. Finally, we observed a consistent and specific
meditation state effect only in the HT meditator group, as indicated by decreased high
alpha (10-11 Hz) power in the meditation vs. instructed mind wandering tasks.
7.5.1 Gamma activity
Our gamma results are generally consistent with a small number of recent studies indi-
cating enhanced gamma power associated with meditation in long term practitioners,
although in these studies the frequencies of the gamma activity were lower than in the
present report . Higher occipital 35-45Hz gamma activity was previously observed
as a specific state effect in Vipassana meditators (Cahn et al., 2010) while meditating
compared to a control condition of instructed mind wandering similar to ours. In
addition, Tibetan Buddhist meditators also showed increased 25-42Hz gamma power
during loving-kindness meditation (a meditation based on the feeling of compassion
towards all other beings) compared to control subjects as both a trait and state effect
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(Lutz et al., 2004). It is relevant to note that in general other EEG studies of meditation
are not analyzing fast frequency rhythms most probably due to technical limitations.
This broadband gamma effect was found not as a specific state effect of meditation
in the meditator groups but as a mixed trait-state effect that was greatest in the Isha
Yoga meditation group and was significant specifically when comparing brain activ-
ity in meditation periods across groups but not when assessing control state activity
across groups. Specifically, comparisons between mind wandering periods and the
meditation periods within groups indicated no specific meditation state effect in the
gamma range for any of the groups. In contrast, comparisons of gamma power across
the first breath focused period showed the Isha yoga meditation group to have greater
gamma power compared to control group. Comparisons during the second medita-
tion periods wherein each meditator group engaged in their own specific meditation
practice yielded significant increase of gamma power in Isha yoga and Himalayan
yoga groups compared to the control group, with the Vipassana group showing a
very strong trend in the same direction. Moreover, the Isha yoga group also showed
a greater gamma power during the breath-focused first meditation period than the
second Shoonya meditation period.
In the litterature, there is no clear understanding of the functional role of EEG
gamma activity, which requieres the synchronous activation of large populations of
neurons. Physiological studies support the hypothesis for a role of gamma synchro-
nization in neuronal communication (Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001; Fries, 2005; Varela
et al., 2001). This hypothesis has been further supported by the finding of a link be-
tween regions of fMRI activation and intra-EEG gamma activity recording (Lachaux
et al., 2007). Lutz et al. (2004) suggested that the gamma band activity observed in
the meditators engaged in loving kindness meditation might reflect specific affective
and attention processes. There was no strong affective component in the meditation
practices we studied, however it might be that the gamma activity we observe, also
of higher frequency than in Lutz et al. (2004)’ s study reflect different attention pro-
cesses in meditators. Indeed, studies in the field of visual attention have shown that
voluntary allocation of attention towards stimuli increases the gamma response com-
pared to unvolontary, stimulus-driven attention (Landau et al., 2007). We can thus
hypothesize that the gamma activity we observe over the frontal areas in HT medita-
tors results of more top-down control of attention in these meditators than in controls.
This top-down control will be exerted to redirect the attention towards the medita-
tion in case of mind wandering episodes and to ignore distracting stimuli such as pain
that can arise in the body from the continuuous seating position or external noises.
In addition, we also report gamma activity over the occipital regions in HT and ISY
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groups. Occipital gamma activity in Vipassana meditators is also reported by (Cahn
et al., 2010), although again at a lower frequency than in our study. Gamma activity
over the occipital lobes have been associated with visual grouping processing and vi-
sual representation (Vidal et al., 2006; Lachaux et al., 2005; Jokisch and Jensen, 2007)
and with sustained attention (Tallon-Baudry et al., 2005). It thus possible that the oc-
cipital gamma activity reflects both different attentional processes and specific visual
representations, for example of different body points (chakras) for the HT meditators.
For the ISY tradition however, it is not clear what kind of representation might be
elicited by the meditation.
Of note, gamma activity in EEG has also recently been associated with eye tremors
and microsaccades in addition to the well known association with scalp and temporal
muscle activity (Yuval-Greenberg and Deouell, 2009; Schwartzman and Kranczioch,
2011), thus rendering suspicious gamma findings in EEG studies. Gamma activity in-
duced by microsaccades is most prominent when using the nose as reference and we
used here mastoid reference, which is likely to be weakly contaminated by microsac-
cades. More importantly, we analyzed the ICA components associated with eye and
scalp muscle noise to assess the possibility that the observed gamma power differ-
ences may be spurious. We did not find differences between meditators and controls
in the eye movement or temporal muscle independent component activities suggest-
ing that the higher gamma amplitude recorded in the meditator groups does not rise
from scalp muscle or ocular activity.
7.5.2 Alpha activity
We found a trait-related increase in amplitude in the alpha frequency band during
meditation that was specific to the Vipassana group and became more significant
during the assayed meditative states. Specifically, during the mind wandering con-
trol state the Vipassana group showed higher amplitude 8-10Hz power than the Hi-
malayan yoga group and during the second mind wandering state the Vipassana
group demonstrated higher amplitude 10-11Hz power than the Isha yoga group. Dur-
ing the breath-focused meditation period the Vipassana group again showed higher
amplitude 8-10Hz power than Himalayan yoga group, and finally, during the specific
differential meditation period the Vipassana group showed higher amplitude 8-10Hz
power than control group, Himalayan yoga group, and the Isha yoga group.
To our knowledge, there is no previous study showing increased alpha frequency
amplitude in Vipassana meditators compared to other meditation traditions (for a re-
cent review, see Chiesa and Malinowski (2011)). Cahn and Polich (2006) reviews the
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literature regarding reports of increased alpha amplitude in a variety of meditation
practices when compared to control states, although none of these studies included
Vipassana meditators. Moreover, increases in alpha power are not reliable state mark-
ers of meditative states Cahn et al. (2010) and in line with our previous results Cahn
et al. (2010), we did not find significant differences between alpha amplitude during
meditation and the control task in the Vipassana group.
A common hypothesis suggests that alpha activity increases during “cortical idling”,
when neurons are not actively processing sensory inputs (Pfurtscheller et al., 1996;
Mann et al., 1996). This hypothesis is related to the fact that closing ones eyes dra-
matically increases alpha power. However, increases of alpha power have also been
observed in tasks requiring the redirection of attention internally, for example when
subjects are asked to imagine a stimulus, leading to the hypothesis that alpha power
inhibits irrelevant sensory inputs (Cooper et al., 2003). Following this hypothesis, the
finding that alpha activity seems to be increased in those practicing Vipassana medita-
tion may be related to the type of focus this form of meditative practice requires. One
might hypothesize that the way of attending to the specific somatosensory awareness
task involved in this form of Vipassana practice while ignoring other types of sen-
sory inputs may increase one’s internalized focus in a more significant manner than
is engaged by the other assayed practices. In fact, inhibiting irrelevant sensory inputs
might not be as important in other meditation traditions, where attending selectively
to some types of endogenous sensory stimulus to the exclusion of others is not a central
focus of the practice. The current findings do suggest that regular practice of Vipas-
sana meditation induces higher trait amplitude in the alpha frequency band although
it is also possible that individuals with higher trait alpha power have a predilection for
taking up Vipassana practice - only controlled longitudinal trials involving different
meditative practices can satisfactorily answer this question.
Within the HT group we found lower high-alpha power (10-11Hz) during the
specific meditation practice compared to the corresponding instructed mind wander-
ing task. In line with the theory mentioned earlier that alpha may index “cortical
idling”,this finding suggests that Himalayan yoga meditation practice was character-
ized by greater cortical processing during the meditation task compared to the IMW
task. Interestingly, decrease of 8-12Hz alpha frequency is also found during sleep
stage 1 (De Gennaro et al., 2001) and earlier studies of meditation have suggested
that meditators appear to maintain their brain state at a transitional level between full
wakefulness and early sleep stages (Fenwick et al., 1977; Stigsby et al., 1981). It is pos-
sible that the assayed Himalayan meditation practice leads to this type of state, given
that the Yoga Nidra practice (sleep of the Yogi) is an important component of the HT
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practice. Further studies of this meditation tradition focusing on Yoga Nidra practice
and including precise metabolic recordings would be able to test this hypothesis more
precisely. The control and the Isha Yoga groups did demonstrate higher alpha 10-
11Hz power during the first 10 minutes of the breath awareness phase than during the
meditation phase as well, suggesting that the decreased alpha power obtained during
the second meditation phase in the HT group may have been a relatively non-specific
effect.
7.5.3 Theta activity
During meditation the VIP group demonstrated greater fronto-central 6-8Hz theta ac-
tivity than the HT group. We did not observe a clear spectral peak in the theta fre-
quency band and our theta results could reflect a smearing in the frequency domain
of the high power alpha frequency peak observed in VIP meditators. However, the
distinct scalp topography for the 6-8 Hz activity with a more frontal component typi-
cal of theta frontal midline activity (Onton et al., 2005) compared to the more occipital
activity in the 10-11 Hz frequency band argue against this hypothesis.
Frontal increase of theta activity has been reported in a variety of meditation prac-
tices (for example Aftanas and Golocheikine, 2001; Arambula et al., 2001; Lagopoulos
et al., 2009; Baijal and Srinivasan, 2010). Frontal midline theta rises from activity of the
medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex (Asada et al., 1999; Ishii et al., 1999)
and have been found to increase with task requiring attention and working memory
(Onton et al., 2005; Scheeringa et al., 2009; Lazarev, 1998; Smit et al., 2004). These re-
sults suggest that mental effort during meditation could be higher for our group of
Vipassana meditators than for the group of HT meditators.
7.5.4 Specific markers of meditative state in different traditions
With regards to the effects comparing between the breath awareness practice (MED1)
and the subsequent meditative period (MED2) it is important to note that MED2 was
always recorded after MED1 so this comparison does not take order effects into ac-
count. It is possible that the differences observed between these states correspond to
non-specific effects related to the passage of time in eyes-closed conditions and is not
specific to the practice involved. Despite this limitation, the fact that different trends in
different groups were observed argues for some specific effects related to the different
practices engaged. As mentioned above both the CTR, ISY and HT groups demon-
strated higher 10-11Hz power during the MED1 (breath awareness) compared to the
MED2 (specific meditation) periods. In addition, the Isha yoga group demonstrated
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higher power in the MED1 periods across lower alpha (8-10Hz), beta (12-20Hz), and
gamma (60-110Hz) frequency ranges. No change in any frequency band power was
found comparing between the two conditions for the VIP group.
The fact that no differences were obtained between the breath awareness and so-
matosensation / open-monitoring periods in the Vipassana group may be related to
the way in which these two practices are taught in tandem in this form of practice.
Breath awareness is often used at the start of Vipassana meditation practice to focus
the mind and it is possible that the VIP group could not refrain from entering a fairly
equivalent breath / somatosensation / open-monitoring meditative state regardless
of the instruction as these three different aspects of the technique are incorporated
strongly into the learning of the practice in this tradition.
To sum up, we have shown that a daily meditation practice induces trait changes
in brain electrical oscillations. These changes vary from one meditation technique to
another and our results emphasize the need to include control participants and if pos-
sible several groups of meditators from different traditions in each meditation study.
Given the absence of clear contrast between the EEG spectral activity during the med-
itative and the instructed mind wandering states (state differences as opposed to trait
differences), we suggest that meditation might be a subtle state that is not too different
from other mental monitoring activities – and would involve the same type of mental
structures and mechanisms. Future studies should also determine what could be the
best control mental state for meditation. In addition, other types of EEG analysis, such
as measures of synchrony might be worth trying to unveil other potential differences
between meditation and other mental states.
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8.1 Synthesis of the results and general discussion
This thesis aimed at characterizing the EEG neuronal substrate of two attentional
states, mind wandering and meditation. My work introduced this new thematic in
a research team and laboratory that were more specialized in the study of visual per-
ception than of subjective states. Since I started this PhD, the interest of the scientific
community for mind wandering and meditation has kept growing. However there is
still much to do before we obtain a clear understanding of the mind wandering and
meditation conscious states.
111
Synthesis of the results and general discussion
8.1.1 EEG correlates of mind wandering
While previous work on mind wandering has investigated mainly the context in which
it occurs and the neural correlates through fMRI or ERPs study, we have tackled for the
first time the dynamic of the EEG oscillatory activity during mind wandering (chapter
3). We designed an original protocol to collect occurrences of mind wandering based
on the subject’s inner experience. Noticing from our own experience that simply try-
ing to observe our breathing for a continuous period of time was already challenging,
we asked our subjects to continuously count their breath from 1 to 10 and to press a
button each time they noticed they had stopped doing the task. This method allowed
us to obtain spontaneous reports of mind wandering events. In addition to this task,
subjects were listening to an auditory oddball protocol. Importantly, subjects partici-
pating to this study were all naive to the practice of meditation .
Using EEG time-frequency analysis, we have shown that periods of mind wander-
ing, defined as the 10-seconde period preceding a button press, are accompanied by
increase amplitude at low frequency bands 2-3.5Hz delta and 4-7Hz theta. By contrast,
the 10-seconde period following a button press, when subjects were focusing back of
the breathing task, are characterized by increased amplitude in the alpha band, and
decreased amplitude in the theta and delta frequency bands (figure 3.2). The ERPs
elicited by the frequent and rare auditory stimuli allowed us to characterized sensory
processing during mind wandering in comparison to the periods of breath concentra-
tion (figure 3.6). The pre-attentive negative component of the ERP at about 100ms after
presentation of a stimulus was reduced during mind wandering, indicating a decrease
in sensory processing.
Based on these results and the vigilance/sleep literature (see chapter 3 ), we sug-
gested that occurrences of mind wandering are accompanied by a decrease in vigilance
level, resembling an early stage of drowsiness.
8.1.1.1 Control task and novelty of the experimental design
The control task being used to study mind wandering was critical. We chose a breath
focus task, which is a relatively neutral non-cognitive task. Ideally, one would study
mind wandering during several control attention engaging tasks. Here, we want to
emphasize the difficulty and novelty of the experimental design and why it was im-
practical for us to use multiple control tasks. Other studies of mind wandering of-
ten use tasks where subjects have to respond continuously to stream of stimuli (e.g.
(Smallwood et al., 2008)) and Smallwood et al. (2006) place a distinction between self-
caught and probe-caught mind wandering episodes. In probe-caught mind wandering
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protocols, to assess the amount of time subjects spend mind wandering while being
unaware of it, they may be probed at regular intervals about their state of mind wan-
dering. Self-caught mind wandering is the type of mind wandering studied in this
report. In our task, we asked subjects to press a button based on pure introspection.
We wanted to collect as many behavioral responses as possible, but despite one hour
of recording for each subject, we only obtained 13-52 clean data epochs per subject
corresponding to a mind wandering episode. In addition, despite the instruction to
stay still, subjects tended to have muscle artifacts in their EEG after pressing the but-
ton, forcing us to reject about 25% of the data. Finally, subjects varied widely in their
propensity to report mind-wandering events, and four subjects had to be excluded
because they provided too few responses. This experiment was the first of its kind
and is a proof of concept that, despite the difficulty encountered, this type of study is
possible.
8.1.1.2 Why do we experience mind wandering ?
The functional role of mind wandering remains debated in philosophy and experi-
mental psychology. The concept of mind wandering plays an important role in Bud-
dhist psychology (Trungpa, 2004) since it is a major obstacle to concentrative medita-
tion practice. Buddhist psychology argues that mind wandering is a non-productive
ego-centered state, a state of “sleep” where our unconscious constantly rehash the
same thoughts and beliefs creating confusion and strengthening our sense of self. By
contrast, some researchers have suggested that mind wandering may be useful to pro-
vide creative insight (Christoff et al., 2009) in a way similar to sleep-induced insight
(Wagner et al., 2004). Our result of finding mind wandering to be a state of low alert-
ness supports both views. It can be considered a state of low concentration or relative
“sleep” as argued in Buddhist psychology but it could also be seen as an hypnagogic
state that may lead to creative insights (Boynton, 2001).
Interestingly Christoff et al. (2008) has also speculated that mind wandering would
be the phenomenological experience of off-line processing occurring during wakeful-
ness, the same way that when asleep, dreams are thought to be expression of memory
consolidation processes through reactivation of experiences. Indeed, off-line process-
ings of experience contributing to memory consolidation that are known to occur dur-
ing the different sleep stages (Peigneux et al., 2001; Stickgold, 2005; Wamsley et al.,
2010) would also be present during wakefulness (Peigneux et al., 2006; Robertson,
2009).
Christoff et al. (2008)’s proposal can also be integrated within theories of mind wan-
dering involving executive attentional control. Executive control is notably involved
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in self-regulation, that is our ability to control our thoughts, feelings and behaviors
(Petersen and Posner, 2012). In their review, Smallwood and Schooler (2006) proposed
that mind wandering would be a disengagement of executive control from the pri-
mary task to redirect the attention towards processing of internal information. This
internal information might thus be arising as side effect of ongoing off-line memory
processes.
Lutz et al. (2008b) have suggested that long term meditation training could en-
hance the capacity to inhibit introspective spontaneous activity during sustained at-
tention engagement through the modification of large-scale neuronal network connec-
tivity and activity. With regards to Christoff et al. (2008) and Smallwood and Schooler
(2006)’s proposals we suggest that meditation training increases executive control to
prevent the automatic redirection of the attention toward the phenomenological con-
tents of the experiences being re-activated by off-line memory processing.
In the view of our results suggesting that mind wandering is a state of early drowsi-
ness, Christoff et al. (2008)’s theory is particularly interesting as it creates a parallel be-
tween mind wandering and dreams and suggest a relationship between the vigilance
state and memory processes. Further studies should investigate possible link between
attentional and memory processes as well as the possible relationship between dreams
and mind wandering.
8.1.2 Perspective in mind wandering research
As we have seen, research on the mind wandering phenomena is a fast growing field
(see figure 2.1). To ensure the reliability of cross-studies comparisons, researchers will
have to develop common concepts to account for the experience of mind wandering.
The recent paper from Christoff (2012) attempts to make the first steps in this sense
but we have seen in chapter 2 that a clear classification of thoughts remains difficult.
Given the wide variety and diversity of mind wandering experiences, we suggest
that adopting a phenomenological approach will greatly help in the definition of mind
wandering within a study. In chapter 4 we have presented our first attempts towards
developing working methodologies to study the phenomenology of mind wandering.
Although preliminary, our first results with the explicitation interview technique high-
light the high variability of experience of mind wandering. The detailed questionnaire
used in the EEG-oculometric study was an attempt to account for this diversity and
allow the subject to give a rather detailed description of the charecteristics of the mind
wandering event he has just experienced. A few studies have equally already devel-
oped a similar detailed experience sampling approach. For example, Stawarczyk et al.
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(2011a) have used a questionnaire to define the “stimulus-dependency” and “task re-
latedness” of their subject’s thoughts. We expect that the use of phenomenological re-
ports in the study of mind wandering will develop, giving the possibilities for accurate
analysis of mind wandering in neuroimaging studies and will improve the reliability
of cross-studies comparisons of the effects of mind wandering.
8.1.3 Comparative study of the EEG activity in meditation
In meditation practices, awareness of mind wandering is critical as they take the mind
away from the meditation practice. Any time an attentional lapse is recognized, the
meditation practionner redirect his mind towards his meditation. Scientific literature
on meditation indicates that meditation practice in general seems to have a positive
impact on both physiological and psychological health (see chapter 6). However, we
were unable to find any clear consensus as to why this is the case. More specifically,
at the physiological level, researchers have not been able to isolate a common EEG
signature of meditation in different meditation practices. Was this because of a real
absence of common EEG features between meditative practices - or even meditation
practitioners - or was it due to differences in studies protocols and recording condi-
tions. To start answering this question, we designed a study aiming at comparing the
EEG activity of practitioners of different traditions of meditation, recorded in the same
conditions (chapter 7).
Different meditation traditions make different use of attention focus and mental
imagery. Within the scientific community meditation practices are usually classified
along a continuum ranging from focused to unfocused attention. In addition prac-
tices can include the mental repetition of a given sound (or mantra) or evocation of
certain mental images. For our comparative study, we have included expert practi-
tioners from meditation traditions with distinct characteristics (chapter 7). Although
our choices were constricted by time, economic and social constraints - the study took
place in India and we had to make appropriate contacts to recruit our participants - we
were able to recruit 27 subjects from a mantra-based meditation (Himalayan Yoga), 20
from open monitoring attention (Vipassana) and 20 from a passive meditation, i.e. re-
quiering no concentrative effort or active control (Isha Yoga) in addition to 32 medita-
tion naive subjects forming a control group. For the purpose of data analysis subjects
were paired for sex and age, forming 4 groups of 16 subjects each.
The comparisons of the mean frequency band content of the EEG between these
4 groups indicates a common increase of the amplitude of fast frequencies gamma
(60-110Hz) in the meditator groups during the meditation condition (figure 7.6). The
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careful inspection of activity from ocular and muscular movements dismissed the hy-
pothesis that the observed gamma activity originates from artefactual sources (see fig-
ure 7.7).We have discussed these results as reflecting different top-down attentional
engagement and processing in meditators compared to controls. We also found in-
crease amplitude of the 8-10Hz alpha in the Vipassana group compared to the all other
groups which we interpreted as higher attentional selectivity in this group.
Intrestingly, we found no state effect: no significant difference was found between
the meditative and the instructed mind-wandering (IMW) task we used as a control
mental state, questionning the relevance of instructed mind wandering as an adequate
control task for meditation.
8.1.3.1 The choice of a control mental state for meditation
Meditation practice requires the practitioner to disengage from the processing of the
self-centered spontaneous thoughts that are considered as naturally produced by the
brain in the resting state (Christoff et al., 2009; Raichle et al., 2001; Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010). An ideal control state would have been to let our participants engage in
mind wandering while resting, since according to our previous study, neural correlates
of mind wandering are quite distinctive from those of a meditative activity (Braboszcz
and Delorme, 2011). In fact, the resting state is a control condition often used in the
meditation litterature (see for example Travis and Wallace, 1999; Khare and Nigam,
2000; Arambula et al., 2001; Aftanas and Golocheikine, 2001; Lutz et al., 2004). How-
ever, experienced meditators also often report spontaneously engaging in meditation
when sitting with no specific task to execute. The instructed mind wandering task was
chosen as it requires to keep the mind involved with episodic memories (Cahn et al.,
2010; Cahn and Polich, 2009), a phenomenal state that is quite different from the one
in (successful) meditation.
Thus our analysis compares the meditative state to a state of active retrieval of
autobiographical events. The results we presented are then likely to reflect the EEG
activity due to differences in the attentional focus and in the semantic and memory
processings of the brain. Of note, there is no similarity between the EEG frequency
content of the instructed mind wandering state and the one of the spontaneous mind
wandering events of our first experiment (chapter 3), which is easily understandable
as IMW does not does not involve the physiological changes associated with sponta-
neous mind wandering.
The fact that we observed a difference between meditation and instructed mind
wandering in only one frequency band and in only one group (see figure 7.4) might
reflect that the same type of structures are active during the two mental states. In
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fact, both states require the monitoring of one’s own mental activity. The difference
lies in the internal attitude subjects adopt towards the thoughts: during meditation
they have to keep a non judgmental attitude of acceptance toward the present ex-
perience and not attempt not to get distracted by thoughts (Bishop et al., 2004). By
contrast, during IMW they are explicitly told to let their mind freely wander through
their memories. It is possible that during the IMW task some of our meditators kept
the non-judgmental attitude towards their experiences as if they had been meditating.
It is also possible that some of our meditators failed to follow instructions and had
episodes of meditation during the control task and episodes of mind wandering dur-
ing the meditation task. We have reported subjective judgement of subjects regarding
the quality of their meditation (see paragraph 7.4.1) which indicates that in all groups
subjects were able to reach a satisfactory meditative state. Unfortunately, we do not
have equivalent reports of judgements regarding the instructed mind wandering ses-
sion which could have indicate wether meditators had episodes of meditation during
the control task or not.
In another line of research protocoles have sometime used contrast between dif-
ferent meditative states within the same subjects. This protocol design, employed for
example in the studies by Lutz et al. (2004) or Carter et al. (2005), requieres however to
study expert practitioners of meditation traditions in which it exists precise descrip-
tion and training of different states, such as in Tibetan Buddhism.
8.1.3.2 The importance of the EEG reference montage on data analysis
The choice of reference can have substantial effect on EEG data analysis. Previous
studies reporting meditation-related gamma activity have used diverse reference mon-
tages such as the vertex electrode Cz (Lutz et al., 2004) and linked earlobes (Cahn et al.,
2010).
For the meditation study, to complement our data analysis using the right mastoid
as a reference, we analyzed the data using the average reference method as well. The
significance for the alpha peak for Vipassana meditators was preserved. However in
the gamma band during the MED2 period, the difference did not reach significance be-
tween the control and the meditator subjects. The activity of independent component
related to eye and muscle artifacts did not differ from the one observed using the mas-
toid reference. Note that we computed ICA artifactual components using the mastoid
montage and re-referenced the components to average reference montages. It is pos-
sible that running the ICA algorithm on the average reference montage would isolate
better components for that montage – although it was impractical in our case since
it would involve re-selecting ICA components and we wanted to be sure to remove
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the same ICA components in all cases. Recently, a comparative study of the effects of
4 different reference montages on the EEG characteristics show that the single mas-
toid reference would consistently show the largest power spectra values whereas the
average reference would consistently show the smallest (Qin et al., 2010). This sug-
gests that the mastoid montage might be more sensitive, and this could explain our
results where the gamma difference reaches significance using the mastoid montage
but not with the average reference one. The ideal reference – something that has not
been achieved so far to our knowledge – would be a perfectly neutral reference not
influenced by brain signals: this is not achieved either by the mastoid or the average
reference (Nunez and Srinivasan, 2006; Ferree, 2006).
8.1.4 Integration of mind wandering and meditation in a general
model of conscious states control
I will now show how mind wandering and meditative states fit in the brain-mind
states continuum outlined in Hobson’s AIM (Activation- Input-ouput gating- Modu-
lation) model (Hobson, 1992). The AIM model has mainly been developed based on
neurobiological aspects of the waking and sleeping states. Although first established
in Hobson (1992), we will base our description on more recent accounts from Hobson
et al. (2000) and Hobson (2009). The three dimensions of the model are based on factors
known to variates with states of consciousness. It is important to note that this model
has been originally developed based on knowledge of the brain activity during the
different states of consciousness that are the waking, REM sleep and non-REM sleep
states, which have been first study in animals before being able to use neuroimaging
technologies in humans.
Activation refers to the information processing capacity of the brain, input-ouput
gating refers to state-dependant changes in the access of the brain to sensory informa-
tion from the external environment and the capacity for the brain to transmit motor
commands to the body. Finally, modulation refers to the neurochemical activity that
originates from neurons of the brain stem by releasing of dopamine, noradrenaline,
serotonin acetylcholine.
Figure 8.1.4 shows Hobson (2009)’s AIM model of brain-mind state, with an em-
phasis on sleep states. The 3 factors described above are the 3 main axes of a cube
which trace a state space model.
How could the meditation and mind wandering states fit into this model? Let’s
consider the experimental results we have obtained on these two states how they may
relate to the AIM model dimensions.
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Figure 8.1: Hobson (2009)’s model of brain-mind state control. The model is created
and the brain-mind states places based on animal and human experiment data (for
dimension activation A and input-output gating I) and based on animal experiment
only for dimension modulation M. Ach:acetylcholine; NA: noradrenaline; NREM: non
rapid-eye movement sleep; REM: rapid eye movement sleep.
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8.1.4.1 Mind wandering state
• Activation: there is no results indicating a changes in the information processing
of the brain during the mind wandering state compared to normal waking state.
Instead, it has been proposed that during mind wandering the information pro-
cessing is decoupled from the primary task (Smallwood et al., 2003). Thus we
will consider that there is no significant changes in activation between normal
waking and mind wandering.
• Input-output gating: there are experimental evidences of a decreased sensory pro-
cessing of external stimli during mind wandering compared to a non - mindwan-
dering state (Smallwood et al., 2008; Kam et al., 2011; Braboszcz and Delorme,
2011, see). In consequence, mind wandering will have a lower value on the I axis
than wake.
• Modulation: a recent study by Smallwood et al. (2011) linked mind wandering
episodes with increased pupil diameter, a result that we have also found in our
own laboratory (Grandchamp et al., 2011, unpublished data). Pupil diameter is
often used as a marker of the noradredrenaline system activity and Smallwood
et al. (2011, 2012) have suggested that higher tonic noradrenaline would facili-
tate mind wandering. This hypothesis is based on the Adaptative Gain Theory
which assumes that gain on cortical processes increases under the action of the
locus coeruleus (in which noreprinephrine is produced) and that cognition can
be bias towards or away from information relevant to an external task depend-
ing on the level of temporal coupling between the activity in the locus coeruleus
and events in the current task (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003; Aston-Jones and
Cohen, 2005). Thus during mind wandering, there will be increased firing rate
of the locus coeruleus leading to increased release of norepinephrine compared
to normal waking state.
8.1.4.2 Meditation state
• Activation: higher gamma activity has been reported during meditation state in
expert Tibetan Buddhist practitioners (Lutz et al., 2004), Vipassana (Cahn et al.,
2010), and Himalayan Yoga, and Isha Yoga meditation (see chapter 7). EGG
gamma activity is supposed to be related to local neuronal communication (Fries,
2005; Varela et al., 2001). Consistent with this hypothesis, link between regions
of fMRI activation and recording of intra-EEG gamma activity have been found
(Lachaux et al., 2007). We may thus consider that, because of higher gamma ac-
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tivity compared to the normal waking state, meditation might correspond to a
state of higher information processing capacity, that is higher activation in the
AIM model.
• Input-output gating: using an auditory oddball protocol, Srinivasan and Baijal
(2007) showed that, for participants with 3 to 7 years of daily practice of a form
of concentrative meditation, pre-attentive perceptual processes was enhanced in
meditators following meditation practice compared to a control group practicing
relaxation. By contrast, also using an auditory oddball protocol although this
time in expert Vipassana meditators, Cahn and Polich (2009) observed a reduc-
tion of the attentional engagement in response to the oddball stimuli as well as
a general decrease of sensory response to stimuli during meditation compared
to a control mental state within the same subjects. Thus there might be an ef-
fect of the meditative state on processing of external stimulation that depend
on the type of meditation. In addition, processing of external stimulation might
vary depending on the level of meditation expertise of the practionners, or even
within a meditation session.
• Modulation: although early studies have investigated neurochemical effects of
meditation on the brain, mostly during transcendental meditation practice, there
is no clear evidence for a shift towards higher or lower noradrenaline or acetyl-
choline levels during meditation. More recently, studies of Vipassana meditation
(Nagendra et al., 2012; Tooley et al., 2000) have found increased levels of mela-
tonine following the practice. Since melatonine is synthetized from serotonine
we may hypothesized that Vipassana meditation induce increased released of
serotonine.
8.1.4.3 Integration to the AIM model
Based on the data and hypothesis listed above, we suggest to introduce the mind wan-
dering and meditation states in the AIM model as in figure 8.2. Given that, as revealed
by the divergent results regarding the “input-output gating” dimension in the medita-
tive state, different forms of meditation may lead to different effects, we only consid-
ered in the model the case of Vipassana meditation, as it is the only tradition for which
wecould gather data for all 3 AIM factors.
Although much work is still needed to confirm this preliminary model of the mind
wandering and meditation states, we believe integration of these states in a more gen-
eral model of consciousness is one step further towards the understanding of the hu-
man mind in its diversity of experiential states.
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Figure 8.2: Adaptation of the Hobson’s model of the conscious state continuum (Hob-
son, 2009) with integration of the mind wandering state and Vipassana meditation
state. The axes have been shifted to allow a better visualization. Mind wandering
occurrences have been linked to increased activity of the noradrenaline system while
external sensory input is limited during mind wandering in favour to increase pro-
cessing of internal input and level of cortical activation remains the same as during
the waking state. The Vipassana meditation states as elicited by experienced practi-
tioners leads to higher level of cortical activation than during normal waking, while
the processing of external inputs is reduced. The serotonine levels during meditation
are considered higher than in he normal wake. A: activation; I: input-output gating; M:
modulation; Ach:acetylcholine; NA: noradrenaline; NREM: non rapid-eye movement
sleep; REM: rapid eye movement sleep.
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8.2 Perspectives
Our work brings new types of data and paradigms in the study of mind wandering
and meditation. We have for the first time studied the EEG oscillatory dynamic of the
mind wandering state and attempted to fill some of the methodological and experi-
mental gaps existing in the study of meditation. However, there is still a long path
before being able to fully understand the mechanisms of human consciousness within
the realm of cognitive science. Here we will present two perspectives to go further
in the study of mind wandering and meditation. A first perspective is the used the
altered state provoked by hypnosis induction to better understand characteristics of
mind wandering. A second one suggest a new sort of control task for within-subjects
comparisons of meditation state effect.
8.2.1 Hypnosis induction as a tool to study mind wandering
We suggest here to study occurrences of mind wandering in the light of another altered
state of consciousness: hypnosis. Hypnosis can be seen as a state of focused attention,
concentration and inner absorption with relative suspension of peripheral awareness
(Faymonville et al., 2006). It is routinely used to reduce stress reaction related to a
clinical intervention or even as an adjunct to reduce pain (Faymonville et al., 1995;
Butler et al., 2005; Kupers et al., 2005) although its mechanisms are far from being
understood.
Interestingly, the litterature mention that subjects report reduction of spontaneous
thoughts in the particular state of consciousness induced by hypnosis (Lynn et al.,
1996; Oakley, 2008).
This seems to suggest that during hypnosis spontaneous fluctuations of the vigi-
lance level observed in the “normal” waking state (Laufs et al., 2006; Braboszcz and
Delorme, 2011) are reduced and that activity of the default mode network (Raichle
et al., 2001) is altered.
This network activated when the subject is at rest and deactivated when engaged
in a task is primarily made up of posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Studies coupling both EEG and fMRI found that the activity
in different EEG frequency bands is spontaneously fluctuating at rest between a mode
dominated by fast frequencies waves and one dominated by slow frequency waves,
and that these fluctuations can be correlated to spontaneous fluctuations of the BOLD
signal (Laufs et al., 2006; Mantini et al., 2007). Recently, EEG studies have shown that
these spontaneous patterns of increased and decreased slow frequencies activity are
associated with periods of mind wandering and periods of concentration, respectively
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Braboszcz and Delorme (2011); Cahn (2007).
Mind wandering tend to be associated with higher activity within the default net-
work and with executive network recruitment (Christoff et al., 2009; Peterson et al.,
2009). More precisely, Stawarczyk et al. (2011a) reported that mind wandering reports
compared to on-task reports are associated with higher degree of activity in the MPFC
and PCC/precuneus.
During hypnosis a recent study found that activity in the prefrontal cortex is re-
duced, a result interpreted by the authors as reflecting the suspension of spontaneous
cognitive activity (McGeown et al., 2009). The precuneus also seems to play a role in
the generation of the internal representations provoked by hypnosis induction (Cojan
et al., 2009; Pyka et al., 2011). While previous studies have suggested that hypnosis im-
plies a reduced role of attentional monitoring, with more automatic processes(Egner
et al., 2005), Cojan et al. (2009) describe a general increase of activity in area implicated
in executive control during hypnosis, and suggest that hypnosis involves a general
attentional change corresponding to filtering of external stimulation to allow focalisa-
tion on internal representations.
Based on the hypothesis of reduced spontaneous thoughts during hypnosis, we
propose to adress the question of wether the emergence of mind wandering is favored
or inhibited by the internal representation produced during hypnotic induction and
aim at determing the neural correlates this phenomenon.
Classical mind wandering sampling protocol (Gruberger et al., 2011; Christoff et al.,
2009; Qin et al., 2011) could be used under the hypnotic state using the Sustained At-
tention to Response Task (SART) (Robertson et al., 1997), a go/no-go task requiring
responses to all stimuli except infrequent targets, coupled with thought probes re-
quiering the subject to rate the "task relatedness" and "stimulus dependency" of their
subjective experience prior to the probe (Stawarczyk et al., 2011a).
If compared to the non-hypnotic state, hypnosis produces less mind wandering
events, then it would be appropriate to undergo a neuroimaging protocol to under-
stand what are differences in brain functioning between the two states.
Adressing for the first time the effect of hypnosis on spontaneous attentional fluctu-
ations using a combination of high spatial and high temporal precision imaging tech-
niques, this project should make the object of my post-doctoral training and I believe
it should shed light both on mechanisms of mind wandering and of hypnosis.
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8.2.2 The quest for an ideal control state in meditation study
Define an ideal control state is always challenging, whatever the cognitive function
being investigated. In the case of meditation, to avoid any bias, the control task has
to be in adequation with characteristics of the practice. For example, in a case where
the meditative practice under investigation are done with eyes closed, like in our own
experiment, the control task should also be done with eyes closed especially in the
case of neuroimaging experiments.
The control task should provoke significant changes in the attentional focus of the
subject while, as much as possible, preventing them from entering a meditative-like
state. For future studies, we suggest to test using the listenning of an audio book
requiering subjects to answer questions at the end of the session to control for the
subject’s meditative state Indeed, listening to auditory stimuli is likely to give a more
external than internal direction to the attention while they have to keep a sustain atten-
tion to the audio book in order to answer the subsequent questions and should help
subjects not automatically drift towards the meditative state. We also suggest that
attending to non-personal material (i.e. , not attending to personal thoughts) might
help meditators to adopt a less neutral internal attitude towards the fact being told -
contrasting with the non-judgemental attitude of meditation.
Although this is purely speculative, we believe this task is worth being tested as
providing an efficient control state for the meditative state. Further studies should
approve or reject our hypothesis.
8.2.3 Towards a better understanding of the mind
More and more neuroscience is taking a turn towards studying the effects of posi-
tive mental state on health and well being. In June 2011, the french Public Health
Authority (Haute Autorité de Santé) called for more consideration of non-medicinal
therapies in medical prescription 1. Amongst the obstacles to a large development of
these practices is the lack of informations both the praticians and the patient have of
the benefits of non-medicinal practices, such as meditation. We believe that a better
scientific knowledge of the mechanisms of action of meditation would greatly help the
medical professions to recognize and acknowledge the drug-free possibilites medita-
tion offers to help patients suffering of diverse psychological or health problems and
to integrate it in the classic “medical toolbox”.
Although at a fundamental level our work helps understand better the mechanisms
1http://www.has-sante.fr/portail/jcms/c_1060771/changer-le-regard-sur-
les-therapeutiques-non-medicamenteuses
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underlying the natural functioning of the brain, through the study of mind wander-
ing, and of the mechanisms underlying meditation and thus contribute to the research
effort aiming at understanding the human mind.
Our wish for the future years is that scientific comprehension of the functionning
of the mind will improve and its contributions will spread in the society so that each
and everyone could have access to the understanding of the cognitive and biologi-
cal mechanisms underlying human consciousness and thus make the best use of its
possibilities.
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Example of an explicitation interview
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Example of an explicitation interview
• Subject: MR-170111
• Meditation: non
• Age: 30 ans
• Sexe: M
In the transcription, E is the experimentateur (the interviewer) and S is the subject (the
interviewee).
E: Décris moi ce qui vient de se passer là pour toi au moment où tu as tapé sur la
table.
S: En fait, je me rend compte que je suis a peu près incapable de rester concentré
sur ma respiration, si tu veux y a des trucs qui se bousculent un petit peu dans le sens
où en même temps que je compte, les idées montent... j’arrive pas à rester, à ne faire
que compter.. c’est du domaine de l’impossible. Donc, euh et puis bon là, je venais de
perdre le compte quoi.. ça .. je me rend compte que juste compter, j’y arrive pas.
E: D’accord. A ce moment là au moment où tu as tapé sur la table et où tu t’es
redressé .. comment c’était.. qu’est ce qui a fait que tu t’es arrêté ?
S: Bah euh une impression de décrochement total quoi. Les chiffres étaient partis,
ça.. ouai l’idée ça euh j’étais plus dans le comptage quoi. Après de là à décrire je..
E: Quand tu dis “les chiffres étaient partis”, comment tu sais qu’ils étaient partis ?
S: Parce que je ne les voyais plus. Je visalise quand je compte, c’est... c’est un peu
comme, quand je lis dans ma tête, mes lèvres elles bougent quand même et quand je
compte dans ma tête, les chiffres ils sont là.
E: D’accord donc là t’étais en train d’essayer de faire la tâche et y a un moment t’as
plus vu les chiffres
S: Voilà
E: et donc t’as les idées..
S: C’est le reste des idées qui a pris le dessus sur le comptage.
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E: et donc au moment.. donc tu comptais et à un moment t’as plus vu les chiffres
et tu dis “le reste des idées à pris le dessus”, comment t’as su que les idées ont pris le
dessus ?
S: C’était au niveau image... euh ... comment te décrire.. ça donne l’impression,
quand je suis comme ça, ça donne l’impression d’un poste de télé qui te fait défiler les
images si tu veux. Et les idées sont comme un flot d’images qui passe et à un moment
donné entre les idées y a les chiffres qui arrivent et là il y en avait plus. Ca..
E: D’accord. Donc au début t’as les chiffres, tu vois les chiffres et à un moment t’as
un flot d’images qui arrive.
S: Oui. En même temps que je compte, voilà, j’ai le compte, j’ai mes images qui
défilent. enfin mes idées mais voilà qui sont là. Je suis en train de réfléchir à autre
chose en même temps parce que j’arrive pas à me concentrer sur une seule.. un seul
comptage et à un moment donné le comptage a été complétement oublié.
E: D’accord. Donc si tu veux, je vais te proposer de le refaire, remets toi comme
t’étais. T’étais dans ta position, un peu penché en avant et tu voyais les chiffres, à un
moment les chiffres ont été un peu bousculés par le flot des images qui défilaient et
donc là t’arrivait plus, t’es plus concentré sur ta respiration.. et euh.. comment, tu
peux me décrire les image ? est ce que il y avait des couleurs ? Elles étaient petites,
grandes ? Hésite pas à refaire.
S: C’est, c’est des images, j’ai tendance à dire “plein écran”. C’est bizarre à dire
mais bon, oui c’est je suis dans le, la réflexion autour d’un élevage que je suis en train
de faire donc euh je vois mes bestioles, c’est tout.
E: D’accord et donc, t’es en train de compter, tu vois les chiffres, et d’un coup les
images en plein écran.
S: Oui
E: ça te prends tout l’espace.. Et comment euh par rapport aux chiffres, est ce que
les chiffres prenaient tout l’espace aussi ? Comment est ce qu’ils étaient placés ?
S: Non, à la limite moins oui. Non les chiffres prennent pas toute la place, non
clairement pas.
E: Est ce que tu peux me décrire comment sont les chiffres ?
S: euh.. [ferme les yeux] je les vois forcément plein écran là
E: Hésite pas à refaire
S: Je peux reprendre le..
E: Oui, pour te remettre dans le bain . . .
S: Oui, c’est du floutage. Ca se superpose et ça se floute c’est vraiment, c’est euh..
Voilà c’est ça . Donc le chiffre est plus ou moins, prend la place qu’il y a dispo, mais
les idées se calent par dessus, ça floute voilà. En fait ça, enfin même pour compter si
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on par de 1 effectivement y a le 1 mais y a le 2 qui se superpose par dessus avec une
3ème image ça, c’est vraiment de la superposition de trucs avec euh un voile de fond
qui est le comptage.
E: D’accord, donc là devant toi tu as des chiffres qui viennent se superposer et les
images
S: et les images encore qui viennent par dessus
E.. qui superposent par dessus et donc tu continues à compter et au bout d’un
moment t’as vu ton élevage.. je sais pas quelle bête
S: ce sont des criquets
E: des criquets, qui se sont superposé. Et à ce moment là, quand tu compte et que tu
vois les images, ta respiration tu la sens comment ? Tu la sens à un endroit particulier
? Comment tu sais que tu respires et que tu comptes tes respirations ?
S: j’en sais rien.. je compte à chaque inspiration donc ça, c’est au moment où je
reprend de l’air, enfin c’est au moment où j’ai plus d’air que je sais qu’il faut que je
compte le suivant. Ca..
E: D’accord, donc euh au moment où tu euhh comment tu sais que tu reprends de
l’air ?
S: j’en sais rien... ohlàlà
E: c’est par, au niveau des sensations, c’est ton ventre qui se gonfle, ton nez ?
S: Non, c’est les poumons qui se gonflent. C’est vraiment le haut de la cage tho-
racique qui.. qui prend. Je respire pas avec le ventre. /................../ Si je me concentre
sur ma respiration, j’oublie de compter.
E: D’accord
S: Disons que là j’essayais de compter en même temps que j’essayais de compren-
dre le moment de l’inspiration, voir le moment de .. enfin et du coup j’en oublie de
compter au moment où j’inspire, ça..
E: D’accord. Mais quand tu fais en comptant en même temps..
S: Je réfléchis pas à la respiration, je sais que quand j’inspire c’est le moment de
changer de chiffre et finalement je me rends même plus compte que c’est à l’inspiration
que je compte.
E: D’accord, et tu m’as dit que ça se passait quand même dans le haut de la cage
thoracique.
S: Oui, je respire que par le.. dans un cas où je me suis concentré effectivement je
ne respire que par le haut de la cage, et par le nez.
E: Donc si on reprend, t’es concentré à compter tes respirations, et donc tu voyais
les chiffres qui apparaissaient devant.
S: Oui
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E: Ta respiration, tu la sentais pas vraiment, mais c’était plutôt au niveau de la cage
thoracique ou bien t’avais aucune sensation ?
S: Non, y a que la sensation d’inspiration que j’ai, c’est tout. Enfin oui, je le sens
gonflé mais pas... c’est pas sur ça que je suis concentré, je l’oublierai presque.
E: d’accord, mais si par exemple moi je devais la ressentir, comme tu la ressens la
sensation d’inspiration„ qu’est ce que je devrais ressentir ?
S: /...../ je sais pas comment décrire, à part la sensation de tension au niveau de
la cage thoracique... la cage qui est repoussée, c’est vraiment le, la sensation que j’en
ai quand je suis là c’est le blocage, enfin le gros du truc que je peux sentir c’est le
moment où j’ai rempli complètement, où je suis à bloc. C’est là que je sais vraiment
que le comptage doit continuer. C’est même pas à l’inspiration, c’est vraiment une fois
que tout est bloqué, quand j’ai rempli au max.
E: D’accord. Donc t’as commencé à compter, à cette fois que t’as eu cette sensation
de rempli à bloc tu changes de chiffres et euh donc tu comptes et au bout d’un moment
y a des images qui viennent se surperposer devant les chiffres. Et à ce moment là euh..
qu’est ce qu’elle devient la sensation de blocage ?
S: elle est oubliée puisque j’expire et que c’est la libération
E: d’accord, donc au moment où les images, les pensées viennent se superposer
aux chiffres, c’est le moment où t’expire ?
S: oui, oui oui
E: et au moment où t’as expiré la suite de la respiration tu..
S: Je ne m’en rends pas vraiment compte jusqu’à ce que je commence à sentir le,
le remplissement. J’ai pas la sensation de gérer vraiment la respiration. /...../ Je me
concentre trop sur la respiration.. disons que y a pas d’effort au vidage et du coup c’est
là que j’ai plus le temps de réfléchir. Le tuc c’est que j’ai l’impression de m’obliger à in-
spirer et du coup je suis obligé de me concentrer sur cette inspiration, que l’expiration
ne me demande pas d’efforts, elle se fait toute seule. Et du coup à ce moment là je suis
entre guillemets libre de laisser courir mes pensées.
E: D’accord et au moment où t’as tapé sur la table, juste avant ça donc t’avais eu
les pensées qui étaient arrivées et euh ton attention sur la respiration, ta respiration tu
la sentais toujours ?
S: Non. C’est pour ça que je me suis relevé, enfin que j’ai tout arrêté c’est que
je n’étais même plus concentré sur la respiration. Ca.. je vais pas dire que j’ai eu la
sensation d’étouffement, on en est pas là mais j’ai pas inspiré aussi fort que les fois
précédentes parce que je n’étais plus autant concentré sur la respiration. Ca, voilà.
E: Ok. Donc si je reprends un petit peu pour remettre le scénario au clair. Donc
t’es en train de compter donc à chaque inspi tu sens une sensation de blocage ca te fait
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compter le chiffre suivant..
S: Oui.
E: Tu voyais les chiffres devant toi qui se superposent, le 1, le 2 et au bout d’un
moment les pensées sous forme d’images vraiment grand écran qui sont venues et à
partir de ce moment là t´ as l’impression que c’est moins..
S: Dans un premier temps, j’arrive à garder le fil, euuh entre deux pensées qui vi-
ennent interrompre le processus. Je suis pas en changement de c hiffre, je suis toujours
dans la même respiration donc ca va. Et à un moment donné, le flot de pensées est
plus important que le comptage et la respiration et du coup je perds le ca euh, je perds
le fil.
E: D’accord. Et quand tu dis le flot de pensées était plus important que la respira-
tion, comment tu sais qu’il était plus important ?
S: C’est l’attention qui se déplace, disons que le .... la tâche principale entre guillemets
est carrément oubliée au profit des idées qui arrivent quoi euuh là où c’était des bribes
d’informations qui sont entrecoupées entre deux respirations là c’est carrément, je suis
parti sur mon truc et j’ai oublié le reste quoi.
E: D’accord. Donc au bout d’un moment où tu comptes, tu voyais les chiffres, tu
voyais des images qui venaient s’intercaler entre les chiffres et au bout d’un moment
les images prennent le dessus
S: ouai, c’est ca, c’est vraiment le..
E: Et est ce que tu peux me décrire le moment où les images prennent le dessus
? Est ce que ca s’accompagne, est ce que t’entends une voix, est ce que t’entends des
sons.. ?
S: Non, non c’est non y a pas de sons, j’arrive pas à me concentrer assez pour
décrocher au niveau auditif, donc ca c’est pas possible. Quand je compte si tu veux,
je change pas d’espace, l’environnement est toujours là, donc non au niveau son y a
rien qui se déclenche. Par contre ca va être au niveau visuel où je dirais que les idées
s’animent.. c’est plus vraiment des images ca va être du, c’est du mouvement qui
s’installe. Au lieu d’avoir des images qui se superposent effectivement, on peut passer
sur une idée de film qui va défiler.
E: Donc t’étais en train de compter, qu début tu sentais bien ta sensation d’inspi,
la sensantion de blocage, de poumons remplis, tu changes de chiffre , y a des pensées
qui s’intercalent quand même à chaque fois entre chaque chiffre mais tu restes sur la
tâche de comptage et au bout d’un moment, les pensées prennent de plus en plus de
place et elles commencent à s’animer.
S: Oui.
E: Donc le contenu euh, comment ca se passe quand ca s’anime, est ce que y a des
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couleurs ? est ce que toi t’as ta voix intérieure qui te racontes un peu ce qui se passe
autour des images ?
S: Non, non non. Enfin au niveau oui couleur, oui oui. Je pense en couleurs. Mais
sinon non, comme je dis y pas de sons, y a pas de... au niveau inconscient y pas de
dictée, y a pas de tout ca. Par contre ouai, c’est de l’animation, c’est ... ca ca me fait
penser quand ca.. quand il y a l’aquarium sur le côté, qu’on regarde la télévision et
que d’un seul coup l’aquarium est plus intéressant que la télévision. Voilà, c’est un
truc qui m’arrive souvent, c’est je regarde la télé et au bout d’un moment finalement
l’aquarium à plus d’intérêt que la télévision. Et c’est vraiment ca le truc. L’intérêt se
déporte.
E: D’accord. Et ces images qui arrivent au moment où t’es en train de compter
les images qui commencent à s’animer et à prendre le dessus, elles ont une direction
particulière, elles arrivent d’un endroit particulier ?
S: Oui. Elles arrivent de la droite. Ca peut sembler très con mais ca déphase c’est
vraiment une sensation de diapo qui arrive de la droite, à l’ancienne. Ca.. voilà.
E: D’accord. Donc t’es en train de compter, tu vois les chiffres, eux ils apparaissent
devant toi ?
S: oui, les chiffres se se comment dire. Les chiffres ont, c’est vraiment une sensation
de flou qui se superposent les uns aux autres.
E; D’accord. Donc flous et ils se superposent les uns aux autres. Et de temps en
temps t’as des pensées qui elles aussi viennent se superposer ?
S: Qui viennent se superposer en transparence effectivement.
E: en transparence, et au bout d’un moment c’est plus les pensées qui viennent se
superposer en transparence, c’est comme une diapo qui arrive de la droite.
S: Oui.
E: Et qui va prendre la place...
S: Oui qui prend la place et ca finit par s’animer pour avoir euh, oui
E: D’accord. Et tu m’as dit ton attention va se déplacer.
S: Oui
E: Comment.. comment tu sais que ton attention se déplace ? Comment ca se passe
?
S: A la limite c’est même l’inverse qui se passe. C’est pas tellement le, la diapo qui
vient se placer par dessus mais plus l’impression d’avoir la, de passer la tête à autre
chose. De tourner la tête vers autre chose. Ca ouai, ouai ouai c’est.. c’est même pas
les choses qui viennent passer par dessus à la limite c’est vraiment.. quand je perds le
comptage c’est l’impression si tu veux que les chiffres sont là en train de défiler et que
je pars pour aller voir autre chose.
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E: D’accord. Donc les chiffres défilent là et toi tu pars, parce que tu sens que t’as un
mouvement de déplacement...
S: Oui oui ca c’est ca, la sensation de regarder ailleurs.
E: D’accord. Et euh cet ailleurs, y a une direction particulière ?
S: Oui comme je te disais les images viennent de la droite, et ca serait la sensation
d’aller vers la droite.
E: D’accord. Donc je reprends. T’es en train de compter, à chaque inspi tu vois les
chiffres un peu flous qui apparaissent et qui se superposent en transparence devant
toi, avec de temps en temps d’autres images qui viennent se superposer, des pensées
S: oui
E: et au bout d’un certain temps, les pensées deviennent plus importantes et ar-
rivent de la droite comme des diapos, elles sont animées et à ce moment là t’as la
sensation d’un déplacement.. tu me dis tourner la tête, tourner ton attention vers la
droite et là, c’est à ce moment là que t’oublie la tâche de compter ?
S: Oui, les chiffres sont plus là.
E: D’accord. Et quand tu me dis ’ca se décale vers la droite, mon attention se décale
vers la droite’, tu peux me décrire ce qui se passe, comment est ce que tu sais que
l’attention se décale, est ce que tu sens tes yeux bouger, est ce que t’as des sensations
particulières ?
S: Uhum, oui j’aurai presque les yeux qui bougent. Oui oui, ah oui oui. C’est.. j’y
ai pas réfléchi mais c’est vrai quand [......] En fait c’est pour compter il faut que j’ai
le.. la sensation que j’ai c’est que je dois avoir le regard devant. Et dès que j’ai les
yeux qui bougent, je suis à autre chose. Là j’étais en position, j’avais la tête baissée.
Dès que j’ai le regard fixe, les yeux fixes devant je compte, dès que je relache, j’arrête
de compter. Là typiquement j’ai eu la sensation d’avoir les yeux qui ont légèrement
relevés et automatiquement, je perds le compte.
E: D’accord. Et donc tu comptes avec les yeux devant et au moment où euh, tu
vois tes chiffres devant toujours et à un moment donc t’as ces images qui arrivent de
la droite et là tes yeux vont se déplacer, c’est bien ca ?
S: Oui. En fait quel que soit le mouvement des yeux, là typiquement c’était vers
le haut, je change de euuh entre guillemets de pensée, je perds l’attention sur mon
décompte et je passe à autre chose. C’est l’impression d’avoir le compteur devant et
au bout d’un moment le compteur devant et au bout d’un moment je perds la fixation
du compteur et je finis par regarder quelque chose qui est autour.. mes pensées sont
autour.
E: Les pensées sont autour du compteur..
S: Oui
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E: Donc si on revient, au moment où, la fois précédente tu me disais c’est des im-
ages qui arrivent par la droite. Au moment où tu les vois arriver, est ce que tu peux
me décrire comment elles sont ces images ? Comment est ce qu’elles arrivent, si elles
sont déjà nettes, floues ? Si elles sont déjà en couleur ?
S: [..] C’est net. De là à dire en couleur, je saurais pas dire, j’ai du mal à.. [...] non
c’est pas en couleur.
E: D’accord. Donc au début c’est pas en couleur, mais après tu vas les voir en
couleur ?
S: Oui, oui. Plus je suis, disons que ca.. si je reste sur mon décompte.. Non, les
couleurs sont là quand je pers le fil. Une fois que je suis sur la.. plus sur mon idée que
sur le comptage là j’aurai de la couleur, mais avant non.
E: D’accord. Donc au début quand tu comptes avec les yeux fixés devant et que tu
vois les chiffres qui se superposent en flou, les images aussi, les images sont en gris,
en noir et blanc ?
S: Oui.
E: et à un moment tu vas en voir arriver par la droite qui sont en noir et blanc, qui
vont se superposer et elles vont prendre de la couleur quand elles vont prendre de
l’importance.
S: oui
E: et le mouvement il y est déjà quand elles arrivent ?
S: Oui. C’est le mouvement qui...
E: L’animation de l’image, quand elle arrive ?
S: elle ne se fait que quand j’ai les yeux fixés dessus.
E; D’accord. Et tu m’as dit aussi quand tu comptes, t’as l’impression d’avoir le
compteur devant avec les yeux fixés dessus et que les idées sont autour ?
S: Oui.
E: et donc l’image qui arrive par la droite, est ce que tu pourrais me décrire si elle
arrive, elle sort de rien ou si elle était déjà autour ?
S: Ca c’est difficile à dire, j’ai pas de sensation particulière [....] je réfléchis trop là...
E: D’accord. Si tu veux je vais reprendre moi les éléments que j’ai et tu me dis
si j’ai oublié quelque chose, si tu veux préciser. Donc je t´ ai demandé de compter
tes respirations de 1 à 10 en boucle, t’as pris une position un peu comme ca, la tête
dans les mains et t’as commencer à compter. Donc à ce moment là t’avais les yeux
qui étaient fixés droit devant toi, tu sentais ta cage thoracique qui se gonflait et quand
elle était à bloc tu savais qu’il fallait changer de chiffre, donc tu comptais 1,2.. comme
ca. Mais toutefois toujours entre les chiffres t’avais des pensées qui venaient aussi se
superposer. Donc les chiffres tu les voyais devant toi en flou en transparence et y avait
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aussi des pensées qui étaient sans couleur, qui venaient se superposer aux chiffres en
transparence. Et au bout d’un moment y a eu une image qui est arrivée par la droite,
qui au dápart n’était pas animée et en noir et blanc, qui est venue se mettre devant,
qui a rempli l’espace. Qui était plus grande que les autres ?
S: Plus grand non. Disons que j’ai l’impression d’avoir toujours le visu en vision
plein écran.
E: D’accord. Donc l’image est venue plein écran et elle a commencé à s’animer, à
prendre des couleurs
S: Oui
E: et à ce moment là tu me dis, tu faisais plus du tout attention à la tâche, t’étais
concentré sur l’image et euh, je voudrais juste qu’on essait de revenir peut être au
moment où l’image commence à prendre des couleurs, comment était ta sensation de
respiration à ce moment là ?
S: Relachée. Justement c’est ca qui m’a fait prendre conscience que je n’étais plus à
ma tâche, c’est que je ne respirais plus à fond.
E: D’accord. Et est ce que tu pourrais me décrire si les couleurs étaient là depuis
longtemps ou si c’est arrivé en même temps ?
S: Non c’était avant. Longtemps je pourrai pas dire, mais j’ai pris conscience que
j’avais arrêté de compter bien après la couleur et l’animation.
E: Ok. Et au moment où tu as tapé sur la table, donc, tu voyais, t’étais dans l’image,
t’as tapé sur la table, comment tu as pris la décision de taper sur la table ? De donner
le signal ?
S: Ca c’est terrible comme question, j’en sais rien. Disons qu’au moment où je sens
que je ne suis plus en train de respirer profondément, j’ai ouvert les yeux.Je me suis
rendu compte que j’étais plus en train de faire ce que je devais faire. Du coup j’ai
ouvert les yeux, et j’ai tapé la table qu’après avoir bien compris que, je vais pas dire
que j’étais revenu, mais presque.
E: D’accord. D’accord donc au moment où l’image est arrivée, elle était en plein
écran, elle était animée, elle avait des couleurs, au bout d’un certain temps, tu t’es
apercu que tu respirais plus aussi à fond qu’avant, que ta respiration était plus légère
et ca ca t’as fait ouvrir les yeux, et c’est là que tu t’es dis “je suis plus en train de faire
la tâche”.
S: Oui.
E: D’accord. Est ce que tu vois des choses à ajouter ?
S: Non.
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During concentration tasks, spontaneous attention shifts occurs towards self-centered matters. Little is
known about the brain oscillatory activity underlying these mental phenomena. We recorded 128-channels
electroencephalographic activity from 12 subjects performing a breath-counting task. Subjects were
instructed to press a button whenever, based on their introspective experience, they realized their attention
had drifted away from the task. Theta (4–7 Hz) and delta (2–3.5 Hz) EEG activity increased during mind
wandering whereas alpha (9–11 Hz) and beta (15–30 Hz) decreased. A passive auditory oddball protocol was
presented to the subjects to test brain-evoked responses to perceptual stimuli during mind wandering.
Mismatch negativity evoked at 100 ms after oddball stimuli onset decreased during mind wandering whereas
the brain-evoked responses at 200 ms after stimuli onset increased. Spectral analyses and evoked related
potential results suggest decreased alertness and sensory processing during mind wandering. To our
knowledge, our experiment is one of the first neuro-imaging studies that relies purely on subjects'
introspective judgment, and shows that such judgment may be used to contrast different brain activity
patterns.
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Introduction
While reading books, most people have had the experience of
finding their attention drifts towards self-centered matters. After
some time (ranging from seconds to minutes), the readers realize
they are mind wandering and bring their attention back to their
reading. Mind wandering episodes thus correspond to the emergence
of task-unrelated thoughts and affects that are attracting the attention
away from the task at hand (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Mason
et al., 2007). Not surprisingly, mind wandering episodes occur in our
everyday life quite often—for instance, as soon as we perform a task
and start realizing we are thinking about something else while doing
it. One may think that avoiding these attention shifts is only a matter
of concentration and willingness to carry out a mental task. Yet, after
weeks, months, or years of training in tasks involving sustained
concentration–such as focused meditation practice–subjects realize
that these events seem to just happen, despite purposefully trying to
avoid them—see Braboszcz et al. (2010) for a review of mind
wandering during meditation practice.
The experience of mind wandering thus highlights the existence of
moment to moment subjectively-attested changes of attentional focus
from a task to non-task related thoughts and we believe that these
changes would most likely be associated with different brain activity.
Although it is a common phenomenon, and although its implication for
consciousness research and the study of attentional processes is critical,
the brain dynamics associated with mind wandering have not yet been
studied directly.
Mindwandering has been associatedwith lower level of alertness and
vigilance (Oken et al., 2006), a mental state with limited external
information processing where attention is decoupled from the environ-
ment (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006). Supporting this hypothesis,
human subjects exhibited decreased performance in rare-target oddball
detection tasks during mind wandering (Giambra, 1995). In addition, the
amplitude of the P300 event-related potential component was reduced
during mind wandering, suggesting a decrease in attentional resources
directed towards stimulus processing (Smallwood et al., 2008).
Although the brain dynamics associated with mind wandering
have not been studied, a number of studies have investigated the
brain dynamics associated with the resting state—an awake neutral
state that is not associated with any specific cognitive task and that is
prone to mind wandering (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001; Mazoyer et al.,
2001). Studies coupling both EEG and fMRI found that the activity in
different EEG frequency bands is spontaneously fluctuating at rest and
can be correlated to spontaneous fluctuations of the BOLD signal
(Laufs et al., 2006; Mantini et al., 2007). These fluctuations seem to
underlie two distinct modes of cerebral activity: amode dominated by
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fast frequency waves (12–30 Hz, beta) that may index higher degrees
of task-related attention (Ray and Cole, 1985; Laufs et al., 2006), and a
mode dominated by slow 3–7 Hz theta waves oscillations that has
been linked to decreased sustained task-related attention and diverse
stages of transition from wake to sleep (Loomis et al., 1937; Makeig
and Inlow, 1993; Klimesch, 1999; Smit et al., 2005). Based on these
results, we hypothesized that task-unrelated attentional drifts–i.e.
mind wandering–would be associated with decreased vigilance and
increased delta and theta power.
It has also been shown that brain evoked responses to external stimuli
change with the degree of vigilance or sleep stage. For example, the
negative brain evoked response to the sensory detection of a sudden
change in the flux of auditory perception called mismatch negativity
(Naatanen et al., 2007) is reduced during the early sleep stages and
drowsiness (Lang et al., 1995; Winter et al., 1995). Since the mind
wandering state should be associated with decreased vigilance, we
expected to observe a decrease in the mismatch negativity amplitude in
the mind-wandering state compared to the breath focus state.
We designed an experiment allowing subjects to experience mind
wandering in conditions we believe to be as close as possible to the
way they are experiencing it in their daily life. We chose a simple
concentration task–a silent breath counting task–that only requires
weak cognitive involvement from the subject, a characteristic known
to favor the induction of mind wandering (Giambra, 1995; Cheyne
et al., 2006). Simultaneously we presented frequent and rare pure-
frequency auditory stimuli that subjects were instructed to ignore,
and we used these stimuli to assess the evoked electrophysiological
activity during the mind wandering and breath concentration states.
Materials and methods
Participants
Sixteen volunteers from the laboratory staff and local universities
(8 females and 8 males; age 19–36 years old, mean: 27 and standard
deviation 5) gave written consent to participate to the experiment.
Participants stated that they were not taking any substances or
medications that could potentially affect their concentration nor having
histories of major psychological disorders or any auditory deficiencies.
Before starting the experiment, all participants read the instructions
and had the possibility to ask questions about the experiment before
giving written consent to participate in the experiment. As detailed
below, 4 of the 16 participants had to be excluded because they did not
report enough mind wandering episodes.
Procedure
Participants sat in a dark room. We asked them to keep their eyes
closed during the recording session. Participants were instructed to
count each of their breath cycles (inhale/exhale) from 1 to 10. As
subjects often lack immediate awareness of their mind wandering
episodes (MWE), we could not ask them to signal MWE occurrence at
the moment their attention was drifting away from the task. Instead,
we asked them to indicate whenever they realized their attention had
drifted, that is whenever they gained meta-consciousness (Schooler,
2002) of their mind wandering episodes. We asked subjects to hold a
button in their right hand and press it whenever they became aware
of having lost track of their breath count. The following instructions
were given to subjects to define what wasmeant by losing track of the
count: “you stopped counting,” “you counted over 10 breaths” or “you
had to reflect intensively to figure out what was the next count.” Once
they pressed the button, participants were instructed to bring their
focus back to their breath and start counting again from one. We read
task directions to participants and made sure they understood them.
The experiment lasted about 1 h and 10 min, split into three blocks
of 20 min separated by 5 min of rest. At the end of each block, we asked
subjects to evaluate their alertness level during the past session (“Did
you feel like falling asleep?”), their eye movement activity (“Did you
open your eyes —if yes can you estimate how many times”), and their
subjective experience when reporting mind-wandering episodes (“Did
you press the button? If yes, what was your subjective experience?”).
None of the participants reported systematically opening their eyes and
none of the participants reported falling asleep. However, 6 of the 12
selected participants reported some level of drowsiness at one time or
another during the 1-h experiment (see Discussion).
Auditory stimuli
While performing the breath counting task, subjects were also
presented with a passive auditory oddball protocol that they were
instructed to ignore. The auditory oddball protocol was composed of
pure sounds of 500 Hz for the standard stimuli (80% of the stimuli)
and 1000 Hz for the oddball (20% of the stimuli). Each sound lasted
100 ms with 10 ms linear amplitude rising and falling times. Inter-
stimulus intervals randomly varied between 750 and 1250 ms.
Oddball stimuli presentation was pseudo-random to ensure there
were never two oddball stimuli presented successively. Auditory
stimuli were calibrated at 72 dB and played through a loudspeaker
located at 1.20 m in front and 45 degrees on the right of the subject.
Recording
We recorded data using a 128-channel Waveguard™ cap (Ad-
vanced Neuro Technology Company—ANT) out of whichwe used 124-
channels—electrodes AFZ, PO6, TP7, and PO5 were damaged and left
out. We plugged the Waveguard™ cap into two synchronized 64-
channel EEG amplifiers also from the ANT Company. We kept most
electrode impedances below 5 KOhm although about 10% of the
electrodes still had higher impedance at the end of preparation–all
impedances were kept below 20 Kohm as recommended in ANT ASA
4.0 software user's guide–ANT recommendation is higher than the
standard 5 Kohm because of the high impedance of its amplifier. We
used M1 mastoid electrode as reference and sampled the data at
1024 Hz. We also recorded EKG by placing two bipolar electrodes on
each side of the subject's torso.
Artifacts correction
We first removed bad electrodes—from 2 to 17 bad electrodes per
subject. We then manually pruned the continuous data from non-
stereotyped, unique artifacts such as paroxysmal muscles activity–high
frequency activities with large amplitude over all electrodes–as well as
electrical artifacts resulting from poor electrode contacts–short-lasting
aberrant oscillatory activity localized at a few electrode sites. We then
used Infomax Independent Component Analysis (Infomax ICA) on the
pruned data to reject artifacts. For each subject, we visually identified and
rejected one to five well-characterized ICA components for eye blink,
lateral eye movements, and temporal muscle noise (Delorme et al.,
2007a). We used visual inspection of component scalp maps, power
spectrum and raw activity to select and reject these artifactual ICA
components.
Data processing
Data processingwas performed underMatlab 7.0 (TheMathworks,
Inc.) using the EEGLAB 7 toolbox (Delorme and Makeig, 2004). We
first downsampled the EEG data from 1024 Hz to 256 Hz and
performed high-pass filtering at 1 Hz using a non-linear elliptic filter.
In addition, we applied an elliptic non-linear notch filter between
45 and 55 Hz. For each subject, we then segmented the EEG data into
20-s data epochs centered on subjects' button presses. We considered
that participants were mind wandering during the 10-s period that
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preceded the button press and we considered that participants were
concentrating on their breath during the 10-s period that followed the
button press (Christoff et al., 2009). Four subjects did not have enough
clean data epochs to be considered for further analysis—the four
subjects had six, five, five and one clean epochs respectively. All the
selected subjects had between 13 and 52 of such 20-s clean EEG data
epochs (mean of 30 per subject; standard deviation of 14). This
ensured that, for each subject, there would be at least 20–30 auditory
stimuli in each condition to compute ERPs (Kappenman and Luck,
2010)—see ERP analysis below. The total number of analyzed mind
wandering events across all subjects was 358.
For each of the two conditions, mind wandering and breath focus,
we also extracted data epochs from 1 s before to 2 s after the
presentation of auditory stimuli. So that auditory stimuli do not occur
too close to a button press, we removed all 3-s data epochs containing
a button press—thus button presses were at least 1 s prior to the
stimulus or at least 2 s after the stimulus. This procedure ensured that
the brain activity related to the button press does not contaminate
our analysis. In addition, we processed brain activity from electrodes
(Oz, Fz) that were not over pre-motor and motor regions limiting
potential contamination of button press brain-related activity. We
thus obtained four groups of data epochs—oddball and standard
stimuli defined over two conditions, mind wandering and breath
focus. We computed mean event related potential (ERP) using a –300
to 0 ms baseline and we performed ERP visualization after applying a
30 Hz linear low pass filter—note that we used the non-filtered data
for computing statistics. We counted a total of 4326 standard stimuli
(mean of 180 per subject; standard deviation of 101) and 1040
oddball stimuli (mean of 43 per subject; standard deviation of 23).
EEG time-frequency analysis
We applied Morlet wavelet decomposition (Goupillaud et al.,
1984) to both the 20-s long data epochs time-locked to button presses
and the short 3-s data epoch time-locked to auditory stimuli. We used
200 linearly-spaced time points and a series of 100 log-spaced
frequencies ranging from 1 Hz to 100 Hz, with 1.5 cycle at the lowest
frequency increasing linearly and capping at eight cycles at 30 Hz.
For long 20-s epochs, we visualized absolute log power−10*log10
(X), X being absolute power at a given time-frequency point. For short
3-s epochs time-locked to auditory stimuli presentation, we also
removed baseline spectral activity by subtracting the pre-stimulus
average baseline log-power at each frequency in order to visualize
power changes in dB unit (Delorme and Makeig, 2004).
Statistics
Statistical tests were performed on ERPs, time-frequency maps
and topographic maps using two-tailed paired parametric student
t-test (df=11). Since most representation involves hundreds of
tests, correction for multiple comparisons was performed using the
cluster method as developed by Maris and Oostenveld (2007). This
method first measures the extent of 1-D (length) or 2-D (surface)
of significance regions (uncorrected) and then tests if the extent of
these regions is significant using a Monte-Carlo approach. For
channel topographies, we set the number of channel neighbors to
4.5 before running Maris and Oostenveld (2007) Matlab function.
We also used FDR (False Discovery Rate) (Benjamini and Yekutieli,
2001) to correct for multiple comparisons and obtained similar
results compared to the cluster method.
Results
EEG activity time-locked to meta-consciousness events
The time frequency analysis of EEG data time-locked to meta-
consciousness event–button press shows a significant influence of the
subject's attentional state at all frequency bands from 2 to 25 Hz
Fig. 1. Time frequency decomposition of transition from mind wandering to breath focus at electrode site Oz. Mind wandering was defined as the period preceding the meta-
conscious event (button press) and breath focus was defined as the period following the meta-conscious event. Topographic maps of power difference are shown for the 2–3.5 Hz
(δ), 4–7 Hz (θ), 15–30 Hz (β) frequency bands from −8 to −2 s before and from 2 to 8 s after the button press. Topographic map of differential power is shown for the 9–11 Hz
(α) frequency band from−6 to−2 s before and 2 to 6 s after the button press (unlike other frequencies bands, the difference of power in the alpha band between mind wandering
and breath focus was not significant for a larger time interval). Areas of statistical significance (pb0.05) are highlighted on the topographic maps (shaded areas represent non-
significant regions for the alpha band topographic map; all electrodes are significant for other frequency bands). The black dot represents the position of electrode Oz.
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(Fig. 1). The most pronounced state-associated change on the EEG
spectral activity occurs in the theta band (4–7 Hz) where absolute
spectral power is significantly higher in the mind wandering state
compared to the breath focus state. This effect is observed at all
electrode sites and is larger over occipital and parieto-central regions.
Absolute power in the delta band (2–3.5 Hz) showed the same trend
although the largest power difference was now observed over the
fronto-central region. By contrast occipital alpha (9–11 Hz) and
fronto-lateral beta (15–30 Hz) power was significantly lower in the
mind wandering state compared to the breath focus state.
During the transition associated with the meta-consciousness (MC)
event, the alpha frequency band in Fig. 1 is not only affected in terms of
amplitude but also in terms of peak frequency. The peak frequency
appears to increase by about 1 Hz after the meta-conscious event for a
period of about 2 s. To test if this observation was significant across
subjects, we defined three time windows, W1 from −6 to −4 s before
theMC event;W2 from0 to 2 s after theMC event;W3 from6 to 8 s after
the MC event. For each subject and for each time window, we then
manually assessed the alpha peak frequency by taking the frequency of
maximum power between 8 and 12 Hz on the power spectrum—the
power spectrum was computed by averaging log-power values of Fig. 1
over the windows of interest W1, W2 and W3. Note that the alpha peak
frequency could not be found for one of the 12 subjects so we computed
statistics using 11 subjects only. Bootstrap statistics revealed significant
difference between the centralW2window and the flankingW1 andW3
windows (W1 versus W2, pb0.0005, df=10; W3 versus W2, pb0.002,
df=10) but not between W1 and W3. Supplementary Fig. 1 is a movie
showing the dynamical change in the power spectrum where the alpha
amplitude changes and peak frequency shifts are made clearly visible.
Stimulus evoked activity during mind wandering and breath focus
We first tested if the attentional state affected grand average ERPs
of the auditory stimuli in the passive oddball paradigm. We observed
that the ERP positive component at about 200 ms after stimulus
presentation (P2) is significantly higher over fronto-central sites from
180 to 280 ms during mind wandering than during breath focus for
both standard and oddball stimuli (Fig. 2). We did not observe any
significant interaction betweenmental state and type of stimuli in this
latency range. However, as shown below, we did observe such an
interaction at earlier latencies.
We found a significant effect of the type of stimulus–oddball or
standard–on the amplitude of the early ERP negative component
between 90 and 120 ms after stimulus onset (Fig. 3). After presentation
of an oddball stimulus the ERP is significantlymore negative over frontal
and temporal regions than after presentation of a standard stimulus
both in the breath focus andmindwandering conditions (Fig. 3C andD).
This increased negativity for oddball is usually termed mismatch
negativity (Naatanen et al., 2007). Themismatch negativity (MMN)was
larger during breath focus compared to mind wandering over the right
frontal region (Fig. 3E). Supplementary Fig. 2 shows single subject
average ERP values and standard error for both the 180 to 200 ms and
90 to 120 ms ERP range.
We then investigated event-related activity using time-frequency
decompositions. The event-related spectral perturbation plot reveals
increased theta band power (4–7 Hz) and decreased high alpha (10–
14 Hz) and high beta (20–25 Hz) band power after stimulus presen-
tation (Fig. 4). In general, statistical inference testing between the
mind wandering and the breath focus state returned a lower p-value
for standard stimuli compared to oddball stimuli—it might be amatter
of number of observations since there was, on average, five times
more trials for standard than for oddball stimuli. From 100 to 300 ms
after standard auditory stimuli presentation, theta (4–7 Hz) power
was significantly higher on frontal sites when subjects were mind
wandering compared to when they were focusing on their breath.
Delta (2–3.5 Hz) power 200 to 350 ms after standard auditory
stimulation follows the same trend and we also observed a significant
power increase for oddball stimuli at occipital and frontal sites. High
beta (20–25 Hz) power from 100 to 300 ms after standard stimuli
presentation is significantly higher on parieto-occipital sites during
mind wandering compared to breath focus. Interestingly, despite
large high alpha (10–14 Hz) evoked power to both standard and
oddball stimuli, we did not observe any significant effect of the
attentional state on the ERSP in this frequency band.
We also tested for difference of ERSP between standard and
oddball stimuli during both the mind wandering and the breath focus
states. Only beta band power from 100 ms to 300 ms after stimulus
presentation differed significantly, being lower for oddball stimuli
(not shown). This effect was not significantly different between the
mind wandering and the breath focus states.
Discussion
Our study aimed at characterizing the neural correlates of
spontaneous and task-unrelated mental activity (i.e. mind wander-
ing) and its effect on sensory processing. Compared to a breath-focus
mental state, we have shown that mindwandering is characterized by
a power amplitude increase in the theta frequency band and a power
amplitude decrease in the alpha and beta frequency bands. We also
showed that, during mind wandering, standard auditory stimuli
induce a higher power in the theta and delta frequency band over
parieto-occipital regions and higher power in the high beta frequency
band over frontal regions. The study of mean evoked related
potentials revealed that the amplitude of the P2 positive ERP
component is larger during mind wandering than during breath
focus and that the MMN is of smaller amplitude during mind
wandering than during breath focus. Taken together these results
establish a strong link between the subjects’ internal experience–
mind wandering or breath focus–and distinct neural correlates.
Control task and novelty of the experimental design
The control task being used to study mind wandering was critical.
We chose a breath focus task, which is a relatively neutral non-
Fig. 2. Effect of the attentional state on the grand-average ERP for oddball and standard
stimuli. (A, B) ERP at electrode site Fz for themindwandering and the breath focus state
for standard (A) and oddball (B) stimuli. The shaded area surrounding each curve
represents the standard error of the mean. (C, D) Topographical maps of the average
ERP difference between mind wandering and breath focus for standard (C) and oddball
(D) stimuli from 180 to 280 ms after stimuli presentation (corresponding to the yellow
highlighted region on the ERP plots). Non-significant areas are grayed out in
topographic maps and the black dot indicates the position of electrode Fz.
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cognitive task. Ideally, one would study mind wandering during
several control attention engaging tasks. Here, we want to emphasize
the difficulty and novelty of the experimental design and why it was
impractical for us to use multiple control tasks. Other studies of mind
wandering often use tasks where subjects have to respond continu-
ously to stream of stimuli (e.g. Smallwood et al., 2008). By contrast, in
our task, we asked subjects to press a button based on pure
introspection. We wanted to collect as many behavioral responses
as possible, but despite 1 h of recording for each subject, we only
obtained 13–52 clean data epochs per subject. In addition, despite the
instruction to stay still, subjects tended to exhibit muscle artifacts in
their EEG after pressing the button, forcing us to reject about 25% of
the data. Finally, subjects varied widely in their propensity to report
mind-wandering events, and four subjects had to be excluded because
they provided too few responses. This experiment was the first of its
kind and is a proof of concept that, despite the difficulty encountered,
this type of study is possible.
Brain states fluctuation at rest and spontaneous reports of mind
wandering
The difference in EEG activity between mind wandering and
breath focus is consistent with the Laufs et al. (2006) EEG-fMRI study
showing that spontaneous EEG alternates between two states at rest.
Our study refines Laufs' results by showing that the low frequencies
(theta-delta) and high frequencies (alpha-beta) changes he observed
may be associated to a transition between a state of concentration on
processing external stimuli and involuntarymindwandering. Our EEG
study further confirms that when subjects are engaged in a task, the
brain can spontaneously shift into another alertness mode, which is
most likely mind wandering.
fMRI bold signal during the resting state shows spontaneous
fluctuations between a “task positive” network comprising brain areas
activated during attention-demanding tasks and a “task negative” (or
“default”) network being activated during rest and deactivated during
these tasks (Fox et al., 2005). Preceding reports of mind wandering,
Christoff et al. (2009) found increased BOLD activity both in the
default network (precuneus, ventral anterior cingulate cortex and
temporoparietal junction) and in the frontal executive network. This
result is consistent with an fMRI study showing increased amount of
mind wandering linked to increased amount of activity in the task
Fig. 3.Mismatch negativity during the mind wandering and breath focus states. (A, B) Grand-averaged ERP to standard and oddball stimuli for the breath focus andmind wandering
state. As in Fig. 2, the shaded area surrounding each curve represents the standard error of the mean. (C, D) Topographical difference maps between the mean ERPs to oddball and
standard stimuli (Mismatch negativity MMN) for the breath focus and the mind wandering state. (E) Topographical difference map between MMN maps in breath focus and mind
wandering condition (map C–map D). Non-significant areas are grayed out on the topographic maps and the black dot indicates the position of electrode Fz.
Fig. 4. Effect of attentional state and type of stimulus on event related spectral
perturbation. The central panel indicates the grand-average ERSP at electrode site Oz
averaged over both oddball (Odd) and standard (Std) stimuli for both the mind
wandering (MW) and the breath focus (BF) state. Topographical maps of power
difference between the mind wandering and the breath focus conditions are shown for
oddball and standard stimuli at given time-frequency regions of interest (dotted
rectangles). Shaded areas on the topographical maps represent non-significant regions.
Topographical maps for which there were no significant electrodes are indicated using a
blank map with the sign “ns” (non-significant). The black dot represents the position of
electrode Oz.
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negative network (Mason et al., 2007). Continuous increase of BOLD
activity in the occipital, frontal and temporal parts of the defaults
network is also found during the transition from eyes-closed
wakefulness to sleep (Olbrich et al., 2009). The higher occipito-
parietal theta and fronto-central delta during mind wandering could
thus be related to increased BOLD activity in these areas. Additional
combined EEG-fMRI studies would be needed to establish a clearer
link between EEG and BOLD signature of the mind wandering state
and its relation to the default mode network, in particular regarding
localization of the neuronal sources of the EEG rhythm correlatedwith
the BOLD signal.
We also observed a delta power increase during mind wandering,
an increase that we believe could be linked to decreased alertness.
Spontaneous delta power increase has been linked to decreased
performance during cognitive processing (Harmony et al., 1996).
Spontaneous delta power increase has also been associated with
decreased level of alertness in various experimental setups (Makeig
and Inlow, 1993; De Gennaro et al., 2001; Caldwell et al., 2003).
Moreover, as reviewed by Laufs et al. (2006) and shown in this report,
delta power increase is associated with alpha power decrease, which
has been associated with low stages of vigilance (Loomis et al., 1937;
Roth, 1961). Note that 6 of the 12 subjects reported some level of
drowsiness during the experiment. To be sure that our results did not
pertain to drowsiness, Supplementary Fig. 3 shows the same time-
frequency decomposition as Fig. 1 although it only includes subjects
that did not report drowsiness. The time-frequency patterns of
Supplementary Fig. 3 are almost identical to the ones visible in Fig. 1.
The meta-consciousness event allowing the transition from the
mind wandering to breath focus state is finally marked by a transient
increase of about 1 Hz of the alpha peak frequency and also by a more
long lasting increase in alpha power. Re-directing the attention to the
task requires increase working memory activity that has been shown
to be correlated with alpha power increase (Jensen et al., 2002), a
power increase that may index re-activation of thalamo-cortical
pathways (Schreckenberger et al., 2004). The alpha-peak frequency
increase may also be a marker of the attentional switch betweenmind
wandering and the focused task since Angelakis et al. (2004) suggests
that increase of peak alpha frequency might represent a state of
"cognitive preparedness".
MMN, attention, alertness, and mind wandering
The study of evoked related potential shows an increased
negativity at frontal electrode sites for the ERP of oddball compared
to the ERP of standard stimuli from 90 to 120 ms after stimulus
presentation. This result corresponds to the mismatch negativity
(MMN) usually described as negative brain response to the sensory
detection of a sudden change in the flux of auditory perception
(Naatanen et al., 2007). The MMN typically occurs approximately 100
to 150 ms after stimulus presentation and is centered on fronto-
central electrodes sites (Naatanen et al., 2007). The amplitude of the
MMN is modulated by the direction of the subject's attention (Sabri
et al., 2006), and is larger when the attention of the subject is directed
toward the auditory stimuli (Alain and Woods, 1997). Our results
show the MMN amplitude is lower during mind wandering compared
to breath focus, which suggest a disengagement of the attention from
stimuli processing during mind wandering.
The reduction of the MMN is also characteristic of drowsiness and
the early sleep stages (Sallinen and Lyytinen, 1997; Nittono et al.,
2001), which supports the idea that the mind wandering state is
associated with decreased vigilance. This also suggests that mind
wandering may share common traits with the decreased alertness
characterizing the transition from wake to sleep (Sabri et al., 2003).
Note that we did not observe in our data the late negativity at about
300 ms after stimulus presentation that accompanies advanced states
of drowsiness leading to sleep or sleep itself (Winter et al., 1995;
Campbell and Colrain, 2002). This suggests that our subjects were not
deeply drowsy. Mind wandering could thus correspond to an early
state of drowsiness of decreased alertness and vigilance.
Late stimulus evoked activity and disengagement of attention from
stimuli processing during mind wandering
ERP analysis also reveals that the amplitude of the positive
component at about 200 ms (P2) is larger during mind wandering
than during breath focus. This effect is also present, although to a
lesser extent, in Cahn (2007) who found a P2 component larger for
distracting stimuli when subjects were actively reactivating autobio-
graphical memories–which may be considered similar to mind
wandering–compared to when they were practicing meditation.
Increase of the P2 component to auditory stimulus has also been
associated with the disengagement of subjects' attention toward
stimuli (Naatanen and Picton, 1987) and is also characteristic of the
sleep onset period (Campbell and Colrain, 2002). Again, this result is
consistent with attentional disengagement toward stimuli processing
during mind wandering.
We did not observe a P300 ERP component associated with the
presentation of the rare stimuli in our passive auditory oddball task.
P300 is best observed in active experimental design where the
subjects have to respond to rare targets and is usually hardly visible in
passive oddball paradigms (Cahn and Polich, 2009). However, using
an active task, Smallwood et al. (2008) showed a reduction of the
P300 ERP during mind wandering. Consistent with our MMN and P2
results, Smallwood et al. (2008) results suggest a disengagement of
attention towards external stimuli processing.
The study of ERSP is harder to interpret since it is rarely presented
in literature. Increased evoked theta frequency over frontal regions
may be related to increased autobiographical memory engagement
duringmindwandering (Jensen and Tesche, 2002; Onton et al., 2005).
Note that the ERP differential scalp maps from 180 to 280 ms were
similar to the theta frequencymapswith strong changes over occipital
regions. The ERP is a complex combination of stimulus-locked phase
synchronization and spectral amplitude increase (Makeig et al., 2002;
Delorme,Westerfield et al., 2007).We tested if ERP and ERSP activities
were linked by computing the correlation between the ERSP activity
and the ERP at electrode site Fz for the evoked delta, theta, alpha and
beta frequency band activity shown in Fig. 2. We did not find any
correlation between the early ERP negative component between 90
and 120 ms after stimulus onset and any of the ERSP components.
However, when pooling data for both types of stimulus and both
attentional states, we did find a positive correlation (pb0.001;
df=47; paired t-test) between the evoked delta (2.5 to 3.5 Hz) and
high alpha (10–14 Hz) activity 100 to 300 ms after stimulus onset and
the late ERP positive component at 180 to 280 ms. This indicates that
both the late ERP complex and delta ERSP activity may index similar
processes in our passive auditory oddball task.
Function of mind wandering
The functional role of mind wandering remains debated in
philosophy and experimental psychology. The concept of mind
wandering plays an important role in Buddhist psychology (Trungpa,
2004) since it is a major obstacle to concentrative meditation practice.
Buddhist psychology argues that mind wandering is a non-productive
ego-centered state, a state of “sleep” where our unconscious
constantly rehash the same thoughts and beliefs creating confusion
and strengthening our sense of self. By contrast, some researchers
have suggested that mind wandering may be useful to provide
creative insight (Christoff, Gordon et al., 2009) in a way similar to
sleep-induced insight (Wagner, Gais et al., 2004). Our result of finding
mind wandering to be a state of low alertness supports both views.
It can be considered a state of low concentration or relative “sleep”
3045C. Braboszcz, A. Delorme / NeuroImage 54 (2011) 3040–3047
Author's personal copy
as argued in Buddhist psychology but it could also be seen as a
hypnagogic state that may lead to creative insights (Boynton, 2001).
We believe that by studying the common brain structures and
dynamics involved in mind wandering, meditation, self, and creativ-
ity, brain-imaging techniques could help bring new light to this
debate.
Based on our results and previous studies, we conclude that mind
wandering is a low-alertness state of rest. If mind wandering
corresponds to a state of rest, one hypothesis is that subjects who
are sleep deprived might spend more time mind wandering during
the day. The time that a subject spends mind wandering may be
estimated using probe-caught mind wandering techniques. Small-
wood and Schooler (2006) place a distinction between self-caught
and probe-caught mind wandering episodes. Self-caught mind
wandering is the type of mind wandering studied in this report. By
contrast, to assess the amount of time subjects spendmindwandering
while being unaware of it, they may be probed at regular intervals
about their state of mind wandering. We would thus anticipate that
probe-caught mind wandering frequency would increase with the
amount of sleep deprivation. Finally, if the activity in the default
network is linked to mind wandering as previously claimed (Mason,
Norton et al., 2007; Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos, 2007), we would
expect that the activity in the default network during the day would
also increase with sleep deprivation. Further studies should be able to
verify or disprove these hypotheses.
In conclusion, we have shown the neurophysiologic markers of
mind wandering. Based only on subjective reports about mind
wandering, we have established that two different attentional states
correspond to two distinct brain states underlying different modes of
sensory processing. Our results suggest that mind wandering
correspond to a state of rest, a state of low vigilance where stimulus
evoked responses are reduced. This study is one of the first event-
related neuroimaging study to rely only on behavioral responses
based on pure–not stimulus induced–introspective subjective reports.
It further demonstrates that neuro-phenomenological approaches to
the study of subjective experience are possible in neuroscience (Lutz
and Thompson, 2003) yet argues for the need of a more fine-grained
taxonomy of private mental states.
Supplementarymaterials related to this article can be found online
at doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.10.008.
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Meditation has been extensively practiced in many 
civilizations for thousands of years as a means of 
cultivating
 a 
state of well-being and for religious purposes. It has now 
started to be studied in terms of its influence on the brain and 
body and used in clinical settings. This chapter will first 
review meditation effects at the physiological, attentional, 
and affective levels and the scientific paradigms used to 
study these effects. A clinical application on emotion 
regulation will then be presented.  
Spiritual practices that aim at transcending the 
common state of consciousness can be found in human 
societies all over the world down to shamanic practices in 
the Paleolithic (Walter & Neumann Fridman, 2004; 
Winkelman, 2000). Formal references to meditation can be 
found in ancient texts as early as the third century BCE in 
the Buddhist wittings of the Abhidharma (Cox, 2004). 
Today, “meditation” is used as a generic term to refer to a 
wide range of practices for self-regulation of emotion and 
attention (Gunaratana, 2002) and is considered an inherently 
experiential practice present in most religious or 
philosophical traditions. Meditation generally involves 
focusing one’s attention on a particular physical or mental 
object. When mind wandering occurs, practitioners are 
instructed to bring their attention back to the meditative task. 
Meditation practices often involve altered states of 
consciousness although these typically only arise during 
intensive practices of several hours a day. Meditation 
practitioners often perform daily meditation for a period of 
time ranging from 15 minutes to several hours, with the goal 
of getting insight into the nature of their minds and the 
universe or reaching a state beyond the materialistic world 
and connecting with the infinite (or a divinity, depending on 
the meditation tradition). 
Based on the assumption that different conscious states are 
accompanied by different neurophysiological states, a 
neuroscientific approach to meditation focuses on altered 
sensory, cognitive, and self-awareness experiences. 
Meditation-induced neurophysiological changes may be of 
two kinds. Changes that occur during meditation practice are 
referred as state changes. Changes which build up over 
months or years and persist even when the mind is not 
actively engaged in meditation are referred to as trait 
changes (Cahn & Polich, 2006). . On one hand, the study of 
meditation states is especially relevant for consciousness 
research as a means of exploring the effect of meditation 
itself on the brain. On the other hand, the study of meditation 
traits is more particularly adapted to the study of 
meditation’s beneficial effects on health and general well-
being in association with potential clinical applications. 
There are a large number of distinct meditative 
practices, but given that self-regulation of attention is a 
major component that is common among all of them, it is 
possible to classify meditative style on a continuum, 
depending on how attentional processes are directed (Cahn 
& Polich, 2006). Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, and Davidson (2008) 
proposed a theoretical framework in which meditation 
practices are categorized in two main groups. 
Concentrative—or focused attention—techniques involve 
continuous sustained attention on a selected object: the 
object of focus may be breath or body sensations, a subvocal 
repeated sound or word (mantra), or an imagined mental 
image. Focused attention meditation requires the narrowing 
of awareness so that the mind only contains the object of 
focus. On the other hand, mindfulness meditation practices, 
also called open-monitoring or insight meditation, involve 
the expanding of awareness with no explicit focus (except 
awareness itself). In mindfulness, practitioners are instructed 
to allow any thought, feeling, or sensation to arise in 
consciousness while maintaining a nonreactive awareness to 
what is being experienced. Mindfulness may be described as 
sustained awareness aimed at nonreactive and nonattached 
mental observation, without cognitive or emotional 
interpretation of the unfolding moment-to-moment 
experience (Cahn & Polich, 2006; Gunaratana, 2002; Kabat-
Zinn, 2003; Lutz, Slagter, et al., 2008). 
 
Different Types of Meditation 
 
Meditation traditions exist all over the world. A 
lengthy and exhaustive review would be necessary to attempt 
to describe each and every one of them, so this chapter will 
focus on only a few of them, mostly from Asian traditions, 
since these are the traditions that have been studied the most 
by Western scientists. 
Soto Zen is a tradition based on mindfulness and 
open awareness. One practices it while sitting, usually facing 
a wall with open eyes. Practitioners are instructed to observe 
their thoughts and emotions as they arise in their minds and 
not to cling to them or engage in narrative thinking but 
simply let these thoughts or emotions go and remain purely 
aware of sitting. Every time practitioners realize that the 
mind has started to wander (i.e., they identified with a 
thought), they have to bring their attention back to the 
present moment. This practice is also called Shikantaza, a 
Japanese term that means “nothing but precisely sitting.” 
In Rinzai Zen, the other major form of Zen practice, 
practitioners are instructed to concentrate on koans. Koans 
are riddles that cannot be solved with knowledge or thinking. 
“What is the sound of one hand clapping?” is a popular Zen 
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koan. Zen students are given a koan by a Zen teacher, 
depending on their level of development in the practice and 
their personality. They are then instructed to meditate on it 
until they can solve it. They regularly present their solution 
to their teacher and, if successful, are given a new koan. 
Koans are ways to help meditators get out of the thought-
based state of ordinary consciousness and access pure 
awareness of the present moment. 
Vipassana meditation is another meditation 
technique that is now widespread in the West. In Vipassana, 
practitioners begin by observing their breath around the area 
of the nostrils to help the mind develop sustained, focused 
attention. Every time the mind wanders, they have to bring it 
back to the sensation of breathing. As they do so, attention 
gets sharper and sharper. Then practitioners have to mentally 
scan sequentially and meticulously each part of the body and 
feel the sensation in each of these body parts . They 
continuously keep their attention moving down from head to 
toes and then up in the reverse direction. At first, they find it 
hard to experience sensation in each and every part of the 
body, but with practice, they progressively come to feel 
sensations in more parts of their bodies. Participants are only 
instructed to keep their attention moving and observe, 
objectively and with equanimity, the sensations that they are 
experiencing. Practitioners should try to avoid developing 
feelings of aversion or cravings for specific sensations, as 
this is believed to disturb both body and mind. Vipassana is a 
good example of a meditation practice in which focused 
attention and open monitoring are both incorporated. 
Mantra or prayer meditation might be the most 
popular type of meditation worldwide and is present in 
Tibetan Buddhism, Sufism, Hinduism, and many other 
traditions. It became widespread in the West in the 1960s 
with the development of transcendental meditation (TM). A 
mantra is a religious or mystical sound, word, or poem that 
can be either recited aloud or subvocally. For instance, Hare 
Krishna practitioners are instructed to repeat the 16-word 
Hare Krishna mantra, “Hare Krishna Hare Krishna, Krishna 
Krishna Hare Hare, Hare Rama Hare Rama, Rama Rama 
Hare Hare,” 1,728 times a day, keeping the correct count 
with the help of prayer beads. The particular body vibration 
that a mantra induces is believed to calm and focus the mind 
and body without the need for intense concentrative efforts. 
When meditators repeat the mantra, they are instructed to 
focus their full attention on the recitation, and also 
sometimes on its meaning if it has one. Some practices 
involve mantra repetition with awareness of the breath (and 
others without breath awareness). As with other types of 
meditation, when meditators experience mind-wandering 
episodes, they are simply instructed to bring their attention 
back to the mantra. 
Mantra meditation is in many ways similar to slow 
reading or chanting of sacred texts while one absorbs their 
meaning. These practices are present in all religions and 
spiritual traditions. Texts involved may be sutras in 
Buddhism (discourse from the Buddha). Christian practices, 
for instance, involve recitation of a prayer phrase or the 
study of Scripture, which involves the slow reading of the 
Bible as the reader considers the meaning of each verse, and 
is practiced by monks of various orders. Although these 
practices are usually not specifically referred to as 
meditation, they involve focused attention and going beyond 
dialectic thinking, two traits they share with meditation. 
Other forms of meditation may involve generating 
and focusing on feelings of loving-kindness or compassion 
toward all living beings (one of many Tibetan Buddhism 
practices). Mental visualization and careful examination of 
sacred objects is another common mediation practice in 
Tibetan Buddhism. Different practices can also be done 
while one is moving. In the case of walking meditation, one 
has to walk slowly, keeping breath coordinated with each 
step, and remain aware of every body sensation and 
movement. While working or doing simple tasks, one may 
simply be present and focused on the action being done now, 
that is, giving the present moment one’s undivided attention, 
without thinking about past or future events. Walking and 
work meditation are an important part of Zen practice. Yoga 
is also a form of meditation in movement. It combines 
specific physical postures, breath patterns, and body 
awareness. 
In most meditation traditions, daily practice is 
supplemented by retreats that involve intensive practice. 
These retreats are often held in complete silence. They can 
last from a few days to several months or even years. In the 
Tibetan meditation tradition, for instance, it is not 
uncommon to see dedicated practitioners engage in monastic 
life spending several years of their lives in complete silent 
isolation. 
Finally, practices have been adapted for clinical use 
based on traditional forms of meditation. An example is Jon 
Kabat-Zinn’s mindfulness-based stress reduction program 
(Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). This program involves a daily 
meditation practice and is usually taught in 2-hour weekly 
classes over a period of 8 weeks, including a full day of 
meditation.  
 
History of the Scientific Study of Meditation 
 
Meditation has been the subject of scientific research for 
about the past 40 years but only started to gain popularity in 
the late 1990s (figure 27.1). The neuroscientific study of 
meditation has involved both fundamental and clinical 
research and aims at understanding how mental training 
affects the brain, the body, and overall health. In 
fundamental research, experience-induced changes in brain 
activity and anatomy, that is neuroplasticity, are a major 
focus of study (Bourgeois, 2005; Draganski, Gaser, Busch, 
Schuierer, Bogdahn, & May, 2004). Interestingly recent 
results suggest that meditation, which is a purely mental 
activity, may also induce brain plasticity (Lutz, Greischar, 
Rawlings, Ricard, & Davidson, 2004). As it often triggers 
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altered states of consciousness, meditation also holds an 
important place in the experimental framework of 
consciousness research (Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007; 
Thompson, 2006; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1999). Both 
of these fields have benefited from the development of brain-
imaging techniques (fMRI, PET, EEG, MEG) and progress 
in signal analysis (Friston, 2002; Lachaux, Rodriguez, 
Martinerie, & Varela, 1999; Makeig, Debener, Onton, & 
Delorme, 2004). These technological improvements allow 
for a better characterization of dynamical interactions in the 
brain and thus enable scientists to study problems that have 
long been relegated to the realm of philosophy, such as the 
question of consciousness. These recent developments, 
together with the development of medical practices 
incorporating meditation in therapeutic protocols—and thus 
the need to validate meditation’s impact on the brain and 
body—account for the recent popularity of meditation 
studies in neuroscience research. 
 
 
Figure 1. Search results for the term “meditation” from 
PubMed, 1990–2009 
 
Scientific interest in meditation also reflect a recent 
shift in cognitive science toward viewing the integration of 
consciousness and first-person experience as a valuable 
object of scientific investigation. At the end of the 19th 
century, the importance of subjectivity and introspection 
were emphasized both in philosophy by Husserl (1936/1970) 
and in the scientific study of mental phenomena by William 
James (1890/1983). However, during the following decades, 
science attempted to reduce cognition and all mental 
phenomena to their observable consequences in the world. In 
the first part of the 20th century, behaviorists praised the 
study of the mind in examining behavioral performances and 
electrophysiological responses. Behaviorism led to a 
complete rejection of subjectivity and private experience, 
which were judged to be outside of the field of science. The 
development of cybernetics around 1940–1950 and the 
subsequent birth of cognitive science led scientists to regard 
the brain as an information-processing unit, and the 
architecture of the first computers was used as a model for 
the brain. Even though the work of Gestalt psychologists 
(Koffka & Schoen, 1955) and phenomenological 
philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty (1995) attempted to 
develop more subjective approaches to the mind, the 
reductionist approach to cognition has had a lasting influence 
on cognitive science. In the last two decades, the 
development of embodied and situated approaches to the 
mind has encouraged reconsideration of the body’s role as 
well as first-person experience in cognition. These 
approaches view cognition as arising from the coupled 
interactions of the brain, body, and environment (Damasio, 
1994; Varela et al., 1991). This shift has been accompanied 
by the renewed use of subjective data in experimental 
protocols (Jack & Roepstorff, 2003; Varela & Shear, 1999). 
Coming from the embodied cognition perspective, which 
sees first-person experience as critical to a complete 
understanding of the mind, Varela developed the 
neurophenomenology approach, which combines first-person 
report of subjective experience with experimental study of 
brain activity (Lutz et al., 2007; Thompson, 2006). 
The neurophenomenology approach to meditation 
has been successfully applied in experimental studies of 
visual perception (Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, & Varela, 
2002), in which subjects were extensively trained to report 
their subjective experience during a psychophysical visual 
task. For meditation to be integrated into experimental 
studies, neurophenomenology needs precise and reliable 
subjective descriptions of the mind during the meditative 
state. The neurophenomenology approach to meditation was 
adapted from Buddhist meditative psychology concepts 
(Lutz et al., 2004; Raffone et al., 2007; Varela et al., 1991). 
Buddhist meditative traditions, like many others, are based 
on mental training of capacities for sustained, attentive 
awareness of the moment-to-moment flow of experience, a 
practice that is supposed to allow the practitioner to develop 
deep insight into the nature and functioning of the mind and 
consciousness (Dreyfus & Thompson, 2006; Gunaratana, 
2002). The basis of Buddhist meditative psychology is 
directly based on reports from expert meditators and is 
supposed to be empirically testable. While still in its infancy, 
neurophenomenology will certainly help us understand 
consciousness and bridge the gap between brain neural 
dynamics and subjective human experience (Rudrauf, Lutz, 
Cosmelli, Lachaux, & Le Van Quyen, 2003; Thompson, 
2006; Varela et al., 1991). 
 
Meditation and the Peripheral Nervous System 
 
Since meditation is often considered to be a 
relaxation technique, it is reasonable to assume that 
meditation practice affects the functioning of the body. The 
mechanisms underlying the effect of meditation on the body 
are not yet understood, and as for cognitive and brain 
activity correlates of meditation, we currently lack formal 
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evaluation procedures for the diverse meditation types and 
methodologies being used (Cahn & Polich, 2006). We will 
thus only provide a brief overview of interesting research 
directions. 
Body Representation 
Meditation induces long-lasting changes to one’s 
body perception that can be observed both at low-level 
cortical representations and at higher-level representation 
associated with the sense of self (Cahn & Polich, 2006). 
Meditation-induced changes in cortical areas 
devoted to process inputs from the body are reported by 
Lazar et al. (2005) and could account for increased 
awareness of the sensory field. Lazar et al.’s study shows 
that regular practice of open-monitoring meditation—which 
focuses on both internal and external sensations—increases 
the thickness of the cortex in somatosensory areas of the 
brain. This increase in cortex thickness was positively 
correlated with meditation experience, so we may 
hypothesize that it functionally corresponds to an increase in 
body awareness. Testing this hypothesis, Khalsa, Rudrauf, 
Damasio, Davidson, Lutz, and Tranel (2008) had long-term 
meditators in both active (yoga) and sitting forms of 
meditation and non-meditators perform a heartbeat detection 
task in which participants had to tell whether or not short 
sounds were displayed synchronously to their own heartbeats 
(they had to try to feel their heartbeats without using their 
finger on peripheral arteries). He found that the meditators 
did not perform any better than the non-meditators. This 
suggests that changes in meditators’ body representation are 
not functionally correlated with better perception of 
physiological sensation. However, in this study, meditators 
systematically rated their experience of interoceptive 
perception higher than did control subjects. Collection of 
their subjective experiences also revealed that they found the 
heartbeat-counting task to be easier than non-meditators did. 
Lazar et al.’s results might then directly index improved 
body awareness without improved body representation. 
Meditation practice also induces changes in one’s 
representation of the self. An fMRI study by Farb et al. 
(2007) showed a decreased coupling between the insular 
cortex, which is involved in the perception of pain and 
internal body responses, and the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC), which is involved in higher-level cognition, after an 
8-week open-monitoring meditation program. This suggests 
the presence of a different type of self-awareness in 
meditation practitioners that is less rooted in one’s sense of 
body and more oriented toward an “impersonal beingness” 
(Cahn & Polich, 2006). 
 
Effect of Meditation on the Autonomic and Immune 
System 
Meditation affects bodily functions in two different 
ways: standard daily meditation practice creates a low 
arousal state, and peak meditation experience fosters a high 
arousal state. According to early theoretical models, 
infrequent peak experiences have quite a different high 
arousal tone than the more common meditative states (Cahn 
& Polich, 2006), but it is difficult to study such experiences 
because of their rarity. This section will thus only review 
data concerning the usual trait commonly experienced during 
meditation practice. Based on early studies of transcendental 
meditation, Jevning, Wallace, and Beidebach (1992) qualify 
the common meditation state as a “wakeful hypometabolic 
state.” 
The autonomic nervous system controls the activity 
of organs and viscera in the body. It is composed of the 
sympathetic and parasympathetic neural pathways. Although 
this is a schematic view and the reality is far more complex, 
these two components are usually believed to have opposite 
actions on their targeted organs or tissues. The sympathetic 
system is most often involved in energy mobilization, 
preparing the organism to react (flight-or-fight response, 
response to stress), whereas the parasympathetic component 
is responsible for most resting and restoration functions (rest 
and digestive functions) of the organism (Jänig, 2003). 
One possible way for meditation to act on 
autonomic activity is through respiration control. Respiration 
is one of the body’s few autonomic functions that can be 
controlled and can affect functioning of the autonomic 
nervous system (Badra et al., 2001; Eckberg, Nerhed, & 
Wallin, 1985). Many meditation traditions consider breath, 
body, and mind to be linked and thus have given, whether 
explicitly or not, the breath a central role in meditation 
practice. Voluntary control of the breath may be achieved 
through specific inhalation-exhalation rhythmic patterns, as 
in pranayamic practice and the slow diaphragmatic breathing 
practiced in yoga that involves specific movement of the 
thoracic cage. Breath also tends to involuntarily slow down 
during mantra chanting (Bernardi et al., 2001), breath-
counting meditation, and simple awareness of the breath 
(Lehrer, Sasaki, & Saito, 1999). 
Slower respiration rate during meditation practice 
induces changes in cardiovascular activity that correspond to 
an increase in the activity of the restorative parasympathetic 
system (Saul, 1990). This increased parasympathetic activity 
has also been assessed through the slowing down of basal 
heart rate in meditators (Pal, Velkumary, & Madanmohan, 
2004) and the increased synchronization, or respiratory sinus 
arrhythmia (RSA), between the breathing cycle and the 
heartbeat during meditation (Cysarz & Bussing, 2005; Ditto, 
Eclache, & Goldman, 2006). RSA corresponds to high 
variability in heart rate as heart rate becomes faster during 
inhalation and slower during exhalation. Mechanisms behind 
human RSA are not yet well understood (Grossman & 
Taylor, 2007; Tzeng, Sin, & Galletly, 2009) but might be 
important to meditation research, as RSA could be used as 
an index of successful emotion exposure during meditation 
(see the section on emotion, below). 
Slow breathing has also been associated with 
increased baroreflex sensitivity (Joseph, Casucci, Casiraghi, 
Maffeis, Rossi, & Bernardi, 2005; Reyes del Paso, et al., 
2006). Decreased blood pressure is often reported after 
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meditation practice by both healthy individuals and 
hypertension patients (Carlson, Speca, Faris, & Patel, 2007; 
Manikonda et al., 2008). Improved control of blood pressure 
is usually considered a sign of balance between 
parasympathetic and sympathetic activity. Finally, since one 
role of sleep is to restore the balance in these autonomic 
systems, the fact that meditators typically require less sleep 
than control subjects (Ajaya, 1976) suggests a better balance 
between these two systems. 
Although few studies have been conducted, there is 
increasing evidence that meditative practice also affects the 
immune system. Psychological states such as stress affect the 
functioning of the immune system (Segerstrom & Miller, 
2004). The immune system is indirectly under the influence 
of the central nervous system via hormonal signaling and 
through activity of the autonomic nervous system (Dantzer 
& Kelley, 1989; Jänig, 2003). Davidson et al. (2003) found 
faster peak rise for the antibody response to a flu shot among 
healthy meditators who underwent an 8-week mindfulness-
based stress reduction (MBSR) training course in open-
monitoring meditation than among non-meditators. Increased 
number and increased activity of lymphocyte T and other 
natural killer cells have also been found in HIV patients after 
MBSR training (Robinson, Mathews, & Witek-Janusek, 
2003; Taylor, 1995). Finally, in a recent study, Pace et al. 
(2009) assessed the effect of compassion meditation (in 
which one works at developing altruistic emotions and 
behaviors towards all living beings) on the immune response 
and found a negative correlation between the amount of 
meditation practice and induced stress immune response. 
We should develop a better understanding of 
meditation effects on the autonomic and immune systems as 
we improve our understanding of these systems’ relationship 
and their dynamic links to the central nervous system. Study 
of slow oscillatory activity in both the central and autonomic 
systems would likely shed light on coupling mechanisms 
between the brain, vegetative functions, and the mind (Basar, 
2008). Jerath, Edry, Barnes, and Jerath (2006) built a model 
of synchronization between the cardiopulmonary and the 
central nervous systems to explain how slow, deep 
pranayamic breathing practiced in yogic meditation can 
influence the autonomic nervous system. Davidson et al. 
(2003) also found that left-sided anterior oscillatory activity 
of the brain is positively correlated with activity of the 
immune system after meditation practice, assessing through 
the quantity of natural killer cells. This type of hemispheric 
activity has also been correlated with both the autonomic 
system activity and emotional regulation (Craig, 2005), as 
we will see in the section dealing with emotions. Thus, 
although a growing body of evidence showing a link 
between mind and body states has accumulated over the 
years, more research will be needed to unravel the 
mechanisms underlying the effects of meditation on the 
autonomic and immune systems. 
 
Meditation and Aging 
As we have seen, meditation training seems to 
protect against stress and boosts the immune system. It has 
also recently been shown to reduce neuronal decay due to 
normal aging. Pagnoni and Cekic (2007) found greater 
prefrontal cortex thickness in middle-aged meditators than in 
non-meditators, as well as a decline in cortical thickness 
associated with age, a result that is also reported by Lazar et 
al. (2005). Nagendra, Sulekha, Tubaki, and Kutty (2008) 
also showed that expert Vipassana meditators did not present 
sleep patterns associated with aging. Both the length of the 
slow waves sleep period before the occurrence of the first 
REM sleep episode and the total length of REM episodes 
typically decrease with age. They showed that this decrease 
was drastically smaller in meditators of age 50–60 than in 
control subjects of the same age. This suggests that 
meditation slows down the brain-aging process through a 
mechanism that has yet to be discovered. 
 
Meditation and Attention 
 
The cognitive function that meditation may affect 
the most is attention, since meditation is a form of attention 
training. Meditation is a skill and as such it may train 
attentional systems. As physical training strengthen body 
muscles, mental training involved in meditation reinforces 
brain attentional circuits. Meditation recruits attentional 
brain areas involved in learning. Using fMRI, a technique 
that monitors metabolic activity in the brain as reflected by 
variations in blood flow, Brefczynski-Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, 
Levinson, and Davidson (2007) found that in a group of 
Tibetan Buddhist meditators, focused attention meditation is 
associated with greater activation in multiple attention-
related brain regions (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, superior 
frontal sulcus, and intraparietal sulcus). Interestingly, brain 
activation varied based on the person’s level of expertise. 
Expert meditators had less activity in attention-related brain 
regions, whereas greater activity among less expert 
meditators was associated with skill acquisition. This 
reduced metabolic activity in attention-related regions of 
highly expert practitioners suggests an effortless—though 
efficient—strategy for attentional resources allocation. This 
is supported by traditional Buddhist descriptions of a 
decreased need for voluntary attentional effort to attain 
concentration for expert practitioners. Using 
electroencephalography, Lutz et al. (2004) also found that 
brain activity varies based on expertise. These results 
suggest that meditation is a technique that is learned and 
perfected over years of practice. 
According to Lutz, Slagter, et al. (2008), meditation 
practices involve at least three attention regulation 
subsystems. First, meditation may involve intense object-
based concentration. Selective attention—or orienting—is 
the selection of specific information from the flow of 
sensory input and involves cortical structures known to gate 
information, such as the temporal-parietal junction, the 
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ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the frontal eye field, and the 
intraparietal sulcus (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Second, 
meditation imposes continuous monitoring of the focus of 
attention. Sustained attention—or alertness—is the 
maintenance of a state of high sensitivity to a perceived 
stimulus or mental object over time and most likely involves 
sustained synchronous activity between the thalamus and the 
right frontal and right parietal cortical structures—also 
known as the thalamo-cortical loop (Berger, Kofman, 
Livneh, & Henik, 2007; Coull, 1998; Posner & Rothbart, 
2007). Finally, meditation also involves transient attention 
shifts, as when one disengages attention from a source of 
distraction and redirects it to the intended object of 
concentration (Cahn & Polich, 2006; Lutz, Slagter, et al., 
2008). This involves executive attention—or conflict 
monitoring—which is the monitoring and resolution of 
conflicts among thoughts, feelings, and mental plan. This 
function is managed by the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, structures that have 
also been shown to be activated when one is self-conscious 
(Ridderinkhof, Van Den Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 
2004; Weissman, Roberts, Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006).  
 
Meditation Improves Perceptual Attention Capacity 
Perceptual pre-attentive processes are sometimes 
under voluntary control—as, for instance, when we focus our 
attention on an object or sound—although they may also be 
affected by environmental cues. Selective visual attention 
focused on an object may be involuntarily influenced by the 
surrounding objects; for example, distracting visual stimuli 
of high contrast have been shown to automatically redirect 
this type of attention (Friedman-Hill, Robertson, Desimone, 
& Ungerleider, 2003). Below, we show how meditation 
affects involuntary allocation of low-level attentional 
resources. 
In the auditory domain, pre-attentive processes 
involve the automatic detection of environmental changes 
and can be studied in the laboratory through the brain’s 
electrical response (event-related potential) to a flow of 
frequent auditory stimuli interspaced with infrequent ones. 
The amplitude of the differential electrical activity between 
frequent and infrequent stimuli, called mismatch negativity, 
was found to increase immediately among expert 
practitioners after a focused attention meditation session 
(Srinivasan & Baijal, 2007). Similar findings were found for 
Vipassana meditation (Cahn, 2007). Focused attention 
training and the higher degree of awareness of the body and 
sensations induced by meditation might be responsible for 
increased sensory cortex sensibility. According to one 
interpretation, neuronal populations tuned to different stimuli 
inhibit each other and compete for attentional resources 
(Näätänen, 1992). Neuronal populations tuned to properties 
of the standard stimulation respond less vigorously upon 
repeated stimulation and become desensitized. Thus when a 
deviant activates a distinct new neuronal population, these 
fresh afferents respond more vigorously, eliciting mismatch 
negativity. Meditation would make these perceptual systems 
sharper and more sensitive. 
Experimental work also shows that open-
monitoring meditation increases processing capacity in the 
visual system. This evidence comes from a study using the 
attentional blink paradigm. In this paradigm, two stimuli are 
presented in close succession. As a result of allocation of all 
attention resources to the first stimulus, the second one is 
often not perceived. However, both behavioral and event-
related potential results show that intensive 3-month open-
monitoring retreats decrease the attentional engagement in 
processing the first target, thus allowing subjects to process 
and perceive the second one (Slagter et al., 2007). 
These results indicate that meditation tends to boost 
low-level attention. This could be due to increased 
attentional resources. Meditation could recruit new attention-
dedicated neuronal networks or strengthen existing ones. 
Another hypothesis is that attentional resources are constant. 
However, since meditation tends to quiet the mind, we may 
observe a disengagement of attention from higher cognitive 
and verbal areas. If attentional systems are not dealing with 
thought affects, they might have more resources to deal with 
low-level perceptual systems. 
 
Meditation Decreases Perceptual Habituation 
Neural and perceptual systems tend to habituate to 
repetitive presentation of stimuli, to which early responses 
are larger than later ones. Meditation has been shown to 
decrease perceptual habituation to repetitive stimuli. This 
type of effect has been mostly observed in open-monitoring 
meditation, in which the practitioner develops attention to 
the present moment-to-moment experience without allowing 
his or her attention to wander. In this meditation, each 
stimulus is seen as fresh and new in the present moment. As 
an individual practicing open monitoring works on 
perceiving each experience as it arises in the moment 
without judging, it might cut off automatic brain 
mechanisms responsible for habituation, establishment of 
routines, and action scenarios. A classical habituation 
paradigm involves repetitively presenting the same stimulus 
and observing the decrease in the induced 10-Hz brain alpha 
wave amplitude with the number of stimulus presentations. 
Non-habituation was demonstrated with open-monitoring 
meditators where the electroencephalographic alpha rhythm 
amplitude did not decrease after repeated stimulus 
presentations (Deikman, 1966; Wenger & Bagchi, 1961). 
These findings are also consistent with Cahn’s study (2008) 
showing less automated recruitment of frontal attentional 
circuits when rare and salient auditory stimuli are processed 
during Vipassana open-monitoring meditation practice. 
Open-monitoring meditation also allows for faster 
reallocation of attentional resources. Valentine and Sweet 
(1999) used an auditory sustained attention task in which 
participants had to mentally count the number of beeps in 
several series of tones presented at different rates. In general, 
fast series came unexpectedly. Open-monitoring meditation 
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resulted in better counting performance in the unexpected 
fast series. Interestingly, this effect was not observed with 
focused attention meditation. One explanation is that 
practitioners of concentrative meditation might have focused 
intensively on the slow series and may have difficulty 
shifting their attention to start counting the faster series. On 
the other hand, open-monitoring practitioners, who only 
partially practice engaging their attention, could more easily 
shift their attention to the fast presentation rate. 
These results indicate that meditation allows for 
non-habituation and faster reallocation of attention. Beyond 
low-level attention allocation, we will see now that 
meditation also has unexpected effects on the activity in 
higher perceptual areas. 
 
Meditation Reduces Neural Population Competition in 
Higher Perceptual Areas 
Carter, Presti, Callistemon, Ungerer, Liu, and 
Pettigrew (2005) reported results of a study of 23 Tibetan 
Buddhist monks who have been engaged in either focused 
attention or open-monitoring meditation. These monks were 
asked to perform a “binocular rivalry” task during which 
they were presented with two images, one before each eye. 
Under these circumstances, they were randomly 
experiencing either both images simultaneously or each of 
them alternatively for 2–3 seconds as the images competed 
for attentional resources in the visual system. No effects of 
open-monitoring meditation were observed either during or 
after the practice. However, monks practicing focused 
attention meditation were able to maintain a stable, 
superimposed percept of the two competing images for a 
longer than normal duration. These results suggest that 
selective and sustained attention allows conflicting stimuli to 
be perceived simultaneously by long-term expert 
practitioners both during and following focused attention 
meditation. This also points to the remarkable influence of 
meditation training on the brain, as no other mental training 
has been shown to affect allocation of attentional resources 
responsible for binocular rivalry. 
Open-monitoring meditation also seems to allow 
meditators to more efficiently process stimuli competing for 
attentional resources. The Attention Network Test has been 
used to assess open-monitoring meditation influence on 
attentional subsystems. The test has subjects indicate the 
direction of a target arrow surrounded by flanker stimuli that 
either point in the same or reverse direction, thus inducing 
perceptual conflict (Fan, McCandliss, Raz, & Posner, 2002). 
Results show that after 5 days of open-monitoring meditation 
training, participants improved their performance in 
responding to trials with conflicting conditions (Tang et al., 
2007). Both of these experiments show that meditation helps 
to efficiently process different conflicting stimuli. 
 
Meditation and Higher-Level Attention for Monitoring 
Mind Wandering 
What meditation practice brings to awareness is the 
presence of private thoughts and feelings that constantly pull 
attention away from its focus. This experience is not 
restricted to meditation practice. In our normal daily 
activities—while reading, for instance—we may suddenly 
notice that instead of being focused on the task at hand, we 
are focusing on unrelated thoughts and feelings (Schooler, 
Reichle, & Halpern, 2004). These attentional drifts are 
termed “mind-wandering episodes” (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2006), during which attention transiently focuses on the flow 
of spontaneous thoughts, what James (1890/1983) called 
“the stream of consciousness.” The subject is generally not 
aware of it when mind wandering occurs, and it is only after 
a certain period of time that he or she becomes aware that his 
or her attention has drifted. This realization is called meta-
consciousness, a re-representation of conscious contents 
(Schooler, 2002; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 
2007). The mind-wandering phenomenon highlights two 
important facts: first, that the quality of focused attention is 
fluctuating, and, second, that we lack awareness of these 
fluctuations. 
Practice of either focused attention or open-
monitoring meditation requires one to keep track of which 
object attention is directed at and to bring it back to the 
object of focus each time it wanders away. This type of 
training may help someone become aware of mind-
wandering episodes and help him or her stay focused on the 
moment-to-moment experience (Gunaratana, 2002). Mind 
wandering and meditation are thus two very different—if not 
opposite—states of consciousness. Mind wandering 
represents a shift in attention “away from the here and now” 
toward private thoughts and feelings (Smallwood, O’Connor, 
Sudbery, & Obonsawin, 2008), whereas the very basis of 
meditation is being present in “the here and now” without 
letting one’s attention to be distracted by thoughts and 
feelings (Gunaratana, 2002; Lutz, Slagter, et al., 2008). 
In favor of this hypothesis, Farb et al. (2007) 
revealed distinct fMRI neural activation patterns in control 
subjects with no meditation training compared to subjects 
who followed an 8-week open-monitoring MBSR program. 
Control subjects were primarily experiencing a mental 
narrative state, where one allows one’s attention to be caught 
by a given train of thought, whereas meditation practitioners 
were aiming at experiencing moment-to-moment awareness 
of the self. Mental narrative led to strong activation of the 
mPFC, and awareness of present experiences led to 
decreased activation of the mPFC and increased activity in 
right lateral PFC and right viscero-somatic areas (Farb et al., 
2007). Thus there might be two possible types of experience 
of the self: one—engaged during mind wandering—based on 
thoughts dealing with past or future experiences of the ego, 
and one based on the moment-to-moment experience of the 
self, involving awareness of sensory information from the 
body. This indicates that the experience of self in the present 
moment is dramatically different both experientially and in 
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terms of brain activity from the experience of self as 
projected in the past or the future, as in mind wandering. 
 
Meditation, Mind Wandering, and “Default Network” 
Brain Activity 
The concept of a default mode of brain functioning 
at rest emerged from the consistent deactivation of a brain 
area network during a series of psychophysical tasks 
compared to resting baseline (Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & 
Menon, 2003; Raichle, MacLeod, Snyder, Powers, Gusnard, 
& Shulman, 2001). The brain network involved in baseline 
activity includes the mPFC, the dorsal part of which has 
been associated with self-referential and emotional mental 
activity (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; 
Ingvar, 1985). Recently, higher activity in the same default 
network was found during a task with a high occurrence of 
mind-wandering episodes than during a task with a low 
occurrence of such episodes (Mason, Norton, Van Horn, 
Wegner, Grafton, & Macrae, 2007), which suggests that 
mind wandering could be the main underlying experience of 
the brain default network. For non-expert meditators, 
practicing meditation with attention focused on a particular 
object brings to awareness how frequent and pervasive mind-
wandering events are. Sonuga-Barke and Castellanos (2007) 
proposed a hypothesis to explain the presence of mind-
wandering events. Fluctuation in the quality of sustained 
attention, (i.e., the occurrence of mind-wandering events 
while one is focusing on a task) could be in part due to 
interference with the default mode of brain activity. In this 
model, interoceptive and exteroceptive attentional focus are 
slowly but continuously fluctuating at rest, so as to allow 
individuals to perceive the environment and process it 
cognitively. Engagement in a task (exteroceptive attention) 
first attenuates interoceptive attention, although with time, 
activity in interoceptive attention network components 
gradually returns, leading to episodes of mind wandering. 
Long-term effects of meditation training could be enhanced 
capacity to inhibit introspective spontaneous activity during 
sustained attention engagements through modification of 
large-scale neuronal network connectivity and activity (Lutz 
et al., 2008). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, 
electroencephalography shows spontaneous fluctuations 
between two distinct and supposedly opposite modes during 
resting-state brain activity (Laufs et al., 2006). One of these 
modes is characterized by the presence of slow oscillations 
of 3–7 Hz (theta activity), which are associated with reduced 
level of vigilance. The other mode is characterized by the 
presence of fast oscillations of 12–30 Hz, which are usually 
associated with high vigilance levels. These spontaneous 
patterns of increased and decreased theta activity have 
recently been associated with periods of mind wandering and 
periods of concentration, respectively (Braboszcz & 
Delorme, 2009; Cahn, 2007). The hypothesized association 
between different vigilance levels and mind-wandering and 
meditation is also supported by EEG studies based on event-
related potential analysis. These studies reveal that mind 
wandering is associated with a reduced capacity for 
processing external events, as assessed by a decrease in 
amplitude of the brain’s electrical response in this state 
(Smallwood et al., 2008), whereas meditation is associated 
with increased sensory information processing (Cahn & 
Polich, 2009; Srinivasan & Baijal, 2007). Thus, mind 
wandering tends to disconnect people from their 
environments, whereas meditation tends to sharpen their 
perceptions of it. 
While meditation practice benefits psychological 
well-being, mental states with a high frequency of mind-
wandering episode, such as depression or boredom, are 
experienced negatively. Carriere, Cheyne, and Smilek (2007) 
found that frequent brief lapses of attention, that is, lack of 
conscious awareness of one’s action, is associated with 
proneness to boredom and depression among students. More 
frequent and intense periods of mind wandering during a 
word-encoding task have also been linked to dysphoria 
(Smallwood et al., 2008). On the other hand, an open-
monitoring meditation offered to students during a month of 
MBSR intervention reduced their psychological distress as 
well as their ruminative thoughts (Jain et al., 2007).  
 
Meditation and Emotions 
 
Regardless of the specific meditation technique, 
meditation leads to state and trait experiences involving a 
deep sense of peace and calm. In fact, achieving enduring 
happiness by freeing oneself from affliction is the central 
doctrine of Buddhism (Ekman, Davidson, Ricard, & 
Wallace, 2005). The fact that meditation affects the way 
emotions are experienced and allows for better regulation of 
negative and distressing feelings is in part an outcome of 
meditation-induced changes on body, brain, and cognitive 
functioning.  
Emotions may be seen as a set of interrelated 
changes in the body in response to a real or imagined 
situation or stimulus. Emotions are experienced as feelings 
and may interrupt ongoing behavior or mental processes in 
to the form of an urge to engage in action (e.g., flight for 
fear, outburst of anger), depending on the emotion felt 
(Hamm, Schupp, & Weike, 2003). Emotions elicit responses 
and changes both in the body and in the attentional systems. 
Increased processing of body sensory inputs might also 
affect the way emotions are first perceived through 
somatosensory information. Increased concentration results 
most likely in better control of mind wandering; that is, 
enhanced attention and better resistance to distraction might 
reduce emotional reaction by reducing negative emotions’ 
propensity to interrupt the ongoing stream of thoughts and 
behavior. Changes in attentional capacities are also most 
likely linked to changes in brain activity, especially in the 
anterior areas, in which neural activity has been linked to the 
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functioning of the autonomic and immune systems, which 
are known to be affected by meditation.  
 
 
The Links Between Brain, Body, and Emotion 
In the last 20 years, asymmetries in brain electrical 
activation have been linked with the way people react to 
emotional situations and regulate their emotions (Allen & 
Kline, 2004; Wheeler, Davidson, & Tomarken, 1993). In 
individuals who tend to react positively and let go quickly of 
negative emotions, the baseline electrical activity of the brain 
exhibits greater left-sided anterior activation than recordings 
of individuals who are more prone to nourishing negative 
emotions (for a review, see Davidson, 2004). After 6 
months’ practice of mindfulness and MBSR meditation, 
healthy participants showed enhanced left-sided prefrontal 
electrical activity in the alpha band after induction of both 
positive and negative feelings (Davidson et al., 2003). The 
same study found increased left-sided PFC activity to be 
associated with reduced anxiety and negative affect as well 
as increased experiences of positive affect. These results 
correlate with previous ones demonstrating that people with 
more left-sided baseline activation in the PFC have a more 
positive outlook on life than individuals with right-sided 
PFC activation (Davidson, 2000). 
The relationship between positive affect and 
anterior brain areas activity is strongly supported, as 
reviewed by Craig (2005), by the anatomical connectivity 
between the autonomic system and anterior brain areas. 
Craig demonstrates clearly how the left anterior part of the 
brain interacts more directly with the parasympathetic 
system and the right anterior part interacts more directly with 
the sympathetic system. Activity in either of the hemispheres 
is thus associated with behavior and emotions in accordance 
with the opposite actions of these two components of the 
autonomous nervous system. Thus left-sided activation 
would correspond to more enriching emotions, that is, those 
eliciting positive, group-oriented behaviors, whereas right-
sided activity would imply activity of the sympathetic 
system and thus reactions associated with negative, aversive 
behaviors. 
 
Meditation and the Regulation of Emotions 
During most meditation practice, practitioners are 
encouraged to keep a balanced, nonjudgmental state of mind. 
Practitioners can achieved this by experiencing feelings 
arising in their mind, then stay for a period of time, and later 
pass away. While meditating, practitioners in most 
meditation traditions are instructed to keep a calm, balanced 
mind, noticing affects with no feeling of aversion toward 
unpleasant emotions or feelings of desire for pleasant, 
enjoyable ones. 
Contemporary research on emotion outlines two 
means through which emotion regulation may be achieved: 
attentional control and cognitive control (Ochsner & Gross, 
2005). Attentional control involves manipulating the amount 
of attention that is naturally allocated to process emotional 
stimuli. Exercising cognitive control involves changing 
expectations or judgments about emotional stimuli. Both of 
these strategies are supposedly present in meditation, 
whether attention is focused away from the emotion (such as 
in concentrative practices) or the emotion is simply being 
observed (such as in contemplative mindfulness practices). 
Cognitive control is also achieved indirectly: as meditators 
gain insight into their minds and bodies, their appraisal of 
emotion automatically evolves. In addition, meditation may 
also change emotion’s appraisal by changing the 
practitioner’s beliefs about the world. 
The way meditation modulates pain perception may 
provide a good overview of how meditation affects the 
process through which emotions give rise to specific feeling. 
Pain is defined as an “unpleasant sensory and emotional 
experience associated with actual or potential tissue damage, 
or described in terms of such damage” (International 
Association for the Study of Pain, 1994). Recently, pain has 
been described in terms of a homeostatic emotion, that is, as 
a feeling from the body (like thirst or hunger) that elicits a 
specific behavior to preserve body equilibrium (Craig, 
2003). 
Numbness and pain that arise from long periods of 
sitting without moving is a common side effect of meditation 
practice during retreats. Constantly changing position 
whenever pain arises would disturb meditation, so meditators 
are asked to use different strategies to cope with pain. 
According to Gunaratana (2001), it is best to adopt a 
voluntary and focused attitude of simply watching the pain—
that is, experiencing the pain without identifying with it. 
Practitioners may also try to lessen the importance of the 
pain by comparing it with the pain that one experienced 
previously in one’s own life, or pain that others are 
experiencing. Another strategy would be to divert the 
attention toward another object, such as the breath, and as a 
last resort to slowly stretch the muscles to see if the pain can 
be lessened. It is said that with practice, it takes more time 
for pain to arise and that it becomes less intense. This 
resistance to pain, which is a major component of meditation 
retreats, probably helps meditation practitioners cope with 
their own suffering in a more detached way after the retreat 
is over. 
Treatments of chronic pain based on diverse 
meditation practices, such as MBSR programs (Kabat-Zinn, 
Lipworth, & Burney, 1985; Morone, Greco, & Weiner, 
2008) and loving-kindness meditation (Carson et al., 2005), 
have revealed positive outcomes associated with 
improvement of overall quality of life. Enhanced tolerance 
of acute pain has also been assessed in different studies with 
both focused attention and open-monitoring meditation. 
Longitudinal study of transcendental meditation shows 
decreased brain activation in the thalamus, prefrontal cortex, 
and anterior cingulated cortex in response to acute pain 
(immersion of the hand in hot water) after 5 months of TM 
daily practice in participants who were new to meditation 
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(Orme-Johnson, Schneider, Son, Nidich, & Cho, 2006). This 
study further suggests that TM practice does not change 
actual pain sensations (as pain rating didn’t change pre– or 
post–TM practice and never significantly differed between 
beginners and long-term practitioners) but does reduce 
emotional distress associated with pain, resulting in 
enhanced tolerance of acute pain. Results of this last study 
are of particular significance, as they highlight meditation’s 
effects on the regulation of the distress associated with 
painful feelings. Thus meditation practice changed the way 
individuals reacted to the emotion related to pain. In fact, 
meditation seems to be acting at the feeling level, in the way 
pain sensations are experienced subjectively as emotions. 
One hypothesis is that meditation training that involves 
developing a nonjudgmental attitude leads to change in 
emotion representation, resulting in less body and mental 
disturbance. 
In fact, the different forms of self-consciousness 
experienced during meditation (Farb et al., 2007) and the 
emphasis placed on equanimity and body sensations suggest 
that meditation leads to a different appraisal of somatic 
markers than the common normal state. According to the 
somatic marker hypothesis of Damasio (1994), emotions 
mark our experiences in terms of body representation, and 
these somatic markers are then used to evaluate new 
situations and experiences. Feelings are based on bodily 
response and precede emotions, which are viewed as mental 
reactions to feelings. In this framework, keeping a 
nonjudgmental state of mind during meditation could delay 
or attenuate emotional reactions to feelings. 
 
Meditation and Brain Imaging 
The regulation of emotions, especially of negative 
ones, has been extensively studied using brain-imaging 
techniques. Studies show that meditation actually affects two 
important areas of the brain emotion circuitry: the amygdala 
and the PFC. The amygdala is engaged in producing 
autonomic, endocrine, and somatic responses as well as 
directing attention toward affective stimuli that are 
potentially important, such as potential threats or potential 
sources of food (Davis & Whalen, 2001). The PFC down-
regulates neural activity in the amygdala and the two areas 
share reciprocal connections (Banks, Eddy, Angstadt, 
Nathan, & Phan, 2007; Davidson, 2002). Less body arousal 
and EEG brain activation has been observed in response to 
negative affects for yoga practitioners (Aftanas & 
Golosheykin, 2005). Consistent with this, when one is 
engaged in focused attention meditation, fMRI studies show 
that amygdala activity in response to emotional negative or 
positive sounds is decreased in long-term Tibetan expert 
practitioners compared to novice ones. Interestingly, the 
more hours participants have spent meditating in their 
lifetimes, the more important is the decrease in amygdala 
activity (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007). However, fMRI 
studies show that when engaged in focused compassion 
meditation, expert meditators from the same tradition 
exhibited greater amygdala activation in response to 
emotional stimuli than novice practitioners (Lutz, 
Brefczynski-Lewis, Johnstone, & Davidson, 2008). 
These seemingly opposite results suggest that 
meditation allows for a wider range of emotional 
experiences, and that these experiences can be modulated 
through the practice of specific meditation techniques. 
Greater embodiment or disembodiment of emotions can be 
achieved through voluntarily modulation of dedicated 
attentional circuits that have been intensively trained through 
meditation practice. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
subjective reports indicate that meditation seems at first to 
intensify the experience of positive as well as negative 
feelings. Then through practice, these intense feelings are 
accepted and might contribute to the experience of a richer 
internal life, as reported by meditation practitioners. 
Taken together, brain-imaging results support the 
empirical hypothesis of meditation-induced emotion 
regulation and suggest that it involves brain plasticity. The 
regular practice of meditation affects the connections 
between the emotional limbic system and the neocortex in 
such a way that it would change the individual’s thoughts 
about and interpretation of negative emotions (i.e., his 
appraisal of his emotion). 
 
Clinical Application of Meditation 
for Emotion Regulation 
 
The beneficial effects of meditation on the appraisal 
of negative emotions have been observed in clinical 
practices. As we will see, meditation practice has been 
shown to reduce alexithymia—difficulty recognizing and 
expressing emotions associated with operative thought 
processes (Sifneos, 1973)—through development of 
emotional intelligence and insight into one’s emotional 
functioning (Baer, Smith, et al., 2004). 
Appearance and inclusion of meditation in clinical 
practices is coincidental with the rise of the “third wave” of 
psychotherapies. The third wave accords particular 
importance not only to emotions but also to the context of 
those psychological phenomena and to their functions (S. C. 
Hayes, 2004). The third wave rises in response to cognitive-
behavioral therapy (CBT), a pure dialectic approach that has 
been successful placing emotions in their proper context but 
remains limited because of the large number of complex 
protocols. Today, working with emotion regulation is the 
core process for approaching and curing mental disorders 
(Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 2004; Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 
2007), and we are currently observing a unification of all 
cognitive-behavioral therapy protocols with the inclusion of 
the core concept of mindfulness (Allen, McHugh, & Barlow, 
2007). Emotion regulation, even the regulation of extremely 
intense emotions resulting from trauma (Brillon, 2006), is 
realized through a three-step process: first feeling the body 
sensation (arousal), then identifying and labeling emotions 
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that arise from both arousal and appraisal, and finally 
accepting the emotion in a nonjudgmental way. This last step 
of accepting one’s own thoughts and cognitive traits has 
been developed by S. C. Hayes et al. (1999) in meditation-
based acceptance and commitment therapy. Any clinical 
intervention should rely on theory addressing these three 
stages 
.Here we first present the nature and function of 
emotions as well as a model of how they operate. We 
subsequently articulate our meditation intervention on this 
model. 
 
The Emotion Apprehension Process: How Emotions Can 
Become Pathological  
Simple principles about emotions must first be 
reviewed: emotions generate body (arousal) and thought 
(appraisal) responses (Frijda, 1986). Emotions may be useful 
for attaining a better response to a situation, even when they 
are negative (Hahusseau, 2006). In fact, patients with lesion 
in the ventro-median prefrontal cortex, the amygdala, or the 
insula, which are three important emotional brain areas, have 
difficulties with decision making (Bar-On, Tranel, et al., 
2003). These lesions result in an incapacity to react 
appropriately to life events or in social contexts. This 
emotional intelligence deficit has been shown to be based in 
a neuronal system that is independent from the one 
supporting cognitive intelligence (Bar-On, Tranel, Denburg, 
& Bechara, 2003). Used at their best, emotions are felt, 
labeled, and accepted. If one step is missing in this process, 
emotions lose their power as a signal and become toxic for 
the mind and body. 
The following metaphor will help us fully 
understand the need for each step in the emotion 
apprehension process and the potential danger of ignoring 
one of them: consider a wound in the sole of the foot that 
causes great pain when you walk barefoot on the sand. There 
are different possibilities for how to deal with this situation: 
1 The pain is so intense that you take a high dose of 
analgesic. The medicine is effective and the pain 
disappears. For a few minutes after, you are careful not 
to walk on the wound. Then you forget about it and 
walk on the anaesthetized injured foot, worsening the 
depth and seriousness of the wound. This problem 
occurs because you have dissociated yourself from the 
pain and do not feel the wound anymore. 
2 You feel the pain but haven’t identified its origin. You 
believe it’s a scratch and place a bandage on it without 
removing the piece of dirty broken glass lodged in the 
foot. The wound gets infected and worsens. This 
problem arises because the nature of the wound was not 
adequately identified. 
3 You feel the pain and have identified its origin but feel 
scared. You refuse any examination by a doctor for fear 
that it will be too painful or you refuse to go to the 
hospital, arguing that you do not have time. The wound 
gets infected and you are immobilized for a long period 
of time. This problem arises because you did not accept 
the wound. 
The types of possible reaction we considered for a 
physical wound are also present for negative emotions. If 
one does not feel one’s emotions (i.e., dissociative disorder), 
does not identify them (i.e., alexithymia), or does not accept 
them (i.e., emotion intolerance), analgesic effects can 
provide short-term relief, but mental and physical health are 
affected over the long term.  
 
The Three Majors Emotional Disorders 
Each of the three following emotional regulation 
disorders corresponds to an anomaly or blockage in the 
process of the emotion arising, developing, being 
experienced, and eventually vanishing. They are at the origin 
of most mental disorders and very often are intertwined. 
Taking them into account is thus of primary importance in 
therapeutic approaches. 
 
Dissociative Disorder 
The absorption experience, experienced by 80% of 
people when reading or watching a movie, and different 
forms of dissociative disorder as described in DSM-IV-TR 
(DSM IV, American Psychiatric Association, 2000) have 
common characteristics: the narrowing of both 
consciousness and perceptual fields. In its most spectacular 
form, it can result in multiple personality disorder or 
dissociative fugue. “Dissociation is a process where the 
usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, 
identity or perception of the environment are spontaneously 
disrupted and certain mental events that are ordinarily 
processed together (e.g., thoughts, emotions, sensations, etc.) 
are isolated from one another” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000, p. 167). 
Dissociative patients commonly have particular 
difficulty adapting to new situations and to establish daily 
routines such as choosing a regular schedule for eating or 
sleeping. They are poorly connected to their internal 
sensations and barely feel pain and other body sensations, 
such as their heartbeat or breathing. Dissociative patients 
don’t adapt to day-to-day reality; they don’t pay attention to 
directions when going from one place to another and listen to 
but don’t comprehend conversations. There are people and 
objects in their homes that they know or have seen but don’t 
remember. In general, they have few memories, even of 
important life events, and they doubt the veracity of those 
memories they do have. These persons live exclusively in the 
mind; they do not have feeling of themselves and are unable 
to focus on the present moment. If placed on a continuum, 
dissociative disorder and mindfulness would be at opposite 
ends, mindfulness being the capacity to be aware of the 
moment-to-moment unfolding experience while keeping a 
nonjudgmental attitude (Kabat-Zinn, 2004). 
Dissociative disorder affects about 10% of the 
population (Foote, Smolin, Kaplan, & Legatt, & Lipschitz, 
2006; Ross, 1991). Dissociative disorder is often associated 
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with difficulties controlling impulsivity, chronic pain 
syndrome, and fibromyalgia. It is also preponderant in 
patients suffering from mental disorders such as depression, 
anxiety disorder, addiction, anorexia, and binge eating 
(Valdiserri & Kihlstrom, 1995) as well as personality 
disorders. The most frequently associated comorbidities 
include borderline personality disorder and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Dell, 1998). 
 
Alexithymia 
Difficulty identifying emotion, which is 
characteristic of alexithymia, comes from the inability to 
express emotions to others (Taylor, 1984). Alexithymic 
patients tend to be inexpressive and emotionally “restricted” 
and have difficulties bonding with others (Taylor, 2000). The 
occurrence of separation and divorce is higher in this 
population than in the normal population. Alexithymia as 
evaluated with the 20-items Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994) affects about 15% of the 
general population with a slight over-representation of men. 
This disorder is often associated with personality 
disorders, addiction to substances such as alcohol, toxics, 
and sedatives and eating disorders like binge eating. It is also 
often associated with somatic disorders (arterial 
hypertension, anger, asthma, etc.). 
 
Emotional Avoidance 
Even when they are suited to life circumstances, 
negative emotions (sadness, fear, shame, anger, stress) may 
generate stress if one does not feel one has control over 
them. They may also generate fear (that they will never end) 
or shame (at the idea that one is the only person to whom 
this happens). In these cases it is not one but two emotions 
that distress the mind and body (Greenberg, 2002). In a 
sense, it becomes twice as hard to cope with emotions (see 
figure 27.2). Thus negative emotions like sadness and anger 
that should be restricted in time turn into long-lasting 
negative moods such as depression or sustained resentment. 
Since negative emotions are often experienced as pain in the 
body, secondary emotions (Greenberg & Paivio, 1997) might 
lead to the development of chronic pain. 
 
Negative emotion 
 
False beliefs about emotions 
 
Secondary emotion 
 
Emotional avoidance 
 
Figure 2. Emotional intolerance model 
Patients who experience emotional avoidance can 
have four types of fearful ruminating thoughts: (1) fear that 
the emotion will never end; (2) fear that the emotion will 
lead to loss of control over behavior; (3) fear of other 
people’s judgments; (4) the fear that intense body arousal 
that results from the emotion could be a major disease 
(Williams, Chambless, & Ahrens, 1994). When an emotion 
is perceived as bearable and is accepted, no conscious effort 
is made to suppress it, and mood stabilizes spontaneously. 
Conversely, efforts to suppress emotions exacerbate them 
and are at the core of most mental disorders. 
Since this disorder has only been recently 
identified, there is no real estimation of its frequency of 
occurrence in the general population, although Barlow 
argues that it is responsible for most mental disorders 
(Barlow et al., 2004). 
 
Meditation-Based Emotion Regulation 
The new meditation-based approach to emotional 
dysfunction emphasizes the advantages of the development 
of body perception of emotion, then identification and 
acceptance through meditation (S. C. Hayes, 2004). Thus, 
for example, in moving meditation such as yoga, what seems 
to be efficient in regulating emotion is self-observation, 
concentration, and acceptance; during this process attention 
is placed on sensations, and impermanence acts as a 
background mind-set (Campbell & Moore, 2004). Talk 
therapy (purely intellectual therapy) seems more limited.. 
“The absence of direct connections from the PFR-L to the 
amygdala may be related to why talk therapy for psychiatric 
conditions that involve amygdala-related conditions is 
relatively inefficient (in terms of the amount of time required 
to achieve a therapeutic effect)” (LeDoux, 2002, p.292). 
Meditating is thus a way to deal with dissociative 
disorders through the development of a mindful attitude. It is 
also a way to deal with alexithymia in that it helps patients 
increase emotional intelligence and enhance their emotional 
tolerance through exposure to emotions. Different types of 
thoughts suppression in all mental disorders are causal 
factors in long term increase of emotional arousals and 
appraisals (Levitt, Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). 
Meditation thus can be used to prevent the use of avoidance 
strategies, which involve physiological arousal 
(interoceptive) avoidance and cognitive avoidance (use of 
other thoughts as distraction), procrastination and worrying 
(avoiding emotionally salient tasks) and rumination in 
depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). 
 
Meditation-Based Protocols and Depression 
Medication-based therapy as well as 
psychotherapies (cognitive therapy and interpersonal 
therapy) are successful in curing punctual depressive 
episodes but fail to prevent relapses. After three major 
depressive episodes, the probability of relapse is about 90%. 
In addition, the continued use of antidepressant over several 
years may be problematic because of the presence of side 
effects and addiction issues. Finding alternative treatments 
has become critical, especially since the World Health 
Organization predicts that in 2020 depression will be the 
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ranked second most common illness worldwide. Meditation-
based clinical intervention can help tackle this major health 
care issue. 
About 40 studies have shown that, once treated with 
a meditation-based protocol, patients do not differ from 
subjects without depressive history in regard to the amount 
of negative thoughts they have (Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 
1998). Instead of studying thoughts’ effects on mood, some 
researchers have also studied mood’s effects on thoughts. 
For example, Teasdale (1983, 1988) showed that experience-
induced sadness (induced by sad music or sad reading 
material) had more impact on subjects with a history of 
depression than on control subjects (Segal & Ingram, 1994). 
Negative emotions thus seem to have a more lasting effect in 
subjects who have suffered from depression. Reactivation of 
negative thoughts in these subjects preserves and deepens 
sad moods through a series of vicious cycles. Sad moods can 
thus generate lasting negative thoughts to the point that a 
slight mood impairment for these patients can trigger 
disastrous changes in thought patterns and can be responsible 
for of the persistence of depression and relapses. 
Cognitive reactivity describes the ability of a slight 
change in mood to degenerate into a series of deeply 
negative thoughts. Cognitive reactivity has a cumulative 
impact: each depressive episode increases the probability of 
a new one since, with time, the depression circuitry is more 
readily activated. Early depressive episodes are most often 
preceded by significant negative events but as new episodes 
occur, the role played by these events becomes less clear. 
Each new episode seems to lower the threshold for 
depression onset. With time, this threshold tends to get so 
low that depressive episodes seem to occur spontaneously. 
Even when an episode of depression is over, cognitive 
reactivity remains and puts the patient at risk of suffering 
another episode. Changing a person’s relationship with his or 
her own thoughts and negative emotions—in a way that 
doesn’t directly act on the content of thoughts—is key to 
stopping the vicious cycle of cognitive reactivity. 
Jon Kabat-Zinn relied on mindfulness-based 
practices to put distance between the patient and his 
cognitive, emotional, and sensory experiences (Kabat-Zinn, 
Lipworth, Burney, & Sellers, 1986; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992). 
Kabat-Zinn’s mindfulness-based stress reduction program 
has become widely popular since about 1970 and is now 
often accepted in clinical settings. MBSR is a structured 
group program composed of 8 two-hour weekly sessions. 
Sessions are centered on mindfulness practice (simple Zen-
like mindfulness meditation) and experiential feedback. 
Participants commit to practice at home for 45 minutes daily, 
at least 6 days a week. MBSR has been shown to be efficient 
for stress reduction (Davidson et al., 2003). Mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy (MBCT) is largely based on Kabat-
Zinn’s stress reduction program and has the same format as 
MBSR except that it makes use of cognitive therapy in 
addition to meditation (McQuaid & Carmona, 2004). MBCT 
therapy has proved to be efficient, as it reduced the 
probability of relapse by about half among patients who had 
experienced at least three major depressive episodes 
(Michalak, Heidenreich, Meibert, & Schulte, 2008; Teasdale, 
Segal, Williams, Ridgeway, Soulsby, & Lau, 2000). 
Here is how Kabat-Zinn (1990) describes the 
emotional detachment process: “It is remarkable how 
liberating it feels to be able to see that your thoughts are just 
thoughts and that they are not "you" or "reality"... The 
simple act of recognizing your thoughts as thoughts can free 
you from the distorted reality they often create and allow for 
more clearsightedness and a greater sense of manageability 
in your life . Mindfulness thus provides a method for 
detachment that turns into recognizable changes in mood. 
Kabat-Zinn’s mindfulness does not teach people how to 
avoid unpleasant emotions and life events: it only proposes 
to teach people how to live with them. 
Thus asking patients to perform a particular task 
(i.e., meditation) when negative thoughts cross their mind 
may help them to abstain from totally identifying with these 
thoughts. It automatically puts some distance between the 
patient and his or her negative thought-affect and allows the 
patient to tolerate these thoughts better. It also absorbs the 
patient’s focus of attention and the limited information-
processing resources of the brain, thus allowing the patient to 
avoid the ruminative loops of thought-affect. Eye movement 
desensitization and reprocessing (Shapiro, 1999), a technique 
that involves performing repetitive eye movement while 
recalling traumatic events, most likely works on the same 
principle, although it lacks the emotional intelligence 
component that is characteristic of meditation-based 
interventions. 
 
Meditation-Based Emotion Exposure  
Meditation protocols are powerful clinical 
interventions and should not be taken lightly. For instance, 
some form of concentrative meditative practices could lead 
to emotional avoidance, as they instruct practitioners to 
direct their attention to a specific object while ignoring all 
others, including negative thought-affect. They could thus 
train patients to avoid negative thought affect, leading to 
with potentially significant consequences. 
MBSR and MBCT are suitable to use to prevent 
relapses in depression but require adjustments when applied 
to intense negative emotions in patients with emotional 
trauma. The procedure used in these practices could lead to a 
form of emotional avoidance, as the attention is intentionally 
and plainly redirected toward specific emotional material. 
Below, we provide an adaptation of these practices that relies 
on breath awareness meditation (a basic form of meditation 
inspired from Zen and Vipassana), which is less abstract and 
easier to achieve than mindfulness for beginners. 
The meditation-based emotion exposure (MBEE) 
protocol has been described by Hahusseau as grouping 
together all elements of the emotional psychosomatic 
process. It is mostly inspired by MBSR and MBCT. 
However, MBCT and MBSR involve standard meditation 
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followed by cognitive assessment. In contrast, MBEE, like 
acceptance cognitive therapy and eye movement 
desensitization and reprocessing, places the emotion at the 
center of the meditation practice. 
 
1. Chose a target emotion and assess the discomfort it 
creates here and now on a scale of 1– 10. It can be: 
–A pervasive negative emotion 
–A painful sensation 
–The image of a recurrent memory 
–An intrusive and compulsive thought or belief 
–A worry 
2. Put yourself in respiratory sinusal arrhythmia by 
a. Isolating yourself 
b. Closing your eyes 
c. Placing your attention around the nostrils, the ribs, 
or the abdomen without trying to slow down or 
change your breathing, but simply observing your 
breath and breathing sensations 
d. Trying to feel both your cardiac rhythm and 
respiratory movements in the same areas of the 
body. 
3. Use the following guidelines to expose yourself to 
emotions for at least 30 minutes while keeping the eyes 
closed. The only goal here is to follow your attention and 
to be aware of where it goes, while remaining aware of 
the breath. Whatever thought arises in your mind or 
sensation in your body, simply observe it, without 
judgment, and with the kindest and most compassionate 
attitude possible (Lutz et al., 2004; Neff, 2004), without 
any desire to change it or to ease the pain, simply 
following the breath until the breathing cycle is complete. 
a. Intentionally direct your attention toward the 
target emotion until your attention becomes 
attracted by another thought, emotion, or object. 
b. Observe, without any judgment, where your 
attention is being drawn. 
c. It is possible that you might experience a physical 
sensation. In this case, follow the breath toward 
this sensation, not trying to stop or resist it, but 
simply trying to feel it. If it is painful, simply 
observe how much pain you feel. 
d. If your attention is attracted by some mental 
content—a thought, a memory, a worry, a 
question—observe this content as if it were 
written on a screen and at the same time feel what 
happens in the body. What bodily sensation is 
present? Observe how much this thought and its 
associated feeling proves that you are suffering 
now. Try to label the emotion you are 
experiencing (sadness, anxiety, anger) and stay in 
touch with it. 
e. If you realize your attention is lost in other 
thoughts, begin again, using the initial target 
emotion. 
4. After emotion exposure: 
a. Assess again the discomfort you feel on a scale of 
1–10. 
b. Briefly write down what you observed during the 
exercise. 
c. In the following hours, observe if anything has 
changed since before the exercise. 
 
Clinical Application of the MBEE to Binge Eating 
Disorder 
Following a failure of classic behavioral therapy 
with a patient suffering from an eating disorder, Hahusseau 
tested the meditation-based emotion exposure protocol 
described above. The literature shows that 20%–50% of 
patients with eating disorders have a traumatic history, such 
as sexual abuse during childhood. Traumatic history is 
neither sufficient nor necessary for an individual to develop 
an eating disorder. However, it is known that a combination 
of abuses, such as an unfavorable family environment 
(Vanderlinden & Vandereycken, 1997), significantly 
increases the probability of binge eating (Hastings & Kern, 
1994). 
It is hard for eating disorder patients with traumatic 
histories to regulate their emotions (Van der Kolk, Pelcovitz, 
Roth, Mandel, McFarlane, & Herman, 1998). Self-mutilation 
and addiction to benzodiazepine or alcohol are found in 70% 
of eating disorder patients with a traumatic history, but in 
only 15% of eating disorder patients without a traumatic 
history (Gleaves & Eberenz, 1994). The frequent 
combination of abuse (Barker-Collo, 2001), dissociative 
disorder (Maaranen, Tanskanen, Haatainen, Koivumaa-
Honkanen, Hintikka, & Viinamaki, 2004), and eating 
disorders (L. Brown, Russell, Thornton, & Dunn, 1999) 
eventually led Hahusseau to offer her patients MBEE. 
Here we describe two case studies that illustrate use 
of the protocol and demonstrate its potential efficacy. Some 
studies have already started investigating the benefits of 
meditation for eating disorders, particularly for binge eating 
disorder (Kristeller & Hallett, 1999), and protocols were 
judged to be “most likely efficient treatments” (Baer, 2003, 
p. 129 ). MBEE involves first collecting anamnestic data 
(patient history), then training the patient to perform the 
emotion exposure protocol and guiding him or her through it. 
The protocol has been split in two sequences: past-emotion 
exposure sessions are done at the therapist’s office and 
current-emotion exposure sessions are done twice with the 
therapist, then at home by the patient on his or her own. 
 
Françoise  
Françoise was married with two kids. She was 52 
years old and 5 feet 7 inches and weighed 233.2 lbs for 20 
years. Françoise was a nurse and had a history of postpartum 
depression. She wished to see a therapist for binge eating 
disorder and her uneasiness at work. She had already done 
two 8-year-long psychotherapies. Her weight anamnesis 
revealed that her father called women “fatty” and she gained 
considerable weight after her children’s birth. She snacked 
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excessively and was not physically active. At work she felt 
insecure during planning discussions, and she always agreed 
to do the most demanding tasks. Her colleagues disliked her 
and saw her as too obsequious. She was aware that her fear 
of her colleagues’ criticism was unreasonable and that her 
behavior was not appropriate but she did not seem to be 
capable of changing it. She did not dare say "no".. 
The primary therapeutic hypothesis was the 
following: 
- Her social situation leads to negative 
emotions. 
- Negative emotions lead to assertion disorder 
and submission. 
- Assertion disorder and submission lead to 
dissatisfaction. 
- Dissatisfaction leads to snacking. 
- Snacking leads to more negative emotions. 
The therapeutic plan initially consisted of the 
behavioral exercise of positive self-assertion (Stravinsky, 
Marks, & Yule, 1982). Although she was motivated to 
complete the assignments and was consistent in doing so, the 
first 30 sessions did not provide satisfying results. She failed 
to successfully assert herself and her intense negative 
emotions remained unchanged. She still could not express 
herself at work. No weight change was observed during this 
initial therapeutic approach. 
She then tried MBEE. The chosen past emotion 
related to her father beating her brother in front of the whole 
family. Françoise experienced repetitive traumatic reliving of 
scenes between her father and brother. As the youngest child 
in her family, she had felt neglected growing up. Her 
mother’s submissiveness and father’s inflexibility and 
violent fits also added to her feelings of insecurity. As a 
child, her primary emotion (Damasio, 1994) or behavioral 
tendency (Frijda, 1986) was passive submission. Since then 
she had suffered from dissociative disorder. 
Recalling the violent scenes between her brother 
and father produced anxiety, extreme insecurity and 
helplessness, and feelings of guilt, sadness, and anger. 
During the emotion exposure protocol, her somatic response 
was severe and involved abdominal pain and accelerated 
breathing rate. She rated her reaction as 7 on a 1–10 
subjective intensity scale. The emotion exposure protocol 
allowed her to release these intense emotions and other 
emotions associated with traumatic memories, such as her 
sexual molestation by a doctor, her father’s insults when she 
was 18 years old, and eventually her brother’s suicide. The 
total exposure consisted of 30 session of 1 hour each with 
two sessions devoted to learning the protocol so she could 
practice emotion exposure at home on her day-to-day 
experiences. 
Within a year Françoise lost about 66 lbs; she is 
now involved in sports and is happy to feel her body again. 
At work she is now at times assertive, expresses her feelings, 
and no longer runs away from conflict. She is now more 
accepting of herself. Today, after 3 years, she still weights 
167 lbs. 
 
Anabelle 
Anabelle was a 45-year-old seamstress. She was 5 
feet 3 inches tall and weighed 211 lbs. She wanted to consult 
a psychiatrist for problems in her relationship and for her 
eating disorder (for which she is also considering gastric 
bypass surgery). She and her twin brother were the youngest 
in a family of six children. Her mother had been diagnosed 
with psychosis. Anabelle was divorced with two children 
ages 20 and 24. She had been in treatment for 5 years and 
regularly used benzodiazepines to ease her anxiety. Her 
treatment at the onset of the emotion exposure protocol was 
Seltraline-50 once a day and 10 drops of haloperidol. Her 
eating disorder had begun a year prior to her divorce, when 
she was 32. Her weight had increased ever since, and her 
behavior reflected her shame: she would closes the door of 
her home quickly so the neighbors would not see she was 
overweight. She had one eating crisis per day, she seemed to 
be emotionally unresponsive, and her colleagues at work 
rejected her. She had had a difficult childhood and was often 
kept awake by her psychotic mother’s scream at night. She 
and her siblings regularly experienced violent attacks by her 
father. At 10 years old, she was sexually abused by her 
brother-in-law and, as a result, suffered from dissociative 
disorder. When she recalled this traumatic event, she rated it 
as 6 on a 1–10 pain scale. 
Anabelle attended a total of 20 sessions: 10 sessions 
of 30 minutes for data collection and functional analysis, 
then nine 1-hour sessions dedicated to MBEE targeting the 
traumatic event, and finally a 2-hour session dedicated to 
learning the technique so she could learn it at home on her 
day-to-day emotions. After the second emotion exposure 
session, Anabelle started to lose weight without effort. 
She now weights 172 lbs and has changed her mind 
about having gastric bypass surgery. She regulates her 
emotions by crying. She once again feels her body, can 
experience satiety, and believes she is making progress 
addressing her dissociative disorder. She decided to stop 
taking antidepressants during the emotion exposure 
treatment. Today, after 6 months, she has not regained 
weight. 
 
Toward Objective Marker of Emotion Exposure 
Emotion regulation describes an individual’s 
capacity to adjust from a high arousal level produced by 
sympathetic nervous system activity to a less elevated one, 
which depends on the parasympathetic autonomic nervous 
system (Gross, 1998). Some measures of autonomic system 
activity such as heart-rate variability (HRV) can thus be used 
to assess emotion regulation. As we have seen, one primary 
effect of meditation is to spontaneously activate the 
parasympathetic system. Systematic observation of patients’ 
HRV recordings during the MBEE revealed that each of its 
steps (feeling, labeling, compassionate acceptance) 
Braboszcz, C., Hahusseau, S., Delorme, A. (2010) Meditation and Neuroscience: from basic research to clinical practice. In “Integrative Clinical 
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influenced the 2- to 3-second cycle sinusoid component of 
heart-rate variability. In the meditation-based emotion 
exposure protocol, the unique instruction given to the patient 
is to observe without judgment—and while breathing—his 
or her emotional, cognitive, imaginary, sensorial material. 
Various meditation practices have been reported to 
induce an overall increase in HRV (Bernardi et al., 2001; 
Cysarz & Bussing, 2005; Ditto et al., 2006; Lehrer et al., 
1999; Phongsuphap, Pongsupap, Chandanamattha, & 
Lursinsap, 2007; Takahashi et al., 2005), which is most often 
interpreted as an increase in parasympathetic over 
sympathetic activation. The protocol could help suppress 
cortical influences on the sinusal node that could disturb the 
heart’s autonomic regulation (Craig, 2005); however, tasks 
that involve changes in respiratory rates must be carefully 
analyzed to avoid flaws in HRV interpretation (Grossman & 
Taylor, 2007). Furthermore, in dissociative disorder patients, 
it is possible to observe in the HRV time series a decrease in 
activity of the autonomic nervous system, as shown by a 
study of skin conductance measure (Sierra et al., 2002). 
HRV would then reflect activity from efferences of the 
central autonomic network (Thayer & Lane, 2000) and could 
be used to measure the presence of voluntary control over 
emotions, called avoidance, or its absence, called acceptance. 
Though further study is necessary before a link can 
be made between meditation-induced increase of the HRV 
and emotion regulation, preliminary results suggest that 
HRV could be used as both an emotional exposure marker 
and a meditative state marker. A better understanding of the 
origin of HRV changes during different meditation practices 
may help us understand the mechanisms behind meditation-
based emotion regulation. 
 
Conclusion 
Meditation promotes both physical and mental well-
being and contributes to the development of positive 
emotional traits (K. W. Brown & Ryan, 2003). It is thus 
important to integrate its active principles in therapies for 
patients suffering from physical diseases and mental 
disorders (Bishop et al., 2004). Becoming aware of the 
fluctuating quality of thoughts, sensations, emotions, and 
other internal phenomena helps reduce dissociative disorders 
and the perceptual narrowing that these disorders induce. It 
also helps reduce alexithymia and emotion avoidance, in 
which a large number of psychiatric disorders are rooted. 
As we have seen, meditation-based interventions 
such as mindfulness-based stress reduction and mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy are already being used in depression 
relapse prevention programs. These techniques have also 
been modified and adapted for the treatment of acute 
disorders such as chronic pain, depression, fibromyalgia, and 
psoriasis, as well as anxiety, eating, and psychosomatic 
disorders. In all cases, results have been encouraging and 
support its use in therapeutic practices (Baer, 2003). In the 
years to come, we hope to see the development and 
validation of more meditation protocols adapted to specific 
disorders. 
In the case of eating disorders, the disorder can 
sometimes be simplified and regarded as resulting from a 
traumatic emotional experience. Under genetic 
predisposition and in the context of an adverse social or 
familial environment, eating disorders foster complete 
avoidance of negative emotions. Thus, as current negative 
emotions are instinctively avoided due to early traumatic 
experiences, eating crises appear to be a preferred mode of 
emotional shunning. Emotional dissociative disorder and 
binge eating disorder appear to have identical functions: to 
suppress the natural emotional process (feeling, labeling, 
accepting; Hallings-Pott, Waller, Watson, & Scragg, 2005). 
HRV during MBEE session turns out to be an excellent 
index of emotion regulation capacity, which is the capacity 
to feel, label, and accept emotions. The combination of high 
levels of respiratory sinusal arrhythmia achieved during 
meditation, enhanced emotional regulation, and the use of 
more suitable coping strategies has proved useful for weight 
loss (Fabes & Eisenberg, 1997). 
The diverse effects of meditation on the body and 
cognitive and affective processes are beginning to be 
understood, and these techniques are now used in clinical 
settings for patients suffering from emotional and attentional 
disorders. The wide range of observable effects of attentional 
training during meditation allows us to study the multiple 
connections between the mind, brain, and body. Such 
connections are increasingly being acknowledged, and their 
investigation offers new pioneering approaches both in 
clinical practices and in fundamental cognitive neuroscience 
research. 
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Résumé 
 
Si l’on essaye de concentrer notre attention sur un objet physique ou mental donné, 
on s’aperçoit vite qu’elle ne peut pas rester indéfiniment fixée sur l’objet en question 
mais se ré-oriente rapidement vers d’autres pensées ou sensations, un phénomène 
appelé dérive attentionnelle. Fait intéressant, les anciennes traditions de pratiques 
de méditation ont développé une grande variété de méthodes visant à développer 
la prise de conscience des épisodes de dérive attentionnelle et à entraîner l’esprit à 
rester concentré. Il est important de souligner que la connaissance du contenu de 
l’attention est une information qui est personnelle au sujet et qui ne peut être évaluée 
qu’à l’aide de méthode prennant en compte la perspective à la première personne. 
Au cours de ma thèse, j’ai étudié à la fois la dérive attentionnelle et les états de 
méditation dans un effort pour mieux comprendre ce qui se passe dans le cerveau 
quand quelqu’un médite. Quelle que soit la tradition de méditation, les dérives 
attentionnelles sont omniprésentes pendant la méditation. Ce sujet constitue donc un 
point de départ idéal pour l’étude de la méditation. Ce phénomène de dérive 
attentionnelle n’est pas unique à la méditation mais est présent dès qu’une personne 
se concentre sur une tâche à l’exclusion de toute autre. En utilisant un protocole 
nouveau, nous montrons que les épisodes de dérive attentionnelle sont 
accompagnés par une amplitude accrue des basses fréquences EEG 1-3Hz delta et 
4-7Hz theta ainsi qu’une réductiondu traitement sensoriel pré-attentif, comme le 
montre l’analyse de potentiels évoqués.  Ces résultats indiquent que la dérive 
attentionnelle est associée à un niveau réduit de vigilance, similaire aux premiers 
stades de la somnolence. Ceci est cohérent avec certains textes bouddhistes sur la 
méditation, qui représentent la dérive attentionelle comme un état de sommeil par 
rapport aux périodes où l’esprit est concentré. Puis, nous avons réalisé une étude 
comparative de l’activité EEG au cours de la méditation pour tenter de déterminer 
l’origine des résultats divergents de la littérature. Nous avons enregistré l’activité 
spontanée EEG de 3 groupes de méditants de 3 différentes traditions de méditation 
et d’un groupe de non-méditants en utilisant le même protocole. Nous avons montré 
que tous les groupes de méditants avaient une amplitude de fréquence gamma 60-
110Hz plus élevée par rapport aux contrôles pendant la méditation, indiquant peut-
être des processus attentionnels différents chez les méditants. Aucune différence n’a 
été trouvée entre l’état mental contrôle et l’état méditatif chez les méditants, ce qui 
suggère que les modifications dues à la pratique longue de la méditation sont plus 
robustes que les effets de l’état mental de méditation par rapport à un état contrôle. 
Dans l’ensemble, notre étude souligne la nécessité de mieux définir ce que pourrait 
être le meilleur état de contrôle mental pour la méditation. Au cours de ce travail j’ai 
également exploré les méthodologies pour recueillir des informations subjectives 
pertinentes. Notre travail apporte de nouvelles perspectives pour l’étude la 
conscience humaine, mais la route reste longue avant que nous ne comprenions 
parfaitement les mécanismes sous-jacents de notre vie intérieure. 
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